The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the trial court ruling that one of two proposed amendments to the City of Houston's charter approved by voters restricted the effectiveness of the other ballot measure, holding that on amendment included a "primary clause" that was void because it conflicted with state law.One of the amendments at the issue was submitted at the behest of the City Council, and the other was initiated by local citizens. The election ordinance included a "primacy clause" providing that the Council's proposition would prevail over the citizen-initiated proposition if voters approved the Council’s proposition by more votes than the citizens’ proposed amendment. The voters approved both amendments. The City brought suit, arguing that the second amendment did not become effective upon its adoption due to the primacy clause. Relying on the primacy clause, the trial court granted summary judgment for the City. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, holding (1) the primacy conflicts with state law requiring that a city must adopt a charter amendment upon its approval by a majority vote; and (2) therefore, the City may not rely on the primacy clause to avoid complying with the citizen-initiated proposition. View "Hotze v. Turner" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the trial court's order certifying a class in this action claiming violations of Tex. Prop. Code 92.019, which regulates landlords' ability to impose late fees on tenants who untimely pay their rent, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to address Petitioners' defenses in the trial plan and their effects on the requirement for class certification.Respondent sued Petitioners for breach of Tex. Prop. Code 92.019 for charging and collecting late fees and charging back rent concessions. Respondent later moved for class certification. After a hearing, the trial court granted the motion. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by failing correctly to identify the elements of Petitioners' defenses in the trial plan and address their effect on the requirements for class certification in violation of Tex. R. Civ. P. 42(c)(1)(D). View "Mosaic Baybrook Once, L.P. v. Cessor" on Justia Law

In this mineral lease dispute, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals concluding that a lease deadline and untimely scheduled drilling date were irrelevant for invoking a force majeure clause and thus reversing the trial court's judgment and remanding the case, holding that the court of appeals erred.In reversing the trial court's judgment, the court of appeals determined that fact issues existed both as to whether the force majeure clause applied and as to each element of the lessee's tortious-interference claims. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, holding (1) construed in context, the phrase "Lessee's operations are delayed by an event of force majeure" does not refer to the delay of a necessary drilling operation already scheduled to occur after the deadline for perpetuating the lease; (2) the force majeure clause in this case did not save the lease; and (3) to the extent the lessee's tortious-interference claims were predicated on the force majeure clause's saving the lease, a take-nothing judgment is rendered in part. View "Point Energy Partners Permian, LLC v. MRC Permian Co." on Justia Law

In this dispute over a "Water/Sewer Base Fee" that Landlords billed tenants each month to recover certain amounts it had paid the municipal utility district the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's grant of partial summary judgment in Tenant's favor and the court of appeals' judgment affirming the trial court's order certifying a class under Rule 24 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, holding that there was no error.Tenant brought suit against Landlords challenging a fee that included not only each apartment's allocated portion of the utility's customer service charge for water and sewer service but also an undisclosed amount equivalent to a portion of the utility's charges for non-water emergency services. Tenant sued under the Water Code on behalf of a tenant class. The trial court granted Landlords' motion for partial summary judgment on liability and certified a class. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) did not err in granting partial summary judgment; and (2) did not abuse its discretion in certifying the class. View "Mosaic Baybrook One, L.P. v. Simien" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals in this insurance dispute, holding that an insurance policy does not incorporate by reference the payout limits in an underlying service agreement.Two employees that were severely burned in a workplace accident at an ExxonMobil Corporation refinery sought compensation for their injuries and settled for a collective amount over $24 million. When two of Exxon's insurers, National Union Fire Insurance Company and Starr Indemnity & Liability Insurance Company, denied Exxon coverage under their umbrella policies Exxon sued both insurers for breach of contract. The trial court sided with Exxon, ruling that National Union was obligated to reimburse Exxon. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Exxon was not insured under National Union's umbrella policy. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Exxon was an insured under National Union's umbrella policy, and the court of appeals erred in ruling otherwise; and (2) because the court of appeals' holding with respect to Starr's policy was predicated on a similar error, judgment in favor of Starr must also be reversed. View "ExxonMobil Corp. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the orders of the trial court granting TotalEnergies E&P USA, Inc.'s motion to stay an American Arbitration Association (AAA) arbitration and denying MP Gulf of Mexico, LLC's motion to compel that arbitration, holding that the parties clearly and unmistakably delegated to the AAA arbitrator the decision of whether the parties' controversy must be resolved by arbitration.In this dispute arising over interests in a group of oil-and-gas leases Total E&P sought a declaration construing the parties' "Cost Sharing Agreement." On the same day, Total E&P initiated an arbitration proceeding asking the International Institute to determine the parties' rights under their "Chinook Operating Agreement." MP Gulf subsequently initiated the AAA arbitration proceeding. Total E&P filed a motion to stay the arbitration, which the trial court granted. The court of appeals reversed and compelled AAA arbitration. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the parties agreed to delegate the arbitrability issue to the arbitrator. View "TotalEnergies E&P USA, Inc. v. MP Gulf of Mexico, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals concluding that neither party had established proper venue in this workers' compensation case, holding that the record adequately demonstrated that venue was mandatory in Dallas County.Tex. Labor Code 410.252(b), a mandatory venue provision governing suits for judicial review of administrative decisions regarding workers' compensation benefits, requires that suit be brought in "the county where the employee resided at the time of the injury." At issue in this case was whether judicial review of the denial of the workers' compensation claim brought by a Texas Tech University offensive lineman who signed a contract to play for the Dallas Cowboys and was injured while attending the team's training camp in California was proper in Travis County, the county to which the insurer sought transfer, or Dallas County. A Dallas County jury found in favor of the plaintiff on his appeal of the denial of his workers' compensation claim. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that neither party had established proper venue. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the plaintiff "resided" in Dallas County at the time of his injury, as required by section 410.252(b), and therefore, venue was mandatory in Dallas County. View "Fortenberry v. Great Divide Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court remanded this case stemming from a labor dispute between a union and city, holding that remand was required to establish whether the city complied with Local Government Code Chapter 174's compensation standards.When the City of Houston and the Houston Professional Fire Fighters' Association, Local 341 could not agree to an employment contract the Fire Fighters sued the City for compensation under the Fire and Police Employee Relations Act, codified in Chapter 174, claiming that the City failed to meet Chapter 174's compensation standards. Thereafter, the City's voters approved the "pay-parity amendment" amending the City's charter. The Houston Police Officers' Union sued the Fire Fighters seeking a declaration that Chapter 174 preempted the pay-parity amendment, rendering it unenforceable. In the first action, the trial court rejected the constitutional and immunity challenges brought by the City, and the court of appeals affirmed. In the second action, the court of appeals reversed, concluding that state law did not preempt the amendment. The Supreme Court affirmed as to the initial suit and reversed as to the second suit, holding (1) Chapter 174 does not violate constitutional separation of powers principles; (2) the Fire Fighters met the prerequisites for seeking Chapter 174 enforcement; and (3) Chapter 174 preempts the pay-parity amendment. View "City of Houston v. Houston Professional Fire Fighters' Ass'n, Local 341" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgments of the court of appeals in two ultra vires suits affirming the judgments of the trial courts denying Defendants' jurisdictional pleas as to the pertinent claims and affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals that the due process claims in one case may continue, holding that remand was required.At issue in these two consolidated cases was whether state university officials have the statutory authority to revoke a former student's degree after concluding that the former student engaged in academic misconduct while pursuing that degree. In both cases, the court of appeals concluded that such authority did not exist and thus affirmed the trial courts' denials of the university officials' plea to the jurisdiction on sovereign immunity grounds. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the university officials' statutory authority encompassed the authority to determine that a student did not meet the conditions for the award of degrees; and (2) one student's allegation that the disciplinary proceeding she underwent violated her due-process rights was allowed to proceed. View "Hartzell v. S.O." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of mandamus filed by a prospective voter in the City of San Antonio's May 2023 election, holding that sufficient post-election remedies existed that permitted the voter to challenge any weakness in the proposed amendment and its placement on the ballot.At issue was a proposed amendment that, if adopted, would amend the City Charter. Relators brought this action requesting that the Court enjoin the City from holding the special election in May, order the City Clerk or Council to separate the policy into single-issue amendments, and to amend the proposition's ballot language. The Supreme Court denied relief, holding (1) Relators' claimed injury was not a reason to remove the proposition from the ballot; (2) to dismantle the policy into pieces in advance of the election deprived the petition signatories of their right to have their amendment considered by the voters as it was proposed; and (3) Relators failed to show that they were entitled to relief in the form of amending the proposition's ballot language. View "In re Morris" on Justia Law