Several homeowners sued an irrigation district, claiming that the district's refusal to remove over twenty-year-old charges from the tax rolls was an ultra vires act, violating the Tax Code's twenty-year limitations period. The district argued that the charges were Water Code assessments, not taxes, and thus not subject to the limitations period.The trial court granted the district officials' jurisdictional plea without permitting discovery, dismissing the homeowners' claims for lack of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth District of Texas affirmed in part, concluding that the pleadings did not support an ultra vires claim under the Tax Code because the homeowners had not sought a refund from the tax assessor and the district had clarified that the charges were assessments under the Water Code.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and determined that the homeowners had sufficiently pleaded facts to demonstrate the trial court's jurisdiction over their ultra vires claim. The court held that the homeowners' pleadings, viewed liberally, alleged that the charges were taxes, had been delinquent for more than twenty years, and that no related litigation was pending at the time of the request to remove the charges. The court concluded that these allegations were sufficient to establish subject matter jurisdiction and did not implicate the district's governmental immunity.The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment regarding the Tax Code ultra vires claim and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Herrera v. Mata" on Justia Law

In 2021, the Texas Legislature enacted Senate Bill 8, known as the Texas Heartbeat Act, which prohibits physicians from performing abortions if a fetal heartbeat is detected. The Act allows enforcement only through private civil actions. Plaintiffs, including Allison Van Stean and various Planned Parenthood entities, alleged that Texas Right to Life (TRTL) organized efforts to sue those violating the Act. They filed multiple suits challenging the Act's constitutionality and sought injunctions to prevent TRTL from enforcing it. The cases were consolidated, and TRTL filed a plea to the jurisdiction and a motion to dismiss under the Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA), both challenging the plaintiffs' standing. The trial court denied both motions.TRTL appealed the denial of the TCPA motion, but the Court of Appeals for the Third District of Texas affirmed the trial court's order, stating that the TCPA did not apply to the plaintiffs' claims. The court did not address the standing issue raised by TRTL. TRTL then petitioned for review.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and held that the Court of Appeals erred by not addressing the standing issue, which is a prerequisite for subject-matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court emphasized that jurisdictional questions must be resolved before addressing the merits of a case. The court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine whether the plaintiffs had standing to sue. If the plaintiffs lack standing, the case should be dismissed; if they have standing, the Court of Appeals should then address the merits of the TCPA motion. View "TEXAS RIGHT TO LIFE v. STEAN" on Justia Law

Robert Roberson, a death-row inmate, was scheduled for execution on October 17, 2024. On October 16, 2024, the Texas House Committee on Criminal Jurisprudence issued a subpoena requiring Roberson to testify on October 21, 2024, creating a conflict between the legislative, judicial, and executive branches. The judicial branch had affirmed Roberson's sentence, and the executive branch had declined clemency. The committee sought to delay the execution to obtain Roberson's testimony, claiming legislative authority to compel testimony superseded the scheduled execution.The committee filed a lawsuit in a state district court, which granted a temporary restraining order to delay the execution. The Texas Department of Criminal Justice (the department) sought relief from the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, which set aside the restraining order. The committee then petitioned the Supreme Court of Texas for a writ of mandamus to enforce the subpoena and delay the execution.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and concluded that the legislative committee's authority to compel testimony does not override the scheduled legal process leading to an execution. The court emphasized the separation of powers, noting that the legislature's investigatory power must be balanced against the judiciary's authority to render judgments and the executive's authority to enforce them. The court held that the committee could have obtained Roberson's testimony earlier and that the legislative subpoena could not disrupt the execution process. Consequently, the court denied the committee's petition for writ of mandamus, allowing the execution to proceed as scheduled. View "IN RE TEXAS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES" on Justia Law

A grassroots organization, Dallas HERO, collected over 169,000 signatures to place three proposed amendments to the City of Dallas charter on the ballot. The city council, however, proposed three additional amendments that would effectively nullify the citizen-initiated amendments by including primacy provisions. The city council's propositions were designated as Propositions K, M, and N, while the citizen-initiated propositions were designated as Propositions S, T, and U. The council passed an ordinance to include all these propositions in a special election scheduled for November 5, 2024.Relators sought emergency mandamus relief from the Fifth Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of Texas, arguing that the council-initiated propositions were misleading and would confuse voters. The Fifth Court of Appeals denied the petition, stating that relators failed to comply with procedural rules and did not demonstrate entitlement to mandamus relief. The relators then brought their case to the Supreme Court of Texas.The Supreme Court of Texas held that the ballot language for the council-initiated propositions K, M, and N was misleading because it did not acknowledge the contradictions with the citizen-initiated propositions S, T, and U. The court found that the ballot language would confuse and mislead voters by omitting the effect of the primacy provisions, which are central to the council-initiated propositions. The court directed the city council to remove Propositions K, M, and N from the ballot to avoid redundancy and confusion, ensuring that the election process remains clear and comprehensible for voters. The court denied relief on the issue of amending the agreed-upon ballot language for Propositions S, T, and U, as relators were estopped from challenging it. View "IN RE DALLAS HERO" on Justia Law

Richard Wade, the former president, CEO, and director of Vertical Computer Systems, Inc., was sued in April 2020 by the company's chief technical officer and several shareholders for breach of fiduciary duty and fraud. Wade's address was initially listed as "3717 Cole Avenue, Apt. 293, Dallas, Texas 75204." After a year, the claims against Wade were severed into a separate action, and the trial court ordered binding arbitration. Wade's attorney later filed a motion to withdraw, listing Wade's address as "3717 Cole Ave., Apt. 277, Dallas, Texas 75204." Notice of the trial was sent to this incorrect address.The trial court scheduled a bench trial for April 19, 2022, and Wade appeared pro se but did not present any evidence. The court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, awarding them over $21 million. Wade filed a pro se notice of appeal, arguing that he did not receive proper notice of the trial. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth District of Texas affirmed the judgment.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and found that Wade did not receive proper notice of the trial setting, which violated his due process rights. The court noted that the notice was sent to an incorrect address and that Wade had informed the trial court of this issue. The court held that proceeding to trial without proper notice was reversible error and that Wade was entitled to a new trial. The court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Wade v. Vertical Computer Systems, Inc." on Justia Law

Dallas County sued state officials in Travis County, alleging that the Texas Health and Human Services Commission (HHSC) failed to take custody of criminal defendants adjudicated incompetent to stand trial, imposing costs on the County. The district court denied the State’s plea to the jurisdiction, leading to an appeal in the Third Court of Appeals. However, due to legislative changes, this appeal is set to be transferred to the newly created Fifteenth Court of Appeals, which will have exclusive jurisdiction over certain state-related cases.The Third Court of Appeals could not resolve the appeal before its mandatory transfer to the Fifteenth Court. Dallas County preferred to remain in the Third Court and petitioned the Supreme Court of Texas to bar the transfer and declare the legislation creating the Fifteenth Court unconstitutional. The County argued that the Fifteenth Court’s statewide jurisdiction, its jurisdictional scope, and the appointment process for its justices were unconstitutional.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and held that it had jurisdiction over Dallas County’s petition. The Court concluded that the creation of the Fifteenth Court was constitutional. It found that the Texas Constitution allows the legislature substantial discretion in creating courts and defining their jurisdiction. The Court also held that the appointment process for the Fifteenth Court’s justices, who will be appointed initially and then elected in the next general election, was constitutional. Consequently, the Court denied Dallas County’s request for relief, meaning the appeal must be transferred to the Fifteenth Court as scheduled. View "IN RE DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS AND BROWN" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed a case involving a new law that prohibits certain medical treatments for children if administered for the purpose of transitioning a child's biological sex or affirming the child's perception of their sex if it is inconsistent with their biological sex. Several parents of children with gender dysphoria, along with physicians and groups that would be affected by the law, sued to enjoin its enforcement, alleging that it is facially unconstitutional. The trial court concluded that the law likely violates the Texas Constitution and temporarily enjoined the law's enforcement.The Supreme Court of Texas disagreed with the trial court's decision. The court held that the plaintiffs failed to establish a probable right to relief on their claims that the prohibition of certain treatments for children suffering from gender dysphoria violates the Texas Constitution. The court emphasized that while parents have a fundamental interest in directing the care, custody, and control of their children, this interest is not absolute. The court concluded that the Legislature made a permissible, rational policy choice to limit the types of available medical procedures for children, particularly in light of the relative nascency of both gender dysphoria and its various modes of treatment. The court also concluded that the law does not unconstitutionally deprive parents of their rights or physicians or health care providers of an alleged property right in their medical licenses or claimed right to occupational freedom. The court further concluded that the law does not unconstitutionally deny or abridge equality under the law because of sex or any other characteristic asserted by plaintiffs. The court therefore reversed and vacated the trial court's order. View "STATE OF TEXAS v. LOE" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute over a provision in a collective bargaining agreement between the City of Austin and the Austin Firefighters Association. The provision, known as Article 10, grants 5,600 hours of "Association Business Leave" (ABL) annually for firefighters to conduct union-related activities. The petitioners, including the State of Texas and several individuals, argued that Article 10 violates the "Gift Clauses" of the Texas Constitution, which prohibit governmental entities from making gifts of public resources to private parties. They contended that the ABL provision improperly benefits the union by allowing firefighters to use paid time off for union activities, some of which they alleged were misused for improper purposes.The case was initially dismissed under the Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA), with the trial court granting relief to the Association, including the award of fees and sanctions. On appeal, the trial court's findings of fact went unchallenged, and the focus was primarily on whether the agreement itself violated the Gift Clauses.The Supreme Court of Texas held that Article 10 does not violate the Gift Clauses. The court found that the provision is not a gratuitous gift but brings a public benefit, serves a legitimate public purpose, and the government retains control over the funds to ensure that the public purpose is achieved. The court emphasized that the ABL must be used for activities that directly support the mission of the Fire Department or the Association and are consistent with the Association’s purposes. The court also reversed the trial court's order granting the Association's TCPA motion to dismiss and its award of sanctions and fees against the original plaintiffs. View "BORGELT v. AUSTIN FIREFIGHTERS ASSOCIATION, IAFF LOCAL 975" on Justia Law

