The Supreme Court conditionally granted Petitioner's petition for a writ of mandamus and directed the district court to rescind a temporary restraining order (TRO) issued by the district court prohibiting the Governor and the Speaker of the House (Defendants) from compelling the attendance of members of the Texas House of Representatives (Plaintiffs), holding that the Texas Constitution gives the House of Representatives the authority to physically compel the attendance of absent members.Plaintiffs fled the state on July 12, 2021 in order to deny the House a quorum, thus preventing the legislature, in special session, from enacting voting legislation they opposed. Plaintiffs fled the state to escape the jurisdiction of the House, whose rules provide that absent members may be arrested and their attendance secured and retained. Plaintiffs then brought this action seeking an injunction prohibiting their arrest. The district court granted a TRO prohibiting Defendants from compelling Plaintiffs' attendance by arrest or restraint. The Supreme Court directed the district court to rescind the TRO, holding that the district court abused its discretion by granting the TRO. View "In re Abbott" on Justia Law

In this matter concerning the general appropriations bill for the next biennium beginning September 1, 2021 the Supreme Court denied Relators' request for a writ of mandamus asserting that the Governor's veto of the Legislature's appropriation for its own operations threatened the Legislature's ability to operate and therefore violated the constitutional separation of powers, holding that this Court declines to settle a dispute between coequal branches of the government.The day before the eighty-seventh Legislature adjourned, Democratic members of the House of Representatives prevented passage of pending legislation that they had opposed by leaving the chamber. When the general appropriations bill was presented to the Governor several days later, the Governor vetoed the Legislature's appropriation for its own operations because "[f]unding should not be provided for those who quit their jobs early." In this mandamus proceeding, Relators - the House Democratic Caucus and the majority of Democratic House members - argued that the veto was an attempt to abolish the Legislature in violation of separation of powers principles. The Supreme Court denied relief, holding that this dispute was one between the members of one branch rather than one between the branches, and where the Governor has made funding for continued legislative operations through the end of September, relief in mandamus was not appropriate. View "In re Turner" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied CenterPoint Energy Houston Electric, LLC's petition for writ of mandamus in this negligence action, holding that the Texas Public Utility Commission (PUC) did not have exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate issues of duty and breach that underlay Plaintiffs' claims.A good Samaritan was electrocuted in an attempt to help the victims of a wreck that downed a CenterPoint power line. The man's family and estate brought wrongful-death and survival claims against CenterPoint, alleging that CenterPoint had a duty to design, construct, operate, and maintain its electricity distribution system to de-energize portions of the distribution lines promptly when they experience faults. CenterPoint filed a plea to the jurisdiction, contending that the PUC's exclusive jurisdiction over an electric utility's rates, services, and operations extends to adjudicating whether its line-protection measures were lawful and complied with industry standards. The probate court denied CenterPoint's plea to the jurisdiction, after which CenterPoint filed a petition for writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court denied relief, holding that the PUC did not have exclusive jurisdiction over any issues underlying this common-law negligence dispute. View "In re Centerpoint Energy Houston Electric, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court answered in the negative a question posed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit regarding whether Amazon.com is a "seller" under Texas law when it does not hold title to third-party products sold on its website but controls the process of transaction and delivery, holding that Amazon is not a "seller" of third-party products under Texas law.At issue was whether third-party e-commerce platforms such as Amazon, eBay, Etsy, and Alibaba are strictly liable for defective products manufactured and owned by third parties. The Supreme Court answered the question in the negative, holding (1) under the Legislature's definition of "seller" in Chapter 82 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, when the ultimate consumer obtains a defective product through an ordinary sale, the potentially liable sellers are limited to those who relinquished title to the product at some point in the distribution chain; and (2) because the product in this case was sold on Amazon's website by a third party and Amazon did not hold or relinquish title, Amazon was not a seller even though it controlled the process of the transaction and the delivery of the product. View "Amazon.com v. McMillan" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied in part and conditionally granted in part the petition for mandamus relief filed by Facebook, Inc. directing the dismissal of three lawsuits brought by three plaintiffs alleging that they were victims of sex trafficking who became entangled with their abusers through Facebook, holding that certain claims may proceed but that the remaining claims must be dismissed.Plaintiffs alleged claims claims for negligence, negligent undertaking, gross negligence, and products liability based on Facebook’s alleged failure to warn of or prevent sex trafficking on its internet platforms. Plaintiffs also asserted claims under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 98.002, which creates a civil cause of action against those who intentionally or knowingly benefit from participation in a sex-trafficking venture. Facebook moved to dismiss all claims as barred by the federal Communications Decency Act, 47 US.C. 230(e)(3). After the motions were denied, Facebook sought mandamus relief. The Supreme Court granted relief in part, holding (1) Plaintiffs' claims for negligence, gross negligence, negligent undertaking, and products liability must be dismissed; and (2) Plaintiffs' claims under section 98.002 may proceed. View "In re Facebook, Inc." on Justia Law

