Justia Texas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After the end of a nine-year marriage, two parents agreed to share joint managing conservatorship of their two children but disputed the allocation of certain parental rights, including the right to designate the children’s primary residence and the division of time with the children. Following a jury trial, the jury determined that the father should have the exclusive right to designate the children’s primary residence within Travis County. The trial court, however, awarded the mother a greater amount of possession time with the children (about 57%) while also granting her the majority of exclusive parental rights, monthly child support, and certain attorney’s fees.The father appealed, challenging the trial court’s possession order on the grounds that it conflicted with the jury’s verdict. The Court of Appeals for the Third District of Texas affirmed the trial court’s judgment, reasoning that the decree implemented the jury’s verdict and that the Family Code did not require the parent with the right to designate the primary residence to have more possession time. The appellate court adopted the view that the designation of primary residence was largely for legal purposes such as school enrollment and relocation, and not necessarily linked to the amount of possession time.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case to resolve a split among the courts of appeals regarding the meaning of “primary residence.” The Supreme Court held that the trial court’s order awarding the mother more possession time than the father contravened the jury’s verdict. The Court clarified that under the ordinary and statutory meaning, “primary residence” must be the home where the child lives most of the time. The Court reversed and remanded the possession order, as well as related determinations regarding parental rights, duties, child support, and appellate attorney’s fees for redetermination. All other aspects of the decree were affirmed. View "GOPALAN v. MARSH" on Justia Law

The dispute arose after the City approved a light rail project and formed a corporation, Austin Transit Partnership (ATP), to implement it. Voters approved a tax increase to fund the endeavor, and ATP—not the City—planned to issue municipal bonds. Taxpayers challenged ATP’s authority to issue these bonds, leading the City and ATP to seek a declaratory judgment confirming their power to assess taxes and issue bonds. The Attorney General, participating as permitted by statute, filed a plea to the jurisdiction, contending neither the City nor ATP qualified as an “issuer” under the statute governing expedited declaratory judgment actions.In the District Court, the City and ATP sought a quick resolution so the project could proceed, while the taxpayers and Attorney General desired delay. ATP’s counsel advised the court not to rule on the Attorney General’s plea to the jurisdiction, thus avoiding an interlocutory appeal and the associated automatic stay. The court accepted this suggestion, explicitly refusing to rule on the plea and moving forward toward trial. The Attorney General then filed a notice of interlocutory appeal, arguing the court’s actions amounted to an implicit denial. The trial court reiterated it had not ruled, and the Court of Appeals for the Fifteenth District dismissed the appeal, finding no order granting or denying the plea and therefore no appellate jurisdiction.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case, holding that a trial court must rule on jurisdictional challenges before proceeding to the merits and cannot strategically avoid issuing a ruling to frustrate the government’s appellate rights. Because the absence of a ruling deprived the State of its statutory right to interlocutory appeal, and no adequate remedy by appeal existed, the Court treated the Attorney General’s petition as a request for mandamus and conditionally granted relief, directing the trial court to rule on the plea to the jurisdiction. The judgment of the Court of Appeals was left undisturbed. View "PAXTON v. THE CITY OF AUSTIN" on Justia Law

A woman was killed when a construction crane collapsed during a storm, striking her apartment building. Her parents, acting individually and on behalf of her estate, brought a negligence and gross negligence lawsuit against several defendants, primarily three related construction and development entities. Following a jury trial, the jury found these entities had engaged in a joint enterprise that caused the woman’s death and awarded over $360 million in compensatory damages, along with $500 million in exemplary damages (which the trial court later reduced under statutory caps). The court entered judgment holding the entities jointly and severally liable for the compensatory damages, with two entities also severally liable for exemplary damages.The defendants, collectively known as the Greystar Entities, filed a single $25 million joint supersedeas bond to suspend execution of the judgment during their appeal. The plaintiffs challenged the sufficiency of this joint bond in the 191st Judicial District Court, Dallas County, arguing that Texas law capped the required bond at $25 million per debtor, not per judgment. The trial court agreed, ruling that each entity needed to post its own $25 million bond and that the joint bond could suspend execution for only one entity unless the defendants designated which one. The Greystar Entities appealed to the Fifth Court of Appeals at Dallas, which affirmed the trial court’s order.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case on a petition for writ of mandamus. The Court held that, under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 52.006(b), the $25 million cap on supersedeas bonds applies per judgment debtor, not collectively to all debtors in a single judgment. The Court also held that the trial court abused its discretion by immediately invalidating the joint bond without allowing a reasonable time for compliance. The Supreme Court conditionally granted partial mandamus relief, directing the trial court to provide additional time for each entity to post an individual bond. View "IN RE GREYSTAR DEVELOPMENT & CONSTRUCTION, L.P." on Justia Law

