Justia Texas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A defendant can prevail on the merits of its counterclaims against a governmental entity when the governmental entity recovers monetary relief on its affirmative claims by filing a lien and a lis pendens and then nonsuits its affirmative claims where the defendant seeks an offset against the amount the governmental entity recovered through the litigation process.Petitioner, which operated pecan orchards, entered into water-supply agreements with Respondent, a political subdivision. Respondent sued Petitioner for breach of contract. Petitioner counterclaimed for breach of contract and fraud. After Respondent recorded a crop lien and a lis pendens against Petitioner’s orchards, Petitioner paid Respondent the amount it sought to remove the lien and lis pendens but continued to pursue its counterclaims seeking an offset against that payment. Respondent later nonsuited its claims. The trial court granted summary judgment for Respondent, ordering that Petitioner take nothing on its counterclaims. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals erred in concluding that Petitioner could not prevail on the merits of its counterclaims merely because Respondent obtained its recovery by filing a lien and lis pendens. View "C. Borunda Holdings, Inc. v. Lake Proctor Irrigation Authority of Comanche County" on Justia Law

A defendant can prevail on the merits of its counterclaims against a governmental entity when the governmental entity recovers monetary relief on its affirmative claims by filing a lien and a lis pendens and then nonsuits its affirmative claims where the defendant seeks an offset against the amount the governmental entity recovered through the litigation process.Petitioner, which operated pecan orchards, entered into water-supply agreements with Respondent, a political subdivision. Respondent sued Petitioner for breach of contract. Petitioner counterclaimed for breach of contract and fraud. After Respondent recorded a crop lien and a lis pendens against Petitioner’s orchards, Petitioner paid Respondent the amount it sought to remove the lien and lis pendens but continued to pursue its counterclaims seeking an offset against that payment. Respondent later nonsuited its claims. The trial court granted summary judgment for Respondent, ordering that Petitioner take nothing on its counterclaims. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals erred in concluding that Petitioner could not prevail on the merits of its counterclaims merely because Respondent obtained its recovery by filing a lien and lis pendens. View "C. Borunda Holdings, Inc. v. Lake Proctor Irrigation Authority of Comanche County" on Justia Law

A turnover order is not a final, appealable judgment when it merely orders funds subject to an as yet unadjudicated ownership dispute into the court’s registry.Here, a turnover order directed funds subject to disputed ownership claims into the court’s registry “without prejudice” to the rights of either the judgment creditor or non-judgment debtor to later seek the funds’ release. Nearly six months after the trial court signed the turnover order, Respondent filed a motion to enforce the turnover order and to have the registry funds released to it on the grounds that Petitioner triggered a condition for releasing the funds when it neglected to appeal the turnover order. The trial court ordered the turnover order enforced and registry funds released to Respondent (the “release order”). The court of appeals dismissed Petitioner’s appeal for want of jurisdiction due to Petitioner’s failure to timely appeal the turnover order. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Petitioner timely appealed the release order; and (2) the turnover order’s provisions did not function as a mandatory injunction, which meant the release order was the final judgment on Petitioner’s claims. View "Alexander Dubs Jefferson & Townsend LLP v. Chevron Phillips Chemical Co." on Justia Law

Defendants’ failure to fully comply with a temporary restraining order did not justify sanctions even more severe than death-penalty sanctions imposed by the trial court.Plaintiffs sought a temporary restraining order (TRO) against Defendants. Without taking evidence, the court signed a TRO prohibiting Defendants from engaging in certain conduct. Plaintiffs later filed a motion for contempt and sanctions, alleging that Defendants knowingly violated the TRO. The trial court granted the motion in an order stating that “death penalty sanctions should be imposed” against Defendants. The court then awarded sanctions of $897,938. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, holding (1) Defendants knowingly violated the TRO without a compelling excuse; but (2) the extreme sanction imposed for the violations of the TRO was an abuse of discretion. View "Altesse Healthcare Solutions, Inc. v. Wilson" on Justia Law

A client’s communications with his registered patent agent, made to facilitate the agent’s provision of authorized legal services to the client, are privileged under Tex. R. Evid. 503.Andrew Silver brought a breach of contract action against Tabletop Media, LLC, alleging that it failed to pay him for his patent. During discovery, Tabletop sought production of emails between Silver and Raffi Gostanian, the patent agent who represented Silver before the United States Patent and Trademark Office. Silver refused to produce the emails, asserting that they were covered by the lawyer-client privilege. The trial court granted Tabletop’s motion to compel production. Thereafter, Silver sought mandamus relief. The court of appeals denied relief. The Supreme Court conditionally granted mandamus relief, holding that, under certain circumstances, the existing lawyer-client privilege extends to communications between a registered patent agent and the agent’s client. View "In re Andrew Silver" on Justia Law

A client’s communications with his registered patent agent, made to facilitate the agent’s provision of authorized legal services to the client, are privileged under Tex. R. Evid. 503.Andrew Silver brought a breach of contract action against Tabletop Media, LLC, alleging that it failed to pay him for his patent. During discovery, Tabletop sought production of emails between Silver and Raffi Gostanian, the patent agent who represented Silver before the United States Patent and Trademark Office. Silver refused to produce the emails, asserting that they were covered by the lawyer-client privilege. The trial court granted Tabletop’s motion to compel production. Thereafter, Silver sought mandamus relief. The court of appeals denied relief. The Supreme Court conditionally granted mandamus relief, holding that, under certain circumstances, the existing lawyer-client privilege extends to communications between a registered patent agent and the agent’s client. View "In re Andrew Silver" on Justia Law

In this discovery dispute, the Supreme Court conditionally granted mandamus relief and ordered the trial court to vacate its order directing a relator to turn over his computer and other electronic devices for forensic examination.Marion Shipman partnered with Mark and Jamie Shelton in various real estate ventures. After their business dealings ceased, a bank sued the Sheltons. Jamie brought a third-party action against Shipman, alleging fraud and breaches of contract and fiduciary duty. Jamie sought to discover a variety of records regarding Shipman’s business dealings with the Sheltons. Dissatisfied with Shipman’s production, Jamie filed a motion to compel and then a second motion to compel, the motion at issue in this case. In his motion, Jamie asserted that Shipman may have destroyed material evidence in this case and asked that the trial court tcompel Shipman to turn over his computer for forensic inspection. The trial court ordered Shipman to product his computer and all “media” for forensic examination. The Supreme Court held that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering Shipman to produce for forensic examination all his electronically stored files of every kind, whether business or personal, and regardless of whether they were related to the issues in the lawsuit, for seventeen years. View "In re Marion Shipman" on Justia Law

In this discovery dispute, the Supreme Court conditionally granted mandamus relief and ordered the trial court to vacate its order directing a relator to turn over his computer and other electronic devices for forensic examination.Marion Shipman partnered with Mark and Jamie Shelton in various real estate ventures. After their business dealings ceased, a bank sued the Sheltons. Jamie brought a third-party action against Shipman, alleging fraud and breaches of contract and fiduciary duty. Jamie sought to discover a variety of records regarding Shipman’s business dealings with the Sheltons. Dissatisfied with Shipman’s production, Jamie filed a motion to compel and then a second motion to compel, the motion at issue in this case. In his motion, Jamie asserted that Shipman may have destroyed material evidence in this case and asked that the trial court tcompel Shipman to turn over his computer for forensic inspection. The trial court ordered Shipman to product his computer and all “media” for forensic examination. The Supreme Court held that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering Shipman to produce for forensic examination all his electronically stored files of every kind, whether business or personal, and regardless of whether they were related to the issues in the lawsuit, for seventeen years. View "In re Marion Shipman" on Justia Law

In this, the second arising out of a 2014 judgment, the Supreme Court reversed the order of the court of appeals concluding that it lacked jurisdiction, holding that the order was a final appealable order.In the first appeal, Appellant posted a supersedes bond. The appeal was unsuccessful, and the trial court ordered Appellant and his surety to pay the full amount of the bond to Appellees. Appellant appealed from that order. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal, concluding that the payment order was not a final order, and therefore, the court lacked jurisdiction. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the order was a final appealable order. View "McFadin v. Broadway Coffee House, LLC" on Justia Law

The Vethan Law Firm represents Turner in a suit against Lopez, who is represented by Cweren. Vethan hired Wright as a paralegal to work on Turner’s case. Wright exchanged emails with lawyers, communicated with Turner, reviewed confidential information, drafted an engagement letter, and attended meetings in which Vethan attorneys discussed Turner’s case. Wright’s employment ended weeks later. Cweren hired Wright months later. To screen for potential conflicts, Cweren apparently asked interview questions based on the applicant’s resume. Wright did not disclose her employment at Vethan on her resume nor did she volunteer any information during the interview. Wright worked for Cweren on the Turner matter for several months, largely in a clerical capacity. After Vethan noticed Wright’s initials on Cweren documents, Vethan asserted that Wright’s participation required Cweren to withdraw as Lopez’s counsel. Wright denied that she had worked on the Turner matter while employed by Vethan. Cweren refused to withdraw but instructed Wright not to discuss the case with other employees, barred her from viewing any Turner files, and shifted all responsibility for the case to other paralegals. Vethan unsuccessfully moved to disqualify Cweren. The Supreme Court of Texas reversed. A court must grant a motion to disqualify a firm whose nonlawyer employee previously worked for opposing counsel if the nonlawyer obtained confidential information about the matter while working at the opposing firm and then shared that information with her current firm. Both requirements are met here. View "In re Turner" on Justia Law