The Supreme Court held that a technical defect in personal service on a ward does not drive the probate court of subject-matter jurisdiction or personal jurisdiction over the ward where the ward is personally served and participates in the proceedings through counsel without objection.Petitioner, the daughter of Mauricette and James Fairley, asked the Supreme Court to void all orders entered in a guardianship proceeding in which Mauricette acted as James's guardian for the final three years of his life. Specifically, Petitioner alleged that personal service on her father by a private process server was insufficient to vest jurisdiction in the probate court because Chapter 1051 of the Estates Code requires a proposed ward to personally be served by a sheriff, constable, or other elected officeholder. The Supreme Court denied relief, holding that Petitioner failed to establish that any deficiency with respect to the method of personal service rose to the level of a violation of due process. View "In re Guardianship of Fairley" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the trial court denying Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's medical negligence claims, holding that Texas Medical Liability Act applied, and therefore, Plaintiff's failure to serve an expert report on Defendants was fatal to her claims.At issue was (1) whether Plaintiff's claims that Defendants negligently administered various treatments that caused scarring and discoloration to her skin constituted "health care liability claims" under the Act, and (2) whether the Act prohibited Plaintiff from filing an amended petition after the Act's deadline for serving expert reports. The Supreme Court held (1) Plaintiff's claims constituted health care liability claims subject to the Act's expert report requirements; (2) the Act did not prohibit Plaintiff from filing an amended petition; and (3) because Plaintiff failed timely to serve an expert report, Plaintiff's claims must be dismissed under the Act. View "Lake Jackson Medical Spa, Ltd. v. Gaytan" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court conditionally granted a petition for a writ of mandamus and directed the court of appeals to vacate its order granting relief and to instruct the trial court to vacate the order it issued in compliance with the court of appeals' directive, holding that a facility's general policies and procedures fall outside the scope of pre-report discovery permitted in medical-liability cases.Kenneth Smith, on behalf of his wife, Donna Smith, brought this action alleging that Donna fell multiple times while in the care of a nursing facility owned by LCS SP, LLC. Before Smith served LCS with an expert report he requested LCS's general operating policies and procedures for the five years before he brought suit. When LCS objected, Smith moved to compel the discovery. The trial court denied the motion, delaying the discovery until after Smith served LCS with the expert report required by Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 74.351(s). Smith petitioned for mandamus relief, which the court of appeals conditionally granted. LCS then petitioned the Supreme Court for mandamus relief. The Supreme Court conditionally granted relief, holding that the trial court acted within its discretion when it declined to compel the requested discovery. View "In re LCS SP, LLC" on Justia Law

In this case involving proper service of lawsuits on financial institutions that act as fiduciaries the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the trial court rendering judgment that the defendant financial institution take nothing on its equitable bill of review, holding that Defendant was not properly served and that the default judgment rendered against it must be set aside.At issue was which of two Texas statutes applied in this case: Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 17.028, which provides that citation may be served on Defendant by serving its "registered agent," or chapter 505 of the Estates Code, which provides that a foreign corporate fiduciary must appoint the Secretary of State as an "agent for service of process." Plaintiff in this case served the Secretary rather than the defendant's designated registered agent. Because it had not updated its Chapter 505 designation of the person to whom the Secretary should forward process, Defendant did not receive the citation, and default judgment was entered against it. The Supreme Court rendered summary judgment granting Defendant's bill of review, holding that Defendant was not properly served. View "U.S. Bank National Ass'n v. Moss" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals holding that the City of San Antonio was not immune from suit under the Texas Tort Claims Act, Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 101.001-101.109, for injuries arising from the use of law enforcement vehicles, holding that the court of appeals erred.Plaintiff was injured when he was riding his motorcycle behind a police officer's vehicle but three lanes over and the car in front of him braked. Plaintiff sued the City, alleging that the officer was negligent in turning on his emergency lights. The trial court concluded that the City failed to prove that the officer was entitled to official immunity, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and dismissed Plaintiff's claims against the City for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the City made the necessary showing that its officer acted in good faith. View "City of San Antonio v. Riojas" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the decision of the trial court granting the City of San Antonio's plea to the jurisdiction and dismissing Plaintiffs' complaint alleging that their injuries arose from a police officer's vehicular pursuit of a fleeing suspect who crashed into their car, holding that the court of appeals erred.After Plaintiffs sued the City pursuant to section 101.021 of the Texas Tort Claims Act the City filed a plea to the jurisdiction arguing that the officer's actions were too attenuated from Plaintiffs' injuries and that the officer's actions were not reckless and did not violate applicable laws or ordinances. The trial court granted the plea to the jurisdiction. The court of appeals reversed, ruling that the City's immunity was waived. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Plaintiffs' claims were barred by sovereign immunity. View "City of San Antonio v. Maspero" on Justia Law