The case involves Dianne Hensley, a justice of the peace in Texas, who announced that due to her religious beliefs, she would not perform weddings for same-sex couples but would refer them to others who would. The State Commission on Judicial Conduct issued her a public warning for casting doubt on her capacity to act impartially due to the person's sexual orientation, in violation of Canon 4A(1) of the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct. Hensley did not appeal this warning to a Special Court of Review (SCR) but instead sued the Commission and its members and officers for violating the Texas Religious Freedom Restoration Act (TRFRA) and her right to freedom of speech under Article I, Section 8 of the Texas Constitution. The trial court dismissed her claims for lack of jurisdiction, and the court of appeals affirmed.The Supreme Court of Texas held that Hensley's suit was not barred by her decision not to appeal the Commission’s Public Warning or by sovereign immunity. The court affirmed the part of the court of appeals’ judgment dismissing one of Hensley's declaratory requests for lack of jurisdiction, reversed the remainder of the judgment, and remanded to the court of appeals to address the remaining issues on appeal. The court found that the SCR could not have finally decided whether Hensley is entitled to the relief sought in this case or awarded the relief TRFRA provides to successful claimants. View "HENSLEY v. STATE COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL CONDUCT" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between Mary Alice Keyes and Sean Leo Nadeau, who are the owners and agents of MonoCoque Diversified Interests, LLC, and David Weller, who provides aviation consulting services through his company, IntegriTech Advisors, LLC. Weller was discussing a potential employment relationship with MonoCoque. After several discussions and email exchanges outlining the agreed terms, Weller accepted MonoCoque’s offer and began working for them. However, disagreements arose over the terms of Weller's compensation, leading to Weller's resignation. Weller and IntegriTech sued MonoCoque, Keyes, and Nadeau, asserting various fraud claims and a Texas Securities Act claim against all three defendants.The defendants argued that they were shielded from liability by Section 21.223 of the Texas Business Organizations Code because they were acting as agents of the company and there was no evidence that they were seeking a direct personal benefit. The trial court granted the defendants' motion for partial summary judgment on the fraud claims. On appeal, the court of appeals reversed the trial court’s decision, holding that Section 21.223 does not abrogate the common law principle that individuals are directly liable for their own tortious conduct, even if committed in the course and scope of their employment.The Supreme Court of Texas affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. The court held that Section 21.223 does not limit an individual’s liability under the common law for tortious acts allegedly committed while acting as a corporate officer or agent, even when the individual is also a shareholder or member. The court concluded that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the fraud claims against Keyes and Nadeau and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "KEYES v. WELLER" on Justia Law