The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the trial court's conclusion that contract language releasing claims against a named entity's predecessors barred the releasor's recovery against an unaffiliated and unrelated predecessor in title, holding that the court of appeals correctly rendered judgment that, as used in the release agreement, the term "predecessors" refers only to corporate predecessors.On appeal, Appellants argued that the neither the contract language nor the circumstances surrounding the execution of the release supported limiting the term "predecessors" to "corporate" predecessors and that "predecessors" naturally refers to predecessors in title. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the release was not ambiguous as to the meaning of "predecessors"; and (2) Appellees were entitled to summary judgment on the affirmative defenses of release, waiver, and third-party beneficiary. View "Finley Resources, Inc. v. Headington Royalty, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals on a survival claim brought by the estate of Clark Davis against United Rentals North America, Inc., rendered a take nothing judgment on this claim, and remanded the case to the district court for a new trial on the remaining claims, holding that racial considerations impermissibly tainted the selection of the jury in the underlying trial.During jury selection, Plaintiffs' counsel stated that "the African-American female was the most favorable juror in this case," and this announced preference was consistent with Plaintiffs' peremptory strikes. The jury returned a verdict for Plaintiffs, and the district court awarded $5 million to Davis's estate. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a new trial was required because counsel stated a racial preference in jury selection, the peremptory strikes were consistent with that preference, and the district court did not remedy the issue. View "United Rentals North America, Inc. v. Evans" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court conditionally granted relief in this mandamus proceeding concerning a motion to compel a medical examination under Tex. R. Civ. P. 204.1, holding that the trial court clearly abused its discretion in denying the motion.Marcos Acosta brought this action alleging that he was injured in an automobile accident caused by the negligence of Roberto Hernandez, who was working for The Sherwin-Williams Company at the time, and seeking damages for, among other things, medical expenses and physical pain. The defendants moved to compel a medical examination of Acosta by their designated expert, but the trial court denied the motion to compel the exam. The court of appeals denied mandamus relief. The Supreme Court conditionally granted relief and directed the trial court to issue an order compelling Acosta to submit to the proposed examination, holding that the defendants showed good cause to compel a medical examination of Acosta. View "In re Sherwin-Williams Co." on Justia Law

In this "highly unusual" personal jurisdiction dispute the Supreme Court held that Texas courts have specific jurisdiction over German automobile manufacturers based on their intentional post-sale tampering with affected vehicles that were owned, operated, and serviced in Texas.The State and several local governments brought civil actions to enforce state environmental laws against Defendants - German automobile manufacturers that intentionally evaded federal emissions standards by embedding illegal emissions-defeating technology in graded vehicles. At issue was whether the manufacturers' contacts with Texas satisfied the constitutional requisites to exercising specific personal jurisdiction. The trial court ruled that the manufacturers were amenable to specific personal jurisdiction in Texas, but the court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that where the manufacturers developed the product, controlled the distribution stream that brought the product to Texas, and "called all the shots," the trial court did not err in exercising specific personal jurisdiction over the German manufacturers. View "State v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the trial court denying the Health and Human Services Commission's (HHSC) combined plea to the jurisdiction and motion for summary judgment, holding that Plaintiffs' conduct was not protected by the Texas Whistleblower Act.Plaintiffs sued HHSC under the Act, alleging that they were terminated in retaliation for their good faith reports about violations of law by HHSC to various law enforcement agencies. HHSC responded by filing a combined plea to the jurisdiction and motion for summary judgment. The trial court denied the plea and motion, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Plaintiffs' reports of misconduct could not support a Whistleblower Act claim against HHSC. View "Tex. Health & Human Services Comm'n v. Pope" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed in part the judgment of the court of appeals in this insurance dispute, holding that Tex. Ins. Code 705.051 does not displace the common-law rule that insurers may not avoid liability under an insurance policy based on a misrepresentation in an insurance application unless the insurer pleads and proves the insured intended to deceive or induce the insurer to issue the policy.At issue was whether the common-law scienter requirement was repugnant to the plain language of section 705.051, which provides that a misrepresentation in an application for an insurance policy does not defeat recovery under the policy unless the misrepresentation is of a material fact and affects the risks assumed. The court of appeals held that the common-law scienter requirement survived section 705.051's recodification, and therefore, summary judgment was not proper. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, holding (1) section 705.051 does not displace the common-law rule; and (2) as a matter of law, the insurer in this case was exempt from complying with the ninety-day notice provision in Texas Ins. Code 705.005. View "American Nat'l Insurance Co. v. Arce" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals in this contract dispute, holding that the court of appeals erred by failing to apply a common-law default rule to the parties' dispute involving the sale of working interests in 109 oil-and-gas leases.According to the Court, Texas cases have long followed a default common-law rule in the circumstances that the words "from" or "after" a specific date to measure a length of time. Under the rule, courts must treat the time period as excluding the specified date (measuring date), and therefore, a period measured in years "from" or "after" a measuring date ends on the anniversary of the measuring date, not the day before. In the instant case, the parties asked the Supreme Court to resolve key issues of contract construction. Noting that the parties could have easily departed from the default rule by indicating as much within the four corners of the relevant lease, the Supreme Court held that because the parties' agreement implicated the default rule without displacing it, the default rule must be applied to the dispute. View "Apache Corp. Apollo Exploration, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. 16.063 did not toll the running of the statute of limitations during Defendant's physical absence from Texas.At issue was whether section 16.063 applies to toll the when the defendant leaves the state for part of the limitations period but remains a Texas resident subject to personal jurisdiction in Texas amenable to service under the Texas long-arm statute. Defendant lived in Texas at the time that she was involved in a car accident with Plaintiff but subsequently moved to Massachusetts to attend school. Defendant, however, returned to Texas during breaks, maintained a Texas mailing address, and kept her Texas driver license. Plaintiff tried serving Defendant at her family's Texas home without success. When Defendant was finally served she successfully moved for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations. Plaintiff appealed, challenging the court's application of Ashley v. Hawkins, 293 S.W.3d 175 (Tex. 2009), to this case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that if a defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction in Texas and amenable to service, she is not absent from the state under section 16.063. View "Ferrer v. Almanza" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court conditionally granted Defendants' petition for mandamus relief from the trial court's order striking their counteraffidavit served under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 18.001, holding that the trial court's order was an abuse of discretion for which Defendants lacked an adequate remedy by appeal.Plaintiff sued Defendants for negligence. At issue was the counteraffidavit and testimony of Dr. Benny Sanchez, who was retained by Defendants as an expert witness. Plaintiff moved to strike Dr. Sanchez's counteraffidavit and testimony, arguing that the counteraffidavit improperly challenged the cause of Plaintiff's injuries, not the necessity of his treatment. The trial court granted the motion. Thereafter, the trial court issued its opinion in Allstate. Defendants later brought this petition seeking a writ of mandamus and citing In re Allstate Indemnity Insurance Co., 622 S.W.3d 870 (Tex. 2021), in support of their argument that the trial court abused its discretion. The Supreme Court agreed and conditionally granted the writ, holding that the trial court clearly abused its discretion by striking Dr. Sanchez's counteraffidavit and testimony, and Defendants lacked an adequate remedy to address this error by way of appeal. View "In re Chefs' Product of Houston, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming a modified version of the order of the district court certifying a class, holding that when the claims for which the plaintiffs seek class certification have no basis in law, even taking all the allegations as true, class certification cannot be granted.Tenants sued Landlord alleging a violation of Tex. Prop. Code 92.056(g), arguing that Landlord was strictly liable for omitting a required lease term. Tenants sought class certification of a class of more than 65,000 former tenants. Landlord moved for summary judgment, arguing that the lawsuit amounted to an "ineffectual[] attempt to manufacture strict-liability requirements and civil-penalty remedies that do not exist under a plain reading of the Texas Property Code." The district court granted the motion for class certification, and the court of appeals affirmed as modified. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that where Tenants' proposed class claims had no basis law, the "rigorous analysis" necessary to certify the class could not meaningfully be performed. View "American Campus Communities, Inc. v. Berry" on Justia Law