Justia Texas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This case involves a dispute over an unrecorded parking agreement related to an office building, hotel, and parking garage in downtown San Antonio. The agreement, executed in 2005, reserved parking spaces in the garage for the office building's occupants and was intended to run with the land. However, it was not recorded in the county's real property records. In 2006, HEI San Antonio Hotel, LP purchased the garage and hotel, financing the purchase through a loan from Merrill Lynch, which was aware of the parking agreement. In 2008, Cypress Real Estate Advisors, through its entity CRVI Crowne Plaza, purchased a note from Merrill Lynch but did not inquire about the parking agreement despite having access to relevant documents.The trial court ruled that the parking agreement was an enforceable easement and rejected the lender's and its affiliate's bona fide purchaser defenses. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth District of Texas agreed that the agreement was an easement but concluded that the lender took the loan without notice of the easement, thus sheltering its affiliate from enforcement.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and agreed with both lower courts that the parking agreement is an easement. However, it disagreed with the Court of Appeals regarding the notice issue. The Supreme Court concluded that both the lender and its affiliated owner had sufficient notice to remove any bona fide purchaser protection. Therefore, the easement was enforceable against the affiliated owner.The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "425 SOLEDAD, LTD. v. CRVI RIVERWALK HOSPITALITY, LLC" on Justia Law

A human trafficker victimized Jane Doe, grooming her through Facebook, which lacked sufficient guardrails for minors. The trafficker convinced Doe to meet in person and advertised her for prostitution on Backpage, leading to her sexual assault at the Texas Pearl Hotel in Houston. Doe sued Facebook and Texas Pearl for violations of Civil Practice and Remedies Code Chapter 98, which imposes civil liability on those who benefit from human trafficking.The MDL pretrial court denied Facebook’s motion to remand the case, and the MDL panel upheld this decision. Facebook argued that its case had no common fact questions with the MDL cases, which involved different defendants, plaintiffs, and incidents. The MDL cases named various hotels and Salesforce as defendants, alleging they facilitated human trafficking through their services. Facebook contended that the lack of common parties or events meant there were no shared fact questions.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and agreed with Facebook. The court held that the tag-along case did not share any common fact questions with the MDL cases. The MDL cases involved different defendants, criminal perpetrators, and incidents, and there was no connection through common parties or events. The court concluded that general patterns of criminal activity by different perpetrators do not create the required common fact question for MDL inclusion. Consequently, the court conditionally granted mandamus relief and directed the MDL panel to remand the tag-along case to its original trial court. View "IN RE JANE DOE CASES" on Justia Law

Kenneth Hahn, who owns a non-participating royalty interest (NPRI) in a mineral estate leased by ConocoPhillips, disputed the amount of royalty owed to him. Hahn's NPRI was initially set at a fixed 1/8 share of production. The case centered on whether this share was reduced when Hahn ratified a subsequent lease by the mineral estate owner, which included its own royalty term, or when he signed a stipulation and cross-conveyance agreeing to accept a different royalty.The trial court denied Hahn's motion for partial summary judgment and granted the Gipses' motion, declaring that Hahn's NPRI was a floating fraction of the landowner's royalty. Hahn appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Hahn's NPRI was a fixed 1/8 share and that the stipulation could not alter this interest. The case was remanded for further proceedings. On remand, the trial court again ruled in favor of ConocoPhillips, declaring that Hahn's ratification of the lease subjected his NPRI to the lease's royalty provision. Hahn appealed again.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and agreed with the Court of Appeals that Hahn's ratification of the lease did not reduce his NPRI from a fixed to a floating fraction. However, the Supreme Court disagreed with the Court of Appeals regarding the stipulation and cross-conveyance. The Court held that the stipulation did effectively reduce Hahn's NPRI by conveying part of it to the mineral fee owner. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment in part and rendered judgment that ConocoPhillips correctly calculated Hahn's share of proceeds from the production on the pooled unit. View "CONOCOPHILLIPS COMPANY v. HAHN" on Justia Law

