Justia Texas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, who owned insurance policies with National Lloyds Insurance Company, filed independent lawsuits against National Lloyds, claiming they were underpaid on claims following two hail storms in Hidalgo County. The Multidistrict Litigation Panel of Texas (MDL Panel) granted the motions of other insurance carriers seeking to transfer cases arising from the hail storms to a pretrial court and subsequently transferred Plaintiffs’ claims to the same pretrial court. At issue in this case was National Lloyd’s failure to produce certain information requested by Plaintiffs. The pretrial court entered an order compelling National Lloyds to produce six categories of documents, including “management reports and emails,” and assessed sanctions for attorney’s fees. National Lloyds sought mandamus relief, asserting that the compelled discovery was overbroad. The Supreme Court conditionally granted mandamus relief, holding (1) the pretrial court abused its discretion in compelling production of the management reports and emails; and (2) because the pretrial court’s order was overboard as the management reports and emails, but because National Lloyds failed to produce five other categories of discovery, the sanctions award must be reevaluated. View "In re National Lloyds Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The City of Corsicana, Navarro County, and Navarro College (collectively, Navarro) filed a Tex. R. Civ. P. 202 petition in the county court of Navarro County to investigate a potential tortious interference claim against the City of Dallas. The county court denied Dallas’s immunity-based plea to the jurisdiction, granted Navarro’s Rule 202 petition, and authorized depositions. The Supreme Court granted mandamus relief conditionally vacating the trial court’s order and remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to determine its jurisdiction over the claim Navarro sought to investigate. Remanded for the county court to vacate its order authorizing depositions and to first determine its jurisdiction in accordance with the standards discussed in this opinion. View "In re City of Dallas" on Justia Law

Norma Heredia filed a personal injury claim against Wal-Mart Stores, Texas. The trial court granted Wal-Mart’s motion for no-evidence summary judgment. Heredia then filed a notice of appeal and an affidavit of indigence in the trial court. No challenge to Heredia’s affidavit was filed within the following ten days, but the court of appeals issued a sua sponte order allowing any interested parties to file a challenge to Heredia’s affidavit in the ten days following the date of that order. Three days later, the court reporter filed a challenge to Heredia’s affidavit. Pursuant to the court of appeals’ order, the trial court set a hearing to determine Heredia’s indigence. Heredia filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court conditionally granted the writ and directed the court of appeals to vacate its order and to allow Heredia to proceed with her appeal without payment of costs, holding that the procedural rules do not permit any out-of-time challenges, regardless of the reason for delay. View "In re Norma Heredia" on Justia Law

Homeowners’ association River Oaks Property Owners, Inc. (ROPO) sued homeowner Carolyn Keenan seeking an injunction requiring Keenan to remove improvements that allegedly violated a limit on impervious cover. The limit was found in 2006 “Amended Restrictions” that purported to amend the neighborhood’s deed restrictions. Keenan counterclaimed, asserting that the Amendment Restrictions were unenforceable because an insufficient number of homeowners had voted for them. Keenan moved to compel production of the homeowner ballots on the Amended Restrictions after ROPO asserted that the ballots were confidential and privileged voting records. The trial court refused to order production of the ballots but stated that Keenan’s counsel could review the ballots without disclosing the contents "to anyone else." Keenan sought mandamus relief. The court of appeals denied relief. The Supreme Court disagreed and conditionally granted relief, holding that Keenan was entitled to copy the ballots and disclose them for purposes of discovery, expert analysis, trial preparation, and trial. View "In re Carolyn Frost Keenan" on Justia Law

A merchant vessel registered in Mexico and sailing with a Mexican crew was ferrying workers, all citizens of Mexico, from a Mexican port to an offshore drilling site when it sank off the coast of Mexico. One worker drowned. The deceased worker’s beneficiaries and ninety-one of the surviving workers sued the operator of the ship, a Mexican entity; the owner of the ship, a Mexican entity; and the operator’s marketing affiliate, a Texas entity created after the incident, for damages in Cameron County, Texas. Defendants moved to dismiss based on forum non conveniens. The trial court denied the motion. Defendants sought mandamus relief from the court of appeals. The court denied relief, ruling that Defendants’ lack of diligence in pursuing relief had prejudiced Plaintiffs. The Supreme Court conditionally granted mandamus relief and directed the trial court to issue an order dismissing the case for forum non conveniens, holding that the factors in Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 71.051(b) predominated in favor of dismissal. View "In re Oceanografia, S.A. de C.V." on Justia Law

ERG, a Texas entity, filed suit against a Canadian entity and a Bermudian shareholder in Texas for tortious interference with its share purchase agreement. ERG also filed suit against the Bermudian owner of the Colombian oil and gas operations in Texas for fraud. The court held that when the Canadian entity sought to purchase shares of a Bermudian entity that owns Colombian assets from a Bermudian shareholder and did not intend to develop a Texas business, it did not purposefully avail itself of Texas’s jurisdiction. The court held, however, that Texas courts have specific - although not general - jurisdiction over the Bermudian owner of the Colombian oil and gas operations. In this case, the claims against the Bermudian owner turn on its Texas-based executives’ alleged misrepresentations in Texas to a Texas entity. While these claims alleging malfeasance stemming from the actions of the executives here, and of those to whom they gave marching orders, is relevant to the specific jurisdiction analysis, these contacts are insufficient to confer general jurisdiction over the Bermudian owner. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Searcy v. Parex Resources, inc." on Justia Law

Defendants are three nonresident private-equity fund limited partnerships and their general partner. The funds invested in a newly created Texas subsidiary that purchased a chain of Texas hospitals from a Texas company. Cornerstone, a Texas company allegedly in the market to purchase the hospitals, filed suit alleging that this conduct was tortious and subjects defendants to Texas’s jurisdiction with respect to claims arising out of that conduct. The court held that the trial court has personal jurisdiction over the Funds and the General Partner where the claims arise out of defendants' Texas contacts and where exercising personal jurisdiction over defendants comports with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Cornerstone Healthcare Grp. Holding v. Nautic Mgmt." on Justia Law

J.B. Hunt’s tractor-trailer traveling on I-10 in Waller County struck a disabled vehicle that had entered the tractor-trailer’s lane. The vehicle’s occupants were injured; one ultimately died. J.B. Hunt sued the occupants in Waller County to recover property-damage costs. Days later, the occupants sued J.B. Hunt in Dallas County to recover personal-injury damages. The occupants of the car claimed, and the Dallas County court agreed, that exceptions to the first-filed rule applied, so the Dallas County court had dominant jurisdiction. The Supreme Court of Texas agreed with J.B. Hunt that the Waller County court has dominant jurisdiction. The occupants do not dispute whether their claims in the Dallas County suit were the subject of a pending action at the time of the Waller County petition, nor that the subject matter of the claims in the two suits otherwise satisfies the compulsory-counterclaim rule. Even if J.B. Hunt’s conduct was inequitable, the occupants failed to allege that the conduct caused their delay, if any, in filing suit. It would be odd and premature to require a potential litigant sit on his hands because his claim, viable though it may be, could be countered by an equally viable claim. View "In re J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc." on Justia Law

The Tarrant Regional Water District supplies water to two million Texans across 11 counties and is a governmental agency with the power of eminent domain. In 2010, the Water District and the City of Dallas approved a financing agreement to build a 150-mile pipeline to transport water owned by Dallas in Lake Palestine to the Dallas/Fort Worth area. Construction began in 2014. The proposed route crosses the 1,000-acre LazyW Ranch five miles northwest of Athens in Henderson County, with a 150-foot-wide underground easement, about 3,375 feet long, covering 11.623 acres. The owner, Bennett, opposed to the project, obtained legislation creating the LazyW District, a municipal utility district. Bennett sued the Water District for violating the Texas Open Meetings Act; the court of appeals concluded that the Water District was immune from suit. Bennett repeatedly tried, unsuccessfully, to replace incumbent board members who support the Project’s use of the Ranch and dedicated a small cemetery on the Ranch in the proposed pipeline's path. The Water District offered the Lazy W $169,218 for the easement, and when the offer was rejected, petitioned for condemnation. Bennett asserted governmental immunity. The court refused to proceed further without deciding whether the case should be dismissed. The court of appeals granted mandamus relief. The Supreme Court of Texas vacated, rejecting an argument that the trial court cannot rule on the Lazy W’s plea to the jurisdiction until the commissioners issue their award. It is important that the special commissioners convene and render an award expeditiously and without interference from the court. The trial court had the obligation to consider the Lazy W’s assertion of immunity when the plea to the jurisdiction was filed. View "In re Lazy W Dist. No. 1" on Justia Law

M-I and NOV compete, providing solid-control equipment to the oil-and-gas industry, including mesh screens that filter solid matter from drilling fluid. In 2012, Russo became business development manager of M-I’s screen division and obtained in-depth knowledge of M-I’s bidding strategies, pricing, customer preferences, solid-control systems, and deployment strategies. In 2014, Russo left M-I to become NOV’s screen division global product line manager. M-I sent Russo a letter, asserting breach of a non-compete agreement he executed when he joined M-I . Russo sought a declaration that the agreement was unenforceable. M-I counterclaimed for breach of the agreement, breach of fiduciary duty, misappropriation of trade secrets, and tortious interference, and asserted third-party claims against NOV. At a hearing on M-I’s application for a temporary injunction, M-I sought to establish its trade secrets by Moore’s oral testimony, and requested that everyone, except counsel, experts, and Russo be excluded from the courtroom. The trial court denied M-I’s request. Concerned about disclosing Moore’s testimony, M-I obtained a recess to petition the court of appeals for a writ of mandamus. M-I submitted, in camera to the court of appeals, Moore's affidavit detailing her proposed testimony . Russo and NOV objected to the affidavit as an ex parte communication. The court of appeals denied their motion for access, along with M-I’s mandamus petition. The Texas Supreme Court conditionally granted mandamus relief. The trial court erred in concluding that the exclusion of NOV’s designated representative from portions of the hearing involving trade secrets would violate due process without balancing the competing interests and must, on remand, conduct that balancing. The court also abused its discretion when it ordered the Moore affidavit disclosed without reviewing it in camera. View "In re M-I, L.L.C." on Justia Law