Justia Texas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Barrie Myers was seriously injured in an automobile crash shortly after midnight on November 30, 2018. Nasar Khan, who had been drinking at Cadot Restaurant in Dallas, rear-ended Myers’s vehicle. Khan’s blood alcohol content (BAC) was 0.139, well above the legal limit. The record, however, leaves many facts about the evening unclear, including how much alcohol Khan consumed and how long he was at the restaurant and Jones’s home before the crash.The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Cadot Restaurant, concluding that Myers produced no evidence to establish that it was apparent to Cadot that Khan was obviously intoxicated to the extent that he presented a clear danger when served. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth District of Texas reversed, holding that a fact issue existed based on Khan’s deposition concessions about his appearance and demeanor at Cadot.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and agreed with the trial court. The court held that the evidence presented by Myers required impermissible inferences upon inferences to establish how Khan may have appeared when served. The court emphasized that the Texas Dram Shop Act requires proof that it was apparent to the provider that the customer was obviously intoxicated to the extent that he presented a clear danger. The court found that the circumstantial evidence, including Khan’s BAC and expert testimony, was insufficient to establish this fact. The court also concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Myers’s motion for continuance. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Texas reversed the Court of Appeals’ judgment and reinstated the trial court’s summary judgment in favor of Cadot. View "Raoger Corp. v. Myers" on Justia Law

Save Our Springs Alliance, Inc. (SOS) challenged a final order by the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) granting the City of Dripping Springs a permit to discharge treated wastewater into Onion Creek. The central issue was the interpretation of TCEQ’s “antidegradation” rules, specifically whether TCEQ should assess water quality degradation by evaluating the water body as a whole or by focusing on numeric changes in individual water-quality parameters. SOS argued for a strict parameter-by-parameter approach, claiming that any significant change in a single parameter, such as dissolved oxygen, should prevent permit approval.The Court of Appeals for the Eighth District of Texas upheld the permit’s issuance, finding that TCEQ’s practice of assessing overall water quality conformed to regulatory requirements. The court also rejected SOS’s argument that TCEQ’s final order was invalid for not including a “statement of the underlying facts” supporting its findings.The Supreme Court of Texas affirmed the Court of Appeals’ judgment. The court held that TCEQ’s whole-body approach to assessing water quality degradation was consistent with the regulatory language, which focuses on overall water quality rather than individual parameters. The court also found that substantial evidence supported TCEQ’s determination that the permitted discharge would not lower Onion Creek’s water quality by more than a de minimis extent. Additionally, the court rejected SOS’s argument that TCEQ’s final order was invalid for lacking specific underlying facts, noting that the order sufficiently informed the parties of the basis for TCEQ’s decision and complied with the relevant statutory requirements. View "Save Our Springs Alliance, Inc. v. Texas Commission on Environmental Quality" on Justia Law

In this case, the State charged an adult with capital murder, alleging he was sixteen at the time of the offense. The juvenile court found it was not practicable to proceed before the adult turned eighteen because the State lacked probable cause to arrest him at that time. The court of appeals reversed and dismissed the case, holding that probable cause existed to arrest him before he turned eighteen, thus the State failed to establish it was impracticable to proceed.The juvenile court granted the State’s motion to transfer the case to adult criminal court, combining elements of two statutory good cause alternatives. The court of appeals vacated the order and dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction, noting the juvenile court’s findings were difficult to decipher and lacked a “due diligence” finding required by one of the statutory alternatives. The court of appeals concluded that the State had sufficient evidence to establish probable cause before the respondent turned eighteen, and the reasons for delay were not beyond the State’s control.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and largely agreed with the dissenting justice from the court of appeals. The Court held that the development of probable cause alone does not determine whether it is “practicable to proceed” with a juvenile prosecution before a person reaches adulthood. Other reasons beyond the control of the State may support such a finding. The Court found that the juvenile court erred in conflating “practicable to proceed” with the existence of probable cause and remanded the case to the juvenile court for a new transfer hearing. The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "IN THE MATTER OF J.J.T." on Justia Law