Houston Police Department Officers Richard Corral and C. Goodman were involved in a high-speed chase of a suspect who had solicited an undercover detective and fled in a stolen vehicle. During the pursuit, Corral's patrol car hit a curb and collided with a pickup truck driven by Ruben Rodriguez and Frederick Okon. Corral claimed the accident occurred because his brakes did not stop him in time. Rodriguez and Okon sued the City of Houston, alleging Corral's negligent driving caused their injuries.The trial court denied the City’s motion for summary judgment, which argued that Corral was protected by official immunity because he acted in good faith and that the emergency exception to the Tort Claims Act applied. The Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth District of Texas affirmed, holding that a fact issue existed regarding whether Corral knew his brakes were not functioning properly, which precluded summary judgment.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and concluded that Corral acted in good faith as a matter of law. The Court found that Corral's statement about the brakes not working did not reasonably support an inference that he had prior awareness of any defect. The Court emphasized that the summary-judgment evidence showed Corral's brakes were functional but did not stop him in time. The Court also held that the City conclusively established Corral's good faith in making the turn during the pursuit, and the plaintiffs failed to raise a fact issue to controvert this proof.The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment and rendered judgment dismissing the case, holding that the City’s governmental immunity was not waived under the Tort Claims Act because Corral was protected by official immunity. View "CITY OF HOUSTON v. RODRIGUEZ" on Justia Law

The Austin American-Statesman requested the University of Texas at Austin to disclose the final results of disciplinary hearings involving sex offenses. The University refused to provide the information without seeking a decision from the Office of the Attorney General (OAG). The Statesman sued the University, seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the disclosure of the records.The trial court granted the Statesman’s motion for summary judgment, ordering the University to produce the requested information. The court found that the University was required to seek an OAG decision and that its failure to do so raised the presumption that the information was subject to disclosure. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding that the University did not establish a compelling reason for withholding the information and that Section 552.114(b) of the Texas Public Information Act (PIA) did not give the University discretion to withhold the records. The court of appeals also reversed the trial court’s denial of attorney fees to the Statesman.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and held that Section 552.026 of the PIA grants educational institutions discretion to disclose information in education records if the disclosure is authorized by the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA). The Court concluded that the PIA does not require the release of such information. Additionally, the Court held that the University was not required to seek an OAG decision before withholding the information, as Section 552.114(d) allows educational institutions to redact information without requesting an OAG decision. The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the court of appeals’ judgment and rendered judgment for the University. View "THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN v. GATEHOUSE MEDIA TEXAS HOLDINGS II, INC." on Justia Law

A client sued its lawyer for legal malpractice after losing a case. The client had previously been sued for fraud and lost, resulting in a significant judgment against it. The client then assigned its malpractice claim against its lawyer to the opposing party in the fraud case, hoping to share in any recovery. However, the court had previously held that such assignments are generally not allowed because they can lead to a reversal of positions that is demeaning to the justice system.In the lower courts, the trial court found the lawyer negligent but not grossly negligent, and the jury awarded damages to the client. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision that the client could pursue its own malpractice claim but reversed the directed verdict on gross negligence, remanding the case for a new trial. In the second trial, the jury again found the lawyer negligent and grossly negligent, awarding significant damages. The court of appeals reversed the judgment due to an improper jury instruction and remanded for a third trial.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and held that the client could pursue its own malpractice claim despite the arrangement with the opposing party. The court found that while there was evidence of the lawyer's negligence, the evidence that the lawyer's negligence was the sole cause of the fraud judgment was conclusory. The court also held that there was no evidence of gross negligence. Therefore, the court affirmed the remand for a new trial on negligence but reversed the judgment on gross negligence, rendering a take-nothing judgment on that claim. View "HENRY S. MILLER COMMERCIAL COMPANY v. NEWSOM, TERRY & NEWSOM, LLP" on Justia Law

Hakan and Lauren Oksuzler married in 2010 and divorced in 2019. Hakan worked for Bank of America, receiving an annual bonus based on his performance. After their divorce, Lauren sought to have Hakan’s 2019 bonus, paid in February 2020, classified as community property. Additionally, the couple disputed the ownership of their marital home, which Hakan purchased before marriage but refinanced during the marriage, listing both as grantees. They also contested the characterization of Hakan’s 401(k) account, which included contributions made before and during the marriage.The trial court found that the 2019 bonus was Hakan’s separate property, awarded Hakan 100% ownership of the marital home, and classified the majority of the 401(k) funds as Hakan’s separate property. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth District of Texas affirmed the bonus and 401(k) classifications but reversed the home ownership decision, ruling that Hakan and Lauren each owned an undivided one-half interest in the home.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case. It held that the 2019 bonus, paid after the divorce for work performed during the marriage, is community property, reversing the Court of Appeals on this issue. The court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision that the marital home should be owned equally by Hakan and Lauren as tenants in common, as Hakan did not rebut the presumption of a gift. Regarding the 401(k) account, the court agreed with the Court of Appeals that Hakan failed to provide sufficient evidence to trace the separate property contributions accurately. Thus, the court remanded the 401(k) issue to the trial court for reconsideration.In summary, the Supreme Court of Texas reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment on the bonus, affirmed the judgment on the marital home and 401(k), and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "IN RE J.Y.O." on Justia Law

