Justia Texas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Court of Criminal Appeals held David Dow, a post-trial capital defense attorney, in contempt for violating Court of Criminal Appeals Miscellaneous Rule 11-003 and suspended him from practicing before it for one year. Dow filed this original proceeding seeking mandamus and declaratory relief in the Supreme Court, contending that the Court of Criminal Appeals exceeded its authority in imposing the sanction. The Supreme Court dismissed Dow’s petition, holding (1) the Court does not have jurisdiction under the Constitution over Dow’s petition for mandamus relief; and (2) because the Court lacked mandamus jurisdiction, it also lacked jurisdiction to grant declaratory relief. View "In re Dow" on Justia Law

At issue in this residential construction dispute was whether the statutory cap on exemplary damages is waived if not pleaded as an affirmative defense or avoidance. The trial court affirmed an exemplary damages award in excess of the statutory cap because Petitioner did not assert the cap until her motion for a new trial. The court of appeals affirmed the exemplary damages award, concluding that the statutory cap on exemplary damages did not apply because Petitioner failed to expressly plead the cap as an affirmative defense. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the court of appeals’ judgment in relation to the exemplary cap, holding (i) the exemplary damages cap is not a matter ”constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense” and need not be affirmatively pleaded because it applies automatically when invoked and does not require proof of additional facts, and (ii) because Petitioner timely asserted the cap in her motion for new trial, the exemplary damages must be capped at $200,000; and (2) affirmed in all other respects. View "Zorilla v. Aypco Constr. II, LLC" on Justia Law

William Marsh Rice University (Rice University), a private institution of higher education, employed Officer Gary Spears as a commissioned peace officer at its police department. Officer Spears arrested Rasheed Rafaey for driving while intoxicated and other charges. The charges against Rafaey were later dismissed. Thereafter, Rafaey sued Officer Spears and Rice University (collectively, Defendants) alleging that the arrest and detention were unlawful. Defendants moved for summary judgment on the affirmative defense that Officer Spears was entitled to official immunity. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals dismissed Defendants’ interlocutory appeal without determining whether Officer Spears was entitled to official immunity, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction over the matter because Officer Spears was not an “officer or employee of the state” that may invoke a court of appeals’ interlocutory jurisdiction under Tex. Civil. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. 51.014(a)(5). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals had jurisdiction under section 51.014(a)(5) to consider the appeals of both Officer Spears and Rice University because the “officer…of the state” language in the statute applies to university peace officers. View "William Marsh Rice Univ. v. Rafael" on Justia Law

In this commercial dispute, Petitioner obtained a $6 million breach-of-contract and tort judgment against Respondents. After filing the lawsuit, Petitioner assigned its claims to its commercial lender. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, alleging that Petitioner had no standing to pursue the litigation because it had assigned the claims to the lender. The trial court concluded that Petitioner had standing. The court of appeals vacated the judgment and dismissed for want of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals failed to consider pertinent evidence before the trial court, and therefore, the cause must be remanded to the trial court for reconsideration. View "Vernco Constr., Inc. v. Nelson" on Justia Law

Two nonresident minors filed suit against Bridgestone Americas Tire Operations, LLC, the manufacturer of an allegedly defective tire that failed, causing a rollover that killed the children’s parents. The minors sued by a next friend - their uncle - who was a Texas resident. The residents resided in Mexico with their grandparents, who became the children’s legal guardians. Bridgestone filed a motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens, asserting that the case belonged in Mexico, not Texas. The trial court denied the motion. Bridgestone petitioned for writ of mandamus in the court of appeals. The court denied relief, concluding that because the next-friend was a Texas resident the case may not be dismissed on forum-non-conveniens grounds. Bridgestone subsequently sought mandamus relief in the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court conditionally granted Bridgestone’s petition for writ of mandamus and ordered the trial court to dismiss the action, holding (1) Texas law allows minors to sue by next friend when they have a legal guardian who is not authorized to sue in Texas in that capacity; (2) a next friend is not a plaintiff for purposes of the forum-non-conveniens statute’s Texas-resident exception; and (3) therefore, this case must be dismissed as a matter of law. View "In re Bridgestone Americas Tire Operations, LLC" on Justia Law

Farm Bureau County Mutual Insurance Company filed this declaratory judgment action against Cristil Rogers, Farm Bureau’s insured, seeking a declaration that it had no duty to defend or indemnify Rogers in an underlying tort action and requesting court costs and attorney fees. Rogers answered and prayed for recovery of her court costs and attorney fees. The trial court denied Farm Bureau’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that Farm Bureau had a duty to defend Rogers in the tort action. The order did not expressly address the parties’ claims for attorney’s fees. The court of appeals dismissed Farm Bureau’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction, concluding that the order denying Farm Bureau’s motion for summary judgment was not final and appealable because Rogers did not file a cross-motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the fact that Rogers did not file a cross-motion for summary judgment did not preclude the trial court from entering a final judgment; but (2) in the absence of the trial court’s intent with respect to the parties’ claims for attorney’s fees, the order at issue did not dispose of all parties and claims. View "Farm Bureau County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rogers" on Justia Law

Donald and Crystal Peel were traveling in their van when they were struck by a truck driven by Michael Conner and owned by Conner's employer. In 2004, the Peels sued Conner and his employer (collectively, Conner). Conner timely answered and requested discovery. The Peels did not respond. In 2013, when the Peels had done nothing to pursue their claims, Conner moved to dismiss for want of prosecution. The trial court refused to dismiss and directed the Peels to respond to Conner’s requests for discovery served more than eight years earlier. Conner filed a petition for mandamus directing the trial court to dismiss the case. The court of appeals denied relief. Conner subsequently petitioned the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court conditionally granted the petition for writ of mandamus and directed the trial court to vacate its order denying Conner’s motion to dismiss and directed the court to dismiss this suit for want of prosecution. View "In re Conner" on Justia Law

A judgment creditor attempted to collect from a partnership after receiving a judgment against the partnership. The partnership proved to be undercapitalized, and its assets could not satisfy the judgment debt. The judgment creditor brought this action seeking a judgment against the individual partners. The trial court granted the partners’ motion for summary judgment. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that limitations precluded pursuit of the partners’ assets because the limitations period began when the underlying cause of action accrued, and that period had passed. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the limitations period against a partner generally does not commence until after final judgment against the partnership is entered; and (2) because this action was brought within that period, limitations did not bar this suit against the partners. View "Am. Star Energy & Minerals Corp. v. Stowers" on Justia Law

When Richmont Holdings, Inc. bought the assets of Superior Recharge Systems, LLC the parties signed an asset Purchase Agreement that contained an arbitration provision. Superior Discharge’s part-owner, Jon Blake, signed an employment contract to continue as general manager of the business. The contract contained a covenant not to compete but not an arbitration provision. After Blake’s employment was terminated, Superior Recharge and Blake (together, Blake) sued Richmont in Denton County for fraud and breach of contract. Richmont then sued Blake individually in Dallas County to enforce the covenant not to compete. The Dallas County suit was subsequently abated. Nineteen months after being sued, Richmont moved to compel arbitration, asserting that Blake’s claims arose out of the Asset Purchase Agreement. The trial court denied the motion, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed. On remand, the court of appeals concluded that Richmont had waived arbitration by substantially invoking the judicial process. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circumstances of this case did not approach a substantial invocation of the judicial process. Remanded. View "Richmont Holdings, Inc. v. Superior Recharge Sys., LLC" on Justia Law

“In Texas, the general rule…is that an injured party cannot sue the tortfeasor’s insurer directly until the tortfeasor’s liability has been finally determined by agreement or judgment.” Plaintiff sued San Diego Tortilla (SDT) for personal injuries after he lost his hand operating a tortilla machine. Plaintiff then added a declaratory judgment claim against SDT’s liability insurer, Essex Insurance Company, seeking a declaration that Essex must indemnify SDT for its liability to Plaintiff. Essex filed motions to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims, arguing that the “no direct action” rule barred Plaintiff from suing Essex until SDT’s liability to Plaintiff was determined. The trial court denied the motions, and the court of appeals denied Essex’s petition for writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court conditionally granted mandamus and directed the trial court to grant Essex’s motions to dismiss, holding that no exception to the “no direct action” rule applied in this case. View "In re Essex Ins. Co." on Justia Law