The Supreme Court held that a party who does not receive notice of an interlocutory order denying arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act in time to appeal because of the trial court clerk's error may seek review by mandamus.Plaintiff sued her employer alleging negligence. Defendant moved to compel arbitration based on its mandatory arbitration policy. The trial court denied the motion to compel, ruling that the policy was unconscionable. The court of appeals remanded the case, after which Defendant filed a supplemental motion to compel arbitration. The trial court denied the motion, but the clerk failed to give Defendant notice of the order. Defendant finally received notice of the order five months after it issued. The Supreme Court issued a writ of mandamus and directed the trial court promptly to issue an order compelling arbitration of Plaintiff's claims, holding (1) the clerk's failure to give notice of the trial court's order deprived Defendant of an adequate appellate remedy; and (2) the arbitration agreement was not illusory. View "In re Whataburger Restaurants LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that Hughes v. Mahaney & Higgins, 821 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. 1991), does not continue to toll the limitations period when a co-party of a malpractice plaintiff pursues the appeal in a higher court but the malpractice plaintiff does not participate in that stage of the proceedings.In Hughes, the Supreme Court held that when an attorney commits malpractice in either the prosecution or defense of a claim that results in litigation, the statute of limitations on the malpractice claim against the attorney is tolled until all appeals on the underlying claim are exhausted. In this case, Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant for legal malpractice in the underlying proceedings. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant on limitations grounds, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Hughes tolling applies only to all appeals in which the malpractice plaintiff participates; and (2) Plaintiff's malpractice claim was barred by limitations. View "Zive v. Sandberg" on Justia Law

In this termination of parental rights case the Supreme Court granted in part the motion to dismiss an appeal from the reversal of a termination of parental rights decree, holding that the case was moot.N.J. gave birth when she was fifteen. Three months later, the Department of Family and Protective Services began termination proceedings against N.J. After a trial, the jury returned a verdict terminating N.J.'s parental rights. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over N.J. The Department petitioned for review. After the Supreme Court granted the petition the Department moved to dismiss, explaining that N.J. had executed an affidavit of voluntary relinquishment of her parental rights more than one year earlier after she had reached the age of majority. The Supreme Court dismissed the appealed portion of the case, holding that the case was moot in light of N.J.'s decision to voluntarily relinquish her parental rights. View "Texas Department of Family & Protective Services v. N.J." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed in part the judgment of the district court in favor of Plaintiff in this medical negligence action, holding that the district court erred in how it structured periodic payments after applying the periodic-payments statute in Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Chapter 74, Subchapter K to Plaintiff's award of future medical expenses.Plaintiff, the mother of A.M.A., brought this action on his behalf alleging that, upon A.M.A.'s delivery, the nurses' delay in summoning the obstetrician when A.M.A.'s heartrate dropped to nondetectable levels for extended periods caused his cerebral palsy. The jury found for A.M.A.and awarded $1.208 million for future healthcare expenses after he turns eighteen. The trial judge applied the periodic payment statute to the award. The Supreme Court remanded the case, holding that the district court erred in the way that it structured the periodic payments. View "Columbia Valley Healthcare System, L.P. v. A.M.A." on Justia Law

In this dispute between a homeowners' association and a townhome owner the Supreme Court reversed the opinion of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the trial court enjoining the owner from renting its townhomes for terms of fewer than seven days, holding that the association had no authority to impose a short-term rental restriction.After the association demanded that the owner stop leasing its townhomes for short-term rentals the owner sued to enforce a covenant in the neighborhood's deed restrictions granting it the right to lease without restriction. The trial court ruled that the short-term rentals breached a provision in the neighborhood's deed restrictions. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the association possessed independent authority under Tex. Prop. Code 204.010(a)(6) to restrict short-term rentals. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that neither the deed covenants nor the Property Code authorized the association to impose a short-term rental restriction. View "JBrice Holdings, LLC v. Wilcrest Walk Townhomes Ass'n" on Justia Law