In this termination of parental rights action the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals rejecting Mother's ineffective assistance of counsel claim, holding that Mother's ineffective assistance claim failed under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).The State sought termination of Mother's parental rights to her child. The trial court found that Mother was indigent and appointed counsel to represent her. After the jury found that grounds existed for termination and that termination was in the child's best interest Mother's retained counsel filed a notice of appeal. Thereafter, the retained counsel was suspended from the practice of law. The trial court then appointed Mother's appellate counsel. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that Mother could not raise an ineffective assistance of counsel challenge because her counsel was retained rather than appointed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) parents in government-initiated suits to terminate the parent-child relationship who retain counsel of their choosing may also challenge their counsel's performance by asserting an ineffective assistance claim; but (2) Mother's ineffective assistance claim failed under Strickland. View "In re Interest of D.T." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied mandamus relief in this action considering whether an electric utility may compel a plaintiff who alleges a common law personal injury claim to appear before the Public Utility Commission before appearing in court, holding that the Commission may not do so unless the claim complains about the utility's rates or its provision of electrical service.This was a personal injury claim against a utility arising under duties at common law and consumer protection statutes. Plaintiff alleged well-settled elements of a negligence claim, but his allegations did not rely on a utility acting in its regulated capacity, nor on a disruption of or failure to provide electrical service. At issue was whether the action was a regulatory action within the auspices of the Commission. The Supreme Court denied the utility's petition for writ of mandamus asking the trial court to abate the case to require Plaintiff to exhaust his administrative remedies before the Commission, holding that this action was not a regulatory action within the auspices of the Commission. View "In re Oncor Electric Delivery Co., LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied a petition for writ of mandamus sought by Texas-New Mexico Power Co. (TNM) in this negligence action, holding that Plaintiffs' claim was not one within the Public Utility Commission's (PUC) exclusive original jurisdiction because it was not about TNM's operations and services as a utility.Plaintiffs, a larger number of homeowners near the Junemann Bayou and Las Marque, sued TNM, their electric utility, for damages due to flooding during Hurricane Harvey, alleging that TNM was negligent in not requiring its contractor to secure wooden mats to the ground during a construction project. The trial court denied TNM's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and TNM petitioned for mandamus relief. The Supreme Court denied the petition, holding that the PUC's exclusive original jurisdiction did not extend to the issues underlying this tort claim. View "In re Texas-New Mexico Power Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals concluding that Plaintiff's claim that his employer failed to reasonably accommodate his disability was viable and that Plaintiff did not meet the elements required for a retaliation claim but reversed the court of appeals' judgment that Plaintiff did not plead a disability-discrimination claim under Tex. Lab. Code 21.051, holding that Plaintiff's pleadings gave fair notice of a claim for discrimination under section 21.051.After Plaintiff exhausted his five months of sick leave while recovering from surgery the Texas Department of Transportation (TxDOT) terminated him. Plaintiff sued under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (TCHRA). TxDOT filed a motion to dismiss, which the trial court denied. The court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) Plaintiff raised a genuine issue of material fact with respect to his failure to accommodate claim; (2) Plaintiff could not make a prima facie case of retaliation; and (3) Plaintiff's pleadings gave fair notice of a claim for discrimination under section 21.051. View "Texas Department of Transportation v. Lara" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court conditionally granted Academy Sports + Outdoors' petition for writ of mandamus arguing that the federal Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA) required dismissal of the underlying suits, holding that the PLCAA barred the lawsuits and protected Academy from continued participation in litigation.Plaintiffs - victims of the 2017 Sutherland Springs church shooting and their families - brought lawsuits against the retailer from which the perpetrator purchased the weapon used in the shooting. Academy filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the PLCAA barred Plaintiffs' suits. The trial court denied the motion. Academy then filed a petition for writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court granted mandamus relief, holding (1) summary judgment was wrongly denied because the underlying lawsuits were qualified civil liability actions that the PLCAA barred as a matter of law; and (2) Academy, who was entitled to summary judgment, lacked an adequate remedy on appeal. View "In re Academy, Ltd." on Justia Law