An employee of Texas Tech University Health Sciences Center–El Paso applied for the position of chief of staff to the university president but was not selected. Instead, a significantly younger candidate was chosen. The employee alleged that she was not selected due to age discrimination, in violation of Chapter 21 of the Texas Labor Code. The university argued that the president hired the more qualified candidate and that there was no evidence of pretext for discrimination.The trial court denied the university’s plea to the jurisdiction, and the Court of Appeals for the Eighth District of Texas affirmed the trial court’s decision regarding the age-discrimination claim. The court of appeals held that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether age was a motivating factor in the university’s decision not to select the employee for the chief-of-staff position. However, the court of appeals reversed the trial court’s decision regarding the retaliation claim, which the employee did not challenge further.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and held that the employee did not present sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact that the university’s stated reasons for not selecting her were a pretext for age discrimination. The court concluded that the university’s reasons for hiring the younger candidate were legitimate and nondiscriminatory, and the employee failed to show that these reasons were false or that age was a motivating factor in the decision. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Texas reversed the court of appeals’ judgment regarding the age-discrimination claim and rendered judgment dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction. View "TEXAS TECH UNIVERSITY HEALTH SCIENCES CENTER-EL PASO v. FLORES" on Justia Law

A fugitive led police on a high-speed chase in Austin, during which Officer Bullock collided with Noel Powell's minivan, causing injuries. Powell, who was not at fault, sued the City of Austin for damages. The City claimed immunity under the Tort Claims Act's emergency exception, which applies if the officer was responding to an emergency and did not act with reckless disregard for safety.The trial court denied the City's plea to the jurisdiction, and the City appealed. The Court of Appeals for the Third District of Texas affirmed, finding a fact issue regarding whether Officer Bullock's actions were reckless, thus requiring further proceedings.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and held that the officer's conduct did not violate any specific law or ordinance applicable to emergency actions. The court also found that Powell did not raise a fact issue regarding the officer's recklessness. Consequently, the Tort Claims Act did not waive the City's immunity. The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment and rendered judgment dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction. View "THE CITY OF AUSTIN v. POWELL" on Justia Law

Patterson-UTI Energy, Inc. and its affiliates (collectively, Patterson) provide oil-and-gas equipment and services and purchase insurance to cover potential costs from incidents during drilling operations. For the 2017-2018 policy year, Patterson obtained an umbrella policy from Liberty Mutual Insurance Europe, Ltd. and an excess policy from Ohio Casualty Insurance Company. After a drilling-rig incident led to multiple lawsuits, Patterson settled the claims and incurred significant legal-defense expenses. Ohio Casualty funded portions of the settlements but refused to cover the defense expenses, leading Patterson to sue Ohio Casualty and its broker, Marsh USA, Inc.The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Patterson, ruling that the Ohio Casualty policy covered defense expenses because it did not clearly exclude them. The parties then moved for an agreed final judgment, which the trial court signed. Ohio Casualty appealed, and the Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth District of Texas affirmed the trial court's decision, reasoning that the excess policy, being a "follow-form" policy, did not unambiguously exclude defense expenses and thus covered them.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment. The Supreme Court held that the excess policy's coverage is determined by its own terms, not the underlying policy. The excess policy defined "loss" as sums paid in settlement or satisfaction of a claim as damages, which does not include defense expenses. Therefore, the excess policy did not cover Patterson's legal-defense expenses. The Supreme Court rendered judgment in favor of Ohio Casualty and remanded the dispute between Patterson and Marsh to the trial court for further proceedings. View "THE OHIO CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY v. PATTERSON-UTI ENERGY, INC." on Justia Law