The case revolves around a personal injury claim filed by Hannah Tanner against Texas State University. Tanner was injured on October 4, 2014, when she was thrown from a golf cart on the University campus. She filed a lawsuit against the University, the Texas State University System, and Dakota Scott, a University employee who was driving the golf cart, on September 29, 2016, just before the two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions was set to expire. However, Tanner did not serve the University until May 20, 2020, several years after the statute of limitations had run.The University argued that Tanner's lawsuit should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because she did not serve the University until after the statute of limitations had expired. The University contended that timely service of process is a statutory prerequisite to a suit against a governmental entity, and Tanner did not satisfy this prerequisite. The district court granted the University's plea to the jurisdiction, but the court of appeals reversed, holding that untimely service does not pose a jurisdictional issue that a plea to the jurisdiction can resolve.The Supreme Court of Texas disagreed with the court of appeals' conclusion. The court held that the statute of limitations, including the requirement of timely service, is jurisdictional in suits against governmental entities. Therefore, the University's plea to the jurisdiction was a proper vehicle to address Tanner's alleged failure to exercise diligence in serving the University. However, the court declined to determine whether the district court properly granted the plea. Instead, the court reversed the court of appeals' judgment and remanded the case for that court to determine whether Tanner's service on Scott excuses her from the duty to serve the University. View "TEXAS STATE UNIVERSITY v. TANNER" on Justia Law

In 2020, Luke Hogan, a graduate student at Southern Methodist University (SMU), found his final semester disrupted by the COVID-19 pandemic. Like many institutions, SMU shifted to online classes in response to government lockdown orders. Hogan, feeling cheated out of the in-person educational experience he had paid for, sued SMU for breach of contract. He sought a refund of his tuition and fees, arguing that the shift to online learning constituted a breach of SMU's promise of in-person education.The federal district court sided with SMU, and Hogan appealed. The Fifth Circuit then certified a question to the Supreme Court of Texas: Does the application of the Pandemic Liability Protection Act (PLPA) to Hogan’s breach-of-contract claim violate the retroactivity clause in article I, section 16 of the Texas Constitution? The PLPA, enacted in 2021, protects schools from monetary liability for altering their activities in response to the pandemic.The Supreme Court of Texas held that the application of the PLPA to Hogan's claim does not violate the Texas Constitution's prohibition on retroactive laws. The court reasoned that Hogan did not have a settled expectation of recovering damages from SMU under these circumstances. The court noted that the common law has traditionally excused a party from performing a contract when performance is rendered impossible by an act of God or government. The court also pointed out that Hogan voluntarily accepted SMU's offer to complete his degree online without a corresponding offer of tuition refunds or reduced fees. Therefore, any right of recovery that might have existed for Hogan was speculative and untested prior to the PLPA's enactment. The court concluded that the PLPA, enacted to resolve legal uncertainty created by the pandemic, did not upset Hogan's settled expectations and thus did not violate the constitutional prohibition on retroactive laws. View "HOGAN v. SOUTHERN METHODIST UNIVERSITY" on Justia Law