In this insurance coverage dispute presenting two certified questions from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit the Supreme Court held that the Northfield exception to the "eight-corners rule" is permissible under Texas law. See Northfield Insurance Co. v. Loving Home Care, Inc., 363 F,3d 523 (5th Cir. 2004).Plaintiff brought the underlying suit alleging that Insured negligently drilled an irrigation well, damaging Plaintiff's land. Insured demanded a defense from its two liability insurers, BITCO General Insurance Corp., which defended under a reservation of rights, and Monroe Guaranty Insurance Company, which refused to defend. BITCO sued Monroe seeking a declaration that Monroe owed a defense to Plaintiff. The certified questions in this case related to the subsidiary issue of whether Texas law permits consideration of stipulated extrinsic evidence to determine whether the duty to defend exists when the plaintiff's pleading is silent about a potentially dispositive coverage fact. The Supreme Court held (1) the Northfield exception is permissible provided that the extrinsic evidence meets three conditions; and (2) the stipulation offered in this case may not be considered because it overlaps with the merits of liability. View "Monroe Guaranty Insurance Co. v. Bitco General Insurance Corp." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the district court concluding that an automobile-liability insurance policy required the insurer to defend and indemnify the insured against claims for damages arising from an accident involving the use of a "golf cart," holding that the insurer had no duty to indemnify the insured.Plaintiff, acting as next friend of her minor daughter, sued the the Pharr-San Juan-Alamo Independent School District and its employee, alleging that her daughter was severely injured after being thrown from a golf cart. The School District, which had obtained automobile-liability insurance from the Texas Political Subdivisions Property/Casualty Joint Self Insurance Fund, requested that the Insurance Fund provide a defense against Plaintiff's claims and indemnify the School District against liability. The Insurance Fund then brought this suit seeking a declaratory judgment that it had no duty to defend the School District. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the School District. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Insurance Fund had no duty to defend the School District because the term "golf cart" did not refer to a "covered auto" as that term was used in the policy. View "Pharr-San Juan-Alamo Independent School District v. Texas Political Subdivisions Property/Casualty Joint Self Insurance Fund" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the trial court's judgment against a utility in this personal injury action, holding that a limitation of liability provision in a utility tariff approved by state regulators barred the utility's liability for damages suffered by a residential customer's houseguests.The tariff at issue provided that the utility "shall not be liable for any damage or loss" in the limited circumstance where damage or loss is "caused by the escape of gas" from the residence's housepiping or appliances. Plaintiffs in this case were injured in precisely that way while they were houseguests at the home of one of the utility's residential customers. The trial court and court of appeals concluded that the liability limitation was applicable only to damage or loss sustained by the utility's customer and therefore, the tariff's liability limitations did not apply to Plaintiffs' negligence claims. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under the filed-rate doctrine, the liability limitation plainly and expressly precluded the utility's liability for Plaintiffs' damagers and appleid to them as "consumers" of the utility's gas services. View "CenterPoint Energy Resources Corp. v. Ramirez" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals concluding that substantial evidence did not support the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality's (TCEQ) decision granting an application filed by Dos Republicas Coal Partnership (DRCP) seeking renewal of a permit for wastewater discharge at a coal mine, holding that DRCP was the correct permit applicant.At the time of this dispute, TCEQ rules required both the operator and the owner of the facility to apply for a permit. DRCP owned the mine, but the dispute was whether DRCP or the contractor it hired to conduct day-to-day activities at the time was the mine's "operator." TCEQ concluded that DRCP was the mine's operator. The court of appeals disagreed, ruling that the application lacked the required applicant and should have been denied. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that DRCP was the entity responsible for the overall operation of the facility and was therefore the correct permit applicant. View "Texas Commission on Environment Quality v. Maverick County" on Justia Law