Justia Texas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A client’s communications with his registered patent agent, made to facilitate the agent’s provision of authorized legal services to the client, are privileged under Tex. R. Evid. 503.Andrew Silver brought a breach of contract action against Tabletop Media, LLC, alleging that it failed to pay him for his patent. During discovery, Tabletop sought production of emails between Silver and Raffi Gostanian, the patent agent who represented Silver before the United States Patent and Trademark Office. Silver refused to produce the emails, asserting that they were covered by the lawyer-client privilege. The trial court granted Tabletop’s motion to compel production. Thereafter, Silver sought mandamus relief. The court of appeals denied relief. The Supreme Court conditionally granted mandamus relief, holding that, under certain circumstances, the existing lawyer-client privilege extends to communications between a registered patent agent and the agent’s client. View "In re Andrew Silver" on Justia Law

A client’s communications with his registered patent agent, made to facilitate the agent’s provision of authorized legal services to the client, are privileged under Tex. R. Evid. 503.Andrew Silver brought a breach of contract action against Tabletop Media, LLC, alleging that it failed to pay him for his patent. During discovery, Tabletop sought production of emails between Silver and Raffi Gostanian, the patent agent who represented Silver before the United States Patent and Trademark Office. Silver refused to produce the emails, asserting that they were covered by the lawyer-client privilege. The trial court granted Tabletop’s motion to compel production. Thereafter, Silver sought mandamus relief. The court of appeals denied relief. The Supreme Court conditionally granted mandamus relief, holding that, under certain circumstances, the existing lawyer-client privilege extends to communications between a registered patent agent and the agent’s client. View "In re Andrew Silver" on Justia Law

In this discovery dispute, the Supreme Court conditionally granted mandamus relief and ordered the trial court to vacate its order directing a relator to turn over his computer and other electronic devices for forensic examination.Marion Shipman partnered with Mark and Jamie Shelton in various real estate ventures. After their business dealings ceased, a bank sued the Sheltons. Jamie brought a third-party action against Shipman, alleging fraud and breaches of contract and fiduciary duty. Jamie sought to discover a variety of records regarding Shipman’s business dealings with the Sheltons. Dissatisfied with Shipman’s production, Jamie filed a motion to compel and then a second motion to compel, the motion at issue in this case. In his motion, Jamie asserted that Shipman may have destroyed material evidence in this case and asked that the trial court tcompel Shipman to turn over his computer for forensic inspection. The trial court ordered Shipman to product his computer and all “media” for forensic examination. The Supreme Court held that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering Shipman to produce for forensic examination all his electronically stored files of every kind, whether business or personal, and regardless of whether they were related to the issues in the lawsuit, for seventeen years. View "In re Marion Shipman" on Justia Law

In this discovery dispute, the Supreme Court conditionally granted mandamus relief and ordered the trial court to vacate its order directing a relator to turn over his computer and other electronic devices for forensic examination.Marion Shipman partnered with Mark and Jamie Shelton in various real estate ventures. After their business dealings ceased, a bank sued the Sheltons. Jamie brought a third-party action against Shipman, alleging fraud and breaches of contract and fiduciary duty. Jamie sought to discover a variety of records regarding Shipman’s business dealings with the Sheltons. Dissatisfied with Shipman’s production, Jamie filed a motion to compel and then a second motion to compel, the motion at issue in this case. In his motion, Jamie asserted that Shipman may have destroyed material evidence in this case and asked that the trial court tcompel Shipman to turn over his computer for forensic inspection. The trial court ordered Shipman to product his computer and all “media” for forensic examination. The Supreme Court held that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering Shipman to produce for forensic examination all his electronically stored files of every kind, whether business or personal, and regardless of whether they were related to the issues in the lawsuit, for seventeen years. View "In re Marion Shipman" on Justia Law

In this, the second arising out of a 2014 judgment, the Supreme Court reversed the order of the court of appeals concluding that it lacked jurisdiction, holding that the order was a final appealable order.In the first appeal, Appellant posted a supersedes bond. The appeal was unsuccessful, and the trial court ordered Appellant and his surety to pay the full amount of the bond to Appellees. Appellant appealed from that order. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal, concluding that the payment order was not a final order, and therefore, the court lacked jurisdiction. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the order was a final appealable order. View "McFadin v. Broadway Coffee House, LLC" on Justia Law

The Vethan Law Firm represents Turner in a suit against Lopez, who is represented by Cweren. Vethan hired Wright as a paralegal to work on Turner’s case. Wright exchanged emails with lawyers, communicated with Turner, reviewed confidential information, drafted an engagement letter, and attended meetings in which Vethan attorneys discussed Turner’s case. Wright’s employment ended weeks later. Cweren hired Wright months later. To screen for potential conflicts, Cweren apparently asked interview questions based on the applicant’s resume. Wright did not disclose her employment at Vethan on her resume nor did she volunteer any information during the interview. Wright worked for Cweren on the Turner matter for several months, largely in a clerical capacity. After Vethan noticed Wright’s initials on Cweren documents, Vethan asserted that Wright’s participation required Cweren to withdraw as Lopez’s counsel. Wright denied that she had worked on the Turner matter while employed by Vethan. Cweren refused to withdraw but instructed Wright not to discuss the case with other employees, barred her from viewing any Turner files, and shifted all responsibility for the case to other paralegals. Vethan unsuccessfully moved to disqualify Cweren. The Supreme Court of Texas reversed. A court must grant a motion to disqualify a firm whose nonlawyer employee previously worked for opposing counsel if the nonlawyer obtained confidential information about the matter while working at the opposing firm and then shared that information with her current firm. Both requirements are met here. View "In re Turner" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the judgments of the court of appeals and the trial court in this interlocutory appeal arising from Respondent’s lawsuit contesting the validity of a sex offender residency restrictions ordinance enacted by the City of Krum. Respondent sued the City, challenging the City’s authority to pass the ordinance. The City filed a plea to the jurisdiction, arguing that Respondent lacked standing to sue. The trial court denied the plea, and Respondent filed an interlocutory appeal. The court of appeals affirmed the order denying the City’s plea to the jurisdiction. The City filed a petition for review. While the petition was pending, the Texas Legislature passed House Bill 1111, codified at Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code 341.906, and the City amended its ordinance. The Supreme Court held that Respondent’s challenge to the ordinance was moot in light of these changes in the law. Therefore, the courts lacked jurisdiction over Respondent’s claims. The court vacated the judgments of the court of appeals and the trial court and dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. View "City of Krum, Texas v. Rice" on Justia Law

The proceedings involving the forfeiture of two handguns pursuant to Tex. Code Crim. Proc. 18.19 are civil in nature such that the Supreme Court has jurisdiction, but, in this case, conviction for possession of a weapon did not authorize a forfeiture under article 18.19(e), which allows forfeiture based on conviction of an offense involving use of the weapon.Defendant was arrested and convicted for the unlawful carrying of two handguns. Thereafter, the State moved under section 18.19(e) for forfeiture of the guns. The trial court granted the motions. The court of appeals determined that the forfeiture proceedings were civil in nature, severed the appeals of the forfeiture orders from the appeals of the convictions, and affirmed the forfeiture orders on the basis that “use” of a weapon under article 18.19(e) includes simply possessing the weapon. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) jurisdiction was proper in the Supreme Court; but (2) the trial court’s forfeiture orders made pursuant to article 18.19(e) were not valid when they were based on Defendant’s conviction under Tex. Penal Code 46. View "Tafel v. State" on Justia Law

In this tort suit arising from a real estate transaction, the Supreme Court conditionally granted mandamus relief to Relators from an order denying leave to designate Plaintiffs’ legal advisors as responsible third parties.Relators’ motion to designate was filed long after an initial trial date but seventy-six days before a new trial setting. The trial court denied the motion to designate without granting leave to replead. The court of appeals denied mandamus relief. The Supreme Court conditionally granted Relators’ petition for writ of mandamus, holding that the trial court erred in denying Relators’ motion because it was filed more than sixty days before the trial setting and the court did not afford Relators an opportunity to cure any pleading deficiency. View "In re Coppola" on Justia Law

At issue in this discovery dispute arising in the context of multidistrict litigation (MDL) involving allegations of underpaid homeowner insurance claims was whether a party’s attorney-billing information is discoverable when the party challenges an opposing party’s attorney-fee request as unreasonable or unnecessary but neither uses its own attorney fees as a comparator nor seeks to recover any portion of its own attorney fees. The MDL pretrial court ordered the insurer in this case to respond to the discovery requests. The Supreme Court conditionally granted mandamus relief and directed the trial court to vacate its discovery order, holding (1) compelling en masse production of a party’s billing records invades the attorney work-product privilege; (2) the privilege is not waived simply because the party resisting discovery has challenged the opponent’s attorney-fee request; and (3) such information is generally not discoverable. View "In re National Lloyds Insurance Co." on Justia Law