The case involves successors in interest of mineral-rights holders who sued in 2019 to declare a 1999 judgment foreclosing on their predecessors’ property for delinquent taxes as void. They argued that there was constitutionally inadequate notice of the foreclosure suit, rendering the foreclosure judgment and the tax sale that followed both void. The current owners sought traditional summary judgment based on the Tax Code’s command that an action relating to the title to property against the purchaser of the property at a tax sale may not be commenced later than one year after the date that the deed executed to the purchaser at the tax sale is filed of record.The trial court granted the current owners' motion for summary judgment, and the court of appeals affirmed. The majority held that the sheriff’s deed conclusively established the accrual date for limitations, so the burden shifted to the successors to adduce evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact as to whether there was a due-process violation that could render the statute of limitations inoperable. Because the successors relied only on their arguments and presented no evidence of a due-process violation, the majority concluded, the current owners were entitled to summary judgment.The Supreme Court of Texas held that under Draughon v. Johnson, the nonmovant seeking to avoid the limitations bar by raising a due-process challenge bears the burden to adduce evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact about whether the underlying judgment is actually void for lack of due process. Because the nonmovant here adduced no such evidence, the trial court correctly granted summary judgment based on Section 33.54(a)(1). However, the court also noted that the law governing this case has undergone meaningful refinement since the summary-judgment proceedings took place. Given these recent and substantial developments in the relevant law, the court remanded this case to the trial court for further proceedings in the interest of justice. View "GILL v. HILL" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between the San Jacinto River Authority (SJRA) and the cities of Conroe and Magnolia, Texas. The SJRA and the cities had entered into contracts obligating the cities to buy surface water from the SJRA. When a disagreement over fees and rates arose, the cities stopped paying their full balances, leading the SJRA to sue the cities for recovery of those amounts. The cities claimed immunity from the suit as government entities.Previously, the trial court had granted the cities' plea to the jurisdiction, and the court of appeals affirmed this decision. The court of appeals held that the SJRA had not engaged in pre-suit mediation as required by the contracts, and therefore, the cities' immunity was not waived.The Supreme Court of Texas disagreed with the lower courts' decisions. The court held that contractual procedures for alternative dispute resolution, such as pre-suit mediation, do not limit the statutory waiver of immunity for contractual claims against local government entities. The court also found that the mediation requirement did not apply to the SJRA's claims. Furthermore, the court rejected the cities' argument that the agreements did not fall within the waiver because they failed to state their essential terms.Consequently, the Supreme Court of Texas reversed the lower courts' decisions and remanded the case back to the trial court for further proceedings to resolve the SJRA's claims on the merits. View "San Jacinto River Authority v. City of Conroe" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between a developer, Campbellton Road, Ltd., and the City of San Antonio, specifically the San Antonio Water System (SAWS). The developer entered into a contract with SAWS in 2003, which included an option for the developer to participate in and fund the construction of off-site oversized infrastructure for a municipal water system. The developer planned to develop two residential subdivisions and needed sewer service for them. The contract stated that if the developer decided to participate in the off-site oversizing project, a contract would form, and the developer would earn credits that could be used to satisfy some or all of the collection component of assessed impact fees.The Court of Appeals for the Fourth District of Texas concluded that the Local Government Contract Claims Act did not apply, and therefore did not waive immunity, because there was no agreement for providing services to the system. The court held that the system had no contractual right to receive any services and would not have “any legal recourse” if the developer “unilaterally decided not to proceed.”The Supreme Court of Texas disagreed with the lower court's decision. The Supreme Court held that the Act waived the system’s immunity from suit because the developer adduced evidence that a contract formed when the developer decided to and did participate in the off-site oversizing project. The court found that the contract stated the essential terms of an agreement for the developer to participate in that project, and the agreement was for providing a service to the system that was neither indirect nor attenuated. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals’ judgment and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Campbellton Road, Ltd. v. City of San Antonio" on Justia Law

Maryam Mohammadi, an employee at a Wells Fargo branch located inside a Randalls grocery store, slipped and fell next to a shopping cart that contained leaking items. Mohammadi sued Randalls, alleging that the store failed to warn her about the puddle that formed next to the cart. The jury ruled in favor of Randalls, finding that the store was not liable under a constructive-knowledge standard of premises liability, which asked whether Randalls should have reasonably known about the danger. The jury was instructed not to consider Randalls's liability under an actual-knowledge standard based on their answer to the constructive-knowledge question.The Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth District of Texas reversed the jury's decision, arguing that the jury should have been allowed to consider liability under the actual-knowledge standard, even after finding no liability under the constructive-knowledge standard. The court of appeals held that Randalls could be charged with actual knowledge of the danger even without actual knowledge of the wet floor, because its employees knew a leaking product placed in a shopping cart would drip onto the floor.The Supreme Court of Texas disagreed with the court of appeals' interpretation. The court found that any error in the jury instructions would have been harmless because there was no evidence that Randalls had actual knowledge of the wet floor. The court clarified that the relevant danger was the wet floor, not the antecedent situation that produced it. The court concluded that since there was no evidence of actual knowledge of the danger, no reasonable jury could have answered the actual-knowledge question in Mohammadi’s favor. Therefore, the court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and reinstated the judgment of the district court. View "Albertsons, LLC v. Mohammadi" on Justia Law