In this wrongful death and survival action brought against an automobile insurer, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the trial court's judgment in favor of the insurer as to Plaintiff's negligence and gross negligence claims, holding that the court of appeals erred.An insured motorist was involved in a single car accident. The motorist's husband later arrived and began taking photos, but while he was engaged in that activity on the side of the road, he was struck by another vehicle and killed. Plaintiff, the motorist, brought this action alleging that the insurer had instructed her to take the photos and that her husband was complying with that instruction when the other driver hit him. Thus, Plaintiff argued, the insurer proximately caused her husband's death. The trial court granted summary judgment for the insurer on the negligence and gross negligence claims. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendant did not have a duty to exercise reasonable care in providing post-accident guidance so as not to increase the risk of harm to its insured. View "Elephant Insurance Co., LLC v. Kenyon" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the trial court's judgment for Plaintiff, a cardiovascular surgeon who sued Defendant, a hospital and Plaintiff's former employer, for engaging in a retaliatory "whisper campaign" against him, holding that the lower courts erred.After leaving the employment of Defendant for a new rival, Plaintiff brought this complaint alleging that Defendant used faulty data on his patients' mortality rates to suppress competition and injure his reputation and practice. The jury rejected Plaintiff's anticompetition claims but concluded that the hospital had defamed him and disparaged his professional association. The trial court granted summary judgment for Plaintiff, and the court of appeals affirmed. At issue on appeal was how a reasonable juror would interpret the charge that was given for the defamation and business disparagement claims. The Supreme Court held (1) the plain text of the charge must be given its commonsense meaning in the context of the case; and (2) the trial court erred in awarding Plaintiff damages for defamation and business disparagement. View "Memorial Hermann Health System v. Gomez" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals as to attorney's fees in this case concerning whether Defendant, a condominium association, was entitled to attorney's fees after obtaining a take-nothing judgment on claims by Plaintiff, a unit owner, the Supreme Court held that the fee award was authorized by Tex. Prop. Code 82.161(b).Plaintiff sued Defendant for, among other things, fraud, civil conspiracy, breach of contract, and negligence. Defendant filed a counterclaim for declaratory judgment and requested attorney's fees. The trial court granted Defendant's motion on twelve declaratory issues. After a trial, the court granted judgment for Defendant and awarded attorney's fees. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment for Defendant but reversed the award of attorney's fees. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that Defendant was a prevailing party under Tex. Prop. Code 82.161(b) and was thus entitled to reasonable attorney's fees. View "Sunchase IV Homeowners Ass'n v. Atkinson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the trial court, rendered pursuant to a jury verdict, that Stephen Stelly owned real property free of any encumbrance, holding that Stelly adequately pleaded a trespass-to-try-title claim.Stelly brought this action against John DeLoach claiming that DeLoach had breached the parties' contract by not delivering a real property deed after Stelly had paid off the debt on the land's original purchase price.The jury entered a verdict in favor of Stelly. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Stelly pleaded only a breach-of-contract claim, not a trespass-to-try-title claim and that the statute of limitations had run on Stelly's breach of contract claim. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that Stelly adequately pleaded a trespass-to-try-title claim. View "Stelly v. DeLoach" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the trial court denying San Antonio City's jurisdictional challenge to the "Save Chick-fil-A law" based on governmental-immunity grounds and dismissing the case, holding that the pleading did not affirmatively negate the existence of jurisdiction.The statute at issue prohibits a governmental entity from taking any adverse action against any person based on the person's membership in or support of a religious organization. Petitioners sued the City of San Antonio after it voted to prohibit the opening of a Chick-fil-A in the San Antonio airport based, at least in part, on Chick-fil-A's contributions to particular religious organizations that members of the city council found objectionable and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The City sought dismissal based on governmental immunity and lack of standing. The trial court denied the City's jurisdictional challenges. The court of appeals reversed and dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Petitioners' pleading did not allege sufficient fact to invoke a waiver of governmental immunity; but (2) because the pleading did not affirmatively negate jurisdiction, Petitioners were entitled to an opportunity to replead. View "Von Dohlen v. City of San Antonio" on Justia Law