Kensington Title-Nevada, LLC, a Nevada-based real estate company, acquired property in Denton, Texas, which contained radioactive materials owned by US Radiopharmaceuticals, Inc. (USR). The Texas Department of State Health Services had denied USR’s application for a radioactive material license and ordered decommissioning of the materials. Kensington proposed a decommissioning plan, which the Department approved, and a licensed contractor began the cleanup. However, Kensington faced conflicting demands from the Department and local taxing entities, leading to a halt in decommissioning.The Department issued a notice of violation to Kensington for possessing radioactive material without a license and sought an $8,000 penalty. Kensington amended its pleading in an ongoing tax dispute to seek a declaratory judgment under Section 2001.038(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act, asserting that the licensing rule did not apply to it as it did not own or possess the radioactive material. The trial court denied the Department’s plea to the jurisdiction, but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Kensington failed to allege a proper rule-applicability challenge.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and held that Kensington had standing to seek a declaratory judgment under Section 2001.038(a). The Court found that Kensington’s allegations of interference with its legal rights due to the Department’s notice of violation were sufficient to establish standing. The Court also concluded that Kensington’s challenge to the applicability of the licensing rule was within the scope of the statute’s waiver of immunity. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ judgment and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "KENSINGTON TITLE-NEVADA, LLC v. TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF STATE HEALTH SERVICES" on Justia Law

After Hurricane Harvey in 2017, the City of Houston amended its ordinances to increase elevation requirements for construction in floodplains. A developer, The Commons of Lake Houston, Ltd., sued the City, claiming the amendments caused a regulatory taking of its property under the Texas Constitution. The developer argued that the new requirements rendered a significant portion of its property undevelopable, leading to financial losses.The trial court denied the City’s plea to the jurisdiction, but the Court of Appeals for the First District of Texas reversed and dismissed the case. The appellate court held that the developer could not establish a valid takings claim because the City amended the ordinance as a valid exercise of its police power and to comply with the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) criteria.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and disagreed with the appellate court's reasoning. The Court held that a regulation could cause a compensable taking even if it results from a valid exercise of the government’s police power or is designed to comply with the NFIP. The Court also found that the developer’s claim was ripe for adjudication, as the City had effectively made it clear that the developer could not obtain the necessary permits under the new ordinance. Additionally, the Court determined that the developer had standing to assert its claim, as it possessed a vested interest in the property affected by the ordinance.The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings to determine whether the amended ordinance caused a compensable taking under the Texas Constitution. View "THE COMMONS OF LAKE HOUSTON, LTD. v. CITY OF HOUSTON, TEXAS" on Justia Law

The Texas Department of Family and Protective Services filed a petition in September 2022 for temporary orders requiring the parents to participate in state-provided services for their child's safety. The trial court granted these temporary orders. In August 2023, the Department filed a petition to terminate the parents' rights and obtain conservatorship of the child. The parents responded with motions for sanctions, claiming the Department's actions were frivolous. The Department then moved to nonsuit its claims. The trial court expressed frustration but granted the nonsuit and planned a separate hearing for the sanctions motions.The trial court signed an order on August 21, 2023, dismissing the Department's claims and removing the case from the docket. However, the court later consolidated the cases and held a hearing on the sanctions motions, ultimately granting them and ordering the Department to pay the parents' attorney's fees. The Department appealed the sanctions order. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth District of Texas vacated the sanctions order, deeming it void because the trial court's dismissal order was considered final, thus ending the court's plenary power before the sanctions order was issued.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and disagreed with the appellate court's conclusion. The Supreme Court held that the trial court's dismissal order was not a final judgment as it did not clearly and unequivocally dispose of all claims and parties. Therefore, the trial court retained its plenary power when it issued the sanctions order. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's judgment vacating the sanctions order, dismissed the appeal, and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "In re C.K.M." on Justia Law

Two business partners, Anthony Bertucci and Eugene Watkins, developed low-income housing projects through various entities. Bertucci provided funding, while Watkins managed the projects. Watkins managed the entities' funds through a separate account, which led to concerns about mismanagement and personal use of funds. After Bertucci's health declined, his son Christopher, acting under power of attorney, discovered potential mismanagement and removed Watkins from his roles. This led to a legal dispute involving claims of breach of fiduciary duty and other violations.The probate court granted summary judgment in favor of Watkins on all claims. Bertucci, represented by his son Christopher as executor of his estate, appealed. The Court of Appeals for the Third District of Texas reversed the summary judgment on some claims, finding fact issues regarding fiduciary duties and limitations, but affirmed the judgment on the derivative claims, concluding that Bertucci failed to adequately brief those claims.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and held that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that Bertucci waived his appeal on the derivative claims due to inadequate briefing. The Supreme Court also found that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that fact issues precluded summary judgment on Bertucci's individual breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims. However, the Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that fact issues precluded summary judgment on Watkins's limitations defense and correctly resolved disputes regarding an expert report and the Dead Man's Rule. The Supreme Court reinstated the probate court's summary judgment on the individual breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to address the derivative claims. View "Bertucci v. Watkins" on Justia Law

A private, for-profit corporation, The GEO Group, Inc., which operates correctional facilities under contracts with federal and state government entities, was assessed a deficiency in sales and use taxes by the Texas Comptroller. GEO Group challenged the deficiency, arguing that the purchases made for operating the facilities were tax-exempt as they were made on behalf of government clients. The Comptroller denied the claim, and GEO Group paid the additional taxes and sued for a refund in district court.The trial court conducted a bench trial and ruled against GEO Group, finding that it failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that it was an "agent" or "instrumentality" of the government, thus not qualifying for the tax exemption. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment, holding that GEO Group's relationship with its government clients was too attenuated to warrant a tax exemption and that the trial court did not err in applying a heightened standard of proof.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and concluded that the correct standard of proof for GEO Group to prove its entitlement to a tax exemption is by a preponderance of the evidence, not clear and convincing evidence. However, the court agreed with the lower courts that GEO Group is not an "agent" or "instrumentality" of the federal or state government under the relevant statutes and rules. Therefore, GEO Group is not entitled to a tax refund. The Supreme Court of Texas affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. View "The GEO Group, Inc. v. Hegar" on Justia Law

Rudolph Rivas, a home builder and real estate developer, engaged the accounting firm Pitts & Pitts, operated by Brandon and Linda Pitts, for various accounting services from 2007 to 2017. The services included preparing quarterly financial statement compilations and tax returns. In 2016, errors were discovered in the financial statements prepared by the Accountants, leading to financial difficulties for Rivas, including overpayment of taxes and loss of credit, which allegedly forced his business into bankruptcy. Rivas sued the Accountants in August 2020, claiming negligence, fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of contract.The district court granted summary judgment for the Accountants on all claims. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth District of Texas affirmed the summary judgment on the negligence and breach of contract claims but reversed it on the fraud and breach of fiduciary duty claims, holding that these claims were not barred by the anti-fracturing rule and had sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and held that the anti-fracturing rule barred Rivas's fraud claim because the gravamen of the claim was professional negligence. The Court also held that no fiduciary duty existed as a matter of law under the undisputed facts, thus the breach of fiduciary duty claim failed. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Texas reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and rendered judgment for the defendants on all claims. View "Pitts v. Rivas" on Justia Law

Jane Roe, a student at Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, reported to President Paige Patterson that she had been sexually assaulted by a fellow student, John Doe. Patterson notified the police, and Doe was expelled for violating the campus firearms policy. Later, Patterson was removed from his position by the university's board, partly due to his handling of Roe's complaint. In response, a group of donors published a letter accusing Roe of lying about the assault and claiming the encounters were consensual. Roe sued Patterson and the university for defamation, alleging that Patterson's agent provided the defamatory content for the letter.The federal district court granted summary judgment in favor of Patterson, concluding that Colter, Patterson's chief of staff, had not acted as Patterson's agent in drafting the letter. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit found that there was a fact issue regarding Colter's agency and certified two questions to the Supreme Court of Texas.The Supreme Court of Texas held that a person who supplies defamatory material to another for publication can be liable if they intend or know that the material will be published. Additionally, a defamation plaintiff can survive summary judgment without identifying specific statements made by the defendant if the evidence is legally sufficient to support a finding that the defendant was the source of the defamatory content. The court emphasized that the plaintiff must show that the defendant was the source of the defamatory statements through direct or circumstantial evidence, but need not provide verbatim evidence of the underlying communication. The case was remanded to the Fifth Circuit for further proceedings consistent with these holdings. View "ROE v. PATTERSON" on Justia Law