A homeowner, Mohammad Rafiei, sued his builder, Lennar Homes, alleging personal injuries due to a construction defect. The purchase contract between Rafiei and Lennar contained an agreement to submit disputes to arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act, including issues of formation, validity, or enforceability of the arbitration agreement. Lennar moved to compel arbitration, but Rafiei argued that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable because the cost of arbitration was prohibitively high. The trial court denied Lennar's motion to compel arbitration.The Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth District of Texas affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that Rafiei had sufficiently demonstrated that the cost to arbitrate was excessive, making the arbitral forum inadequate to vindicate his rights. The court of appeals concluded that if Rafiei were required to pay more than $6,000, he would be precluded from pursuing his claims.The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the judgment of the court of appeals. The court held that the record failed to support a finding that the parties' delegation clause was itself unconscionable due to prohibitive costs to adjudicate the threshold issue in arbitration. The court noted that Rafiei had not provided sufficient evidence to show that he could not afford the cost of arbitrating the arbitrability question. The court also noted that Rafiei had not provided evidence of how the fee schedule would be applied to resolve the unconscionability issue. The court remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Lennar Homes Of Texas Inc. v. Rafiei" on Justia Law

This case arises from a parental rights termination appeal in Texas. The father had been the primary caregiver for his three children, including one-year-old twins and a three-year-old daughter. However, the father tested positive for methamphetamine and the children were removed by the Department of Family and Protective Services due to the father's drug use and homelessness. Although the father initially complied with a service plan, which included drug testing and treatment, he eventually refused further treatment and missed subsequent drug tests. The trial court terminated the father's parental rights, but the court of appeals reversed the decision, arguing that the Department had failed to prove harm to the children as a direct result of their father's drug use.The Supreme Court of Texas disagreed with the court of appeals' interpretation of "endanger" in the context of illegal drug use. It held that a parent's endangering conduct does not need to be directed at the child or result in actual injury to the child. Instead, endangerment encompasses a larger array of conduct that exposes a child to loss or injury, or jeopardizes the child's physical or emotional well-being. The court argued that the father's pattern of drug use, coupled with his homelessness, employment instability, and almost complete abandonment of his children for the six months preceding the trial, posed a substantial risk to the children's emotional well-being. Therefore, legally sufficient evidence supported the trial court's determination that the father's conduct endangered the children. The case was remanded to the court of appeals for a best-interest determination. View "In re R.R.A." on Justia Law

The case before the Supreme Court of Texas concerned the City of Dallas and the Employees’ Retirement Fund of the City of Dallas. The issue at hand was whether a city ordinance could confer a third party the perpetual right to veto categories of future lawmaking. The Court of Appeals held that the City of Dallas could not amend Chapter 40A of its code of ordinances unless the board of trustees of the Employees’ Retirement Fund agreed to the amendment. However, the Supreme Court of Texas found that such delegation of lawmaking authority was not permissible.The Supreme Court of Texas based its ruling on the principle that a legislative body cannot bind its successors, and on the constitutional principle forbidding the city council from giving away its authority to legislate. The court determined that the board’s veto in § 40A-35(a) was unenforceable and cannot prevent an otherwise valid ordinance from taking effect.However, the court did not resolve whether the City must hold an election that submits § 8-1.5(a-1) to the voters before it can enforce that provision. The court declined to address this question and remanded the case back to the Court of Appeals for further consideration. View "THE CITY OF DALLAS v. THE EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT FUND OF THE CITY OF DALLAS" on Justia Law

Dorothy Hampton was released from the Medical Center of Southeast Texas after an abdominal hernia surgery. Later that night, she fell at home, becoming confused and disoriented, and was readmitted to the hospital. She filed a health care liability claim against Dr. Leonard Thome, alleging that she was released prematurely from the hospital which led to her fall and subsequent mental and physical injuries. Hampton's lawyer sent a pre-suit notice to Dr. Thome along with a medical authorization form as required under Texas law before filing a suit. The form listed only two providers and omitted future health care providers.Hampton filed her suit outside the usual two-year statute of limitations but within the 75-day tolling period provided by the law. Dr. Thome argued that the lawsuit was filed outside the limitations period as the medical authorization form served by Hampton was deficient, and hence the 75-day tolling period was not applicable. The trial court rejected this argument, but the court of appeals reversed the decision.The Supreme Court of Texas held that an imperfect medical authorization form is still a medical authorization form, which is sufficient to toll the statute of limitations for 75 days. The court emphasized that the limitations period should be established with clarity at the outset. Any defects or omissions in the medical authorization form that came to light during the litigation could have been adequately addressed by the statutory remedy of abatement, additional discovery, or even sanctions. The judgment of the court of appeals was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "HAMPTON v. THOME" on Justia Law