A purchaser acquired a large ranch in Texas that was crossed by a decades-old electric distribution line operated by an electric cooperative. The cooperative had constructed the original line in 1947, relying on an unrecorded document from a prior owner’s estate purporting to grant an easement, though this document was never filed in county records. The line was visible and marked in a survey at the time of the purchaser’s acquisition. In 2012, the cooperative undertook a significant upgrade of the line to serve a new customer and substation, tripling the number of poles and nearly doubling the number of wires, without recorded evidence of a valid easement for the expanded use. The purchaser objected, asserting trespass after learning of the upgrade.The trial in the 63rd District Court of Kinney County resulted in a jury finding that the cooperative had not established a written or prescriptive easement, but did hold an easement by estoppel, based on reliance upon the prior owner’s unrecorded document. The jury further found that the upgrade did not exceed the scope of this easement, and the trial court rendered judgment for the cooperative. The Fourth Court of Appeals in San Antonio affirmed, holding that evidence supported both the existence and scope of the easement by estoppel.Upon review, the Supreme Court of Texas concluded that legally sufficient evidence supported the jury’s finding that an easement by estoppel existed because the cooperative had detrimentally relied on the prior owner’s representation and the purchaser had actual notice of the line. However, the Court held as a matter of law that the scope of the easement by estoppel was limited to the cooperative’s original use, and that the substantial upgrade—serving new customers and requiring significantly more infrastructure—exceeded that scope. The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the judgment of the court of appeals, rendered judgment for the purchaser on the trespass claim, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "BOERSCHIG v. RIO GRANDE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC." on Justia Law

Two neighboring landowners in Victoria County, Texas, became embroiled in a dispute after one party, the Kuceras, constructed a dam and berms while developing their property, allegedly altering a creek’s natural flow and causing flooding on the Kolles’ adjacent land. The Kolles, who jointly own and use their property for cattle grazing, sued the Kuceras for violating the Texas Water Code and on several common-law grounds, including nuisance and trespass. The Kuceras attempted to designate Victoria County as a responsible third party, arguing the county’s actions might have contributed to the flooding, but the trial court struck this designation due to lack of evidence that the county violated any legal standard. At trial, a jury found the Kuceras liable under multiple theories, apportioned responsibility among them, and awarded the Kolles both economic and exemplary damages.On appeal, the Thirteenth Court of Appeals concluded that the Kolles could not recover damages for loss of use because the injury to their property was permanent, reducing the total economic damages from $425,000 to $175,000. However, the court affirmed the remainder of the trial court’s judgment, including the exemplary damages.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed whether the exemplary damages awarded exceeded statutory limits under Civil Practice and Remedies Code Chapter 41. The Court held that the statutory cap on exemplary damages must be calculated based on the percentage of economic damages attributable to each defendant, not the total damages awarded. Further, when economic damages are awarded jointly to plaintiffs as a single sum, the cap applies to each defendant based on that single amount. The Court reversed the court of appeals in part and remanded the case to the trial court to reallocate the exemplary damages and consider whether, in light of reduced actual damages, the exemplary awards are unconstitutionally excessive. View "K & K INEZ PROPERTIES, LLC v. KOLLE" on Justia Law

A group of members of the Texas House of Representatives left the state in August 2025 to prevent the House from reaching the two-thirds quorum required to conduct business. Their absence was intended to block the passage of redistricting legislation. After approximately two weeks, the absent members voluntarily returned, restoring the quorum and allowing the legislation to proceed. The Governor subsequently signed the redistricting bill into law, and the state began conducting elections under the new district lines.In response to the walkout, the Governor and the Attorney General filed petitions for writs of quo warranto with the Supreme Court of Texas, seeking to remove certain absent legislators from office. They argued that by intentionally leaving the state to prevent the House from functioning, those members had abandoned or forfeited their offices. The accused legislators, in turn, contended that quorum-breaking is a legitimate legislative tactic and does not constitute abandonment or forfeiture of office. While the House itself employed limited disciplinary measures during the walkout, including withholding financial resources from absent members, it did not expel any member or seek judicial intervention.The Supreme Court of Texas denied the petitions for writs of quo warranto. The Court held that the Texas Constitution assigns the power to compel the attendance of absent legislators and discipline members to each legislative house, not to the courts. The Court emphasized that political mechanisms provided by the Constitution were sufficient to address the situation and that judicial intervention was unwarranted. The Court declined to exercise discretionary jurisdiction over the petitions and did not resolve whether a judicial remedy might ever be available in similar circumstances. The petitions were denied. View "IN RE STATE OF TEXAS" on Justia Law

The case involves disputes among the descendants of Roy and Grace Whittenburg, who were beneficiaries of separate trusts holding interests in a large ranch spanning New Mexico and Colorado. After years of litigation over the ranch’s ownership, the parties signed two settlement agreements: a Partial Settlement Agreement (PSA) and a later Compromise Settlement Agreement (CSA). These agreements were intended to resolve their disputes, with provisions for partitioning the ranch and a clause designating Texas as the forum for enforcement. When the parties could not agree on partitioning, a group led by Angela Kate initiated partition proceedings in New Mexico, as allowed by the agreements. Another group, led by John Burk, opposed the partition, resulting in protracted litigation and additional attorney’s fees.The 251st District Court of Randall County, Texas, after a bench trial, found John Burk had breached the settlement agreements by opposing the partition in the New Mexico litigation, causing Angela Kate to incur $216,112 in extra attorney’s fees. Despite these findings, the trial court entered a take-nothing judgment, holding that the attorney’s fees from the New Mexico litigation were not recoverable as damages. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh District of Texas affirmed, reasoning that the American Rule barred recovery of such fees as damages for breach of contract.The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the Court of Appeals. It held that the American Rule does not bar recovery of attorney’s fees incurred in prior litigation as damages for breach of a settlement agreement, provided the breach was not itself the basis for that prior litigation. Because the fees at issue resulted from litigation initiated before John Burk’s breach, Angela Kate was entitled to recover those excess fees as actual damages. The Court also held she could seek reasonable attorney’s fees for the Texas suit, remanding for reconsideration of the appropriate amount. View "WANG v. WHITTENBURG" on Justia Law

An Oklahoma company, formed to acquire mineral rights in Appalachia, alleged that two Texas parties failed to convey certain West Virginia mineral interests as contractually agreed. The Oklahoma company, which included non-Texas owners and participants, had funded the purchase of these rights, but a number of mineral deeds were recorded in the name of the Texas seller rather than the buyer. As a result, royalties from those mineral rights were paid to the seller. The Oklahoma plaintiff sought to compel the Texas defendants to reform the deeds, perform their contractual obligations, declare the plaintiff’s entitlement to the royalties, and enjoin the defendants from transferring the disputed interests.The 141st District Court in Tarrant County, Texas, denied the defendants’ plea to the jurisdiction and ultimately granted summary judgment for the plaintiff, awarding specific performance, deed reformation, declaratory relief, an injunction, and monetary relief. The court found it had jurisdiction over the parties and the contract, even though the mineral rights were located in West Virginia. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second District of Texas reversed, holding that Texas courts lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the suit’s gravamen was the adjudication of title to foreign (West Virginia) real property.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the matter and disagreed with the appellate court’s application of the so-called “gist” rule. The Supreme Court held that Texas courts with personal jurisdiction over the parties may issue in personam judgments concerning contractual obligations to convey out-of-state real property, as long as the judgment binds only the parties and does not purport to establish or alter title to the property by the court’s own force. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court’s judgment and remanded for consideration of remaining issues. View "BRAXTON MINERALS III, LLC v. BAUER" on Justia Law

A young man died after his motorcycle collided with a tractor-trailer owned and operated by a nationwide commercial motor carrier. The victim’s parents and his estate brought a wrongful-death and survival action against the trucking company, its driver, and a customer whose goods were being transported at the time of the accident. The plaintiffs alleged that the customer was negligent for hiring the trucking company, claiming it should have known the carrier employed reckless drivers due to a history of safety violations. However, the pleadings did not allege that the customer owned, operated, or controlled the truck, employed the driver, influenced how the shipment was conducted, or that the shipment itself involved any unusual risk or hazard.The trucking company and driver were sued for negligence and gross negligence. The plaintiffs later amended their petition to name the customer (a national retailer) as a defendant on the same theories. The customer moved to dismiss the claims under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91a, arguing it owed no duty of care to the public as a mere shipper of goods transported by an independent, federally regulated carrier. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, and the Fourteenth Court of Appeals summarily denied mandamus relief.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case on petition for writ of mandamus. It held that Texas law does not impose a duty of care on a passive shipper in these circumstances. The court concluded that because the customer neither created nor controlled the risk, and the allegations did not show any exception to the general rule against liability for acts of independent contractors, the claims against the customer had no basis in law. The Supreme Court of Texas conditionally granted mandamus relief, directing the trial court to vacate its denial and dismiss the claims against the customer. View "IN RE HOME DEPOT U.S.A., INC." on Justia Law

After the Texas Legislature enacted Senate Bill 8, which created a private civil enforcement mechanism for certain abortion restrictions, the Lilith Fund for Reproductive Equity’s deputy director made a sworn statement indicating the Fund had paid for abortions potentially in violation of that law. In response, Sadie Weldon filed a Rule 202 petition in Jack County seeking to depose the deputy director and obtain documents related to possible violations of the statute. While Weldon's petition was pending, the Lilith Fund initiated a lawsuit against Weldon, seeking a declaratory judgment that the statute was unconstitutional, as well as injunctive relief to prevent Weldon from pursuing related legal actions.The trial court denied Weldon’s Rule 202 petition, and Weldon subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the Lilith Fund’s suit under the Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA), which aims to quickly dispose of lawsuits that chill the exercise of free speech, association, or petition. The trial court did not rule on Weldon’s TCPA motion, resulting in its denial by operation of law. Weldon appealed, but the Court of Appeals for the Second District of Texas affirmed the denial, holding that the TCPA did not apply because the Fund’s suit was not “based on or in response to” Weldon’s Rule 202 petition.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and held that the TCPA does apply. The Court found that the Fund’s legal action was indeed “based on or in response to” Weldon’s exercise of her right to petition, as her Rule 202 petition was a protected activity under the statute and the Fund’s lawsuit sought relief directly connected to that petition. As a result, the Supreme Court of Texas reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings under the remaining steps of the TCPA analysis. View "WELDON v. THE LILITH FUND FOR REPRODUCTIVE EQUITY" on Justia Law