Justia Texas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioners in this case were Mexican citizens who broadcast television programs on over-the-air signals that originated in Mexico but traveled into parts of Texas. Respondents were residents of Texas who alleged that Petitioners defamed them in some of those television programs. Petitioners filed special appearances challenging the trial court’s jurisdiction over them. The trial court denied the special appearances. In an interlocutory appeal, the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the evidence supported the trial court’s conclusion that Petitioners had minimum contacts with Texas and that the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction over Petitioners will not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. View "TV Azteca, S.A.B. de C.V. v. Ruiz" on Justia Law

Middle school and high school cheerleaders, through their parents, sued Kountze Independent School District after the District prohibited them from displaying banners at school-sponsored events containing religious messages or signs. The District filed a plea to the jurisdiction, asserting mootness in light of its subsequent adoption of a resolution providing that the District was not required to prohibit religious messages on school banners. The trial court denied the District’s plea. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Plaintiffs’ claims for declaratory and injunctive relief were moot because the District voluntarily discontinued its prohibition on the display of banners containing religious messages or signs. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the resolution only states that the District is not required to prohibit the cheerleaders from displaying religious messages on school banners and reserves to the District discretion in regulating those banners, this case was not moot, as the challenged conduct might reasonably be expected to recur. Remanded. View "Matthews v. Kountze Indep. Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against Defendant, alleging breach of contract and misappropriation of trade secrets. Concerned by Plaintiffs’ counsel’s (Counsel) exposure to certain documents as a result of Counsel working “closely” with Defendant’s former finance manager, Defendant moved to disqualify Counsel from representing Plaintiff. The special master denied the motion to disqualify. The trial court, however, ordered Counsel’s disqualification. The court of appeals subsequently denied Plaintiffs’ petition for mandamus relief. The Supreme Court conditionally granted mandamus relief, holding that the trial court improperly disqualified Counsel under In re American Home Products Corp., as the American Home Products screening requirement does not govern a fact witness with information about his former employer if his position with that employer existed independently of litigation and he did not primarily report to lawyers. Rather, to the extent that a fact witness discloses his past employer’s privileged and confidential information, the factors outlined in In re Meador should guide the trial court’s decision regarding disqualification. View "In re RSR Corp. and Quemetco Metals Ltd., Inc." on Justia Law

Respondent sued Petitioners and attempted to serve Petitioners by using Petitioners’ registered address on file with the Secretary of State’s office. Petitioners, however, had moved several years earlier and had failed to provide an updated registered address to the Secretary of State. Petitioners did not answer the lawsuit, and Respondent obtained a default judgment. Pursuant to Tex. R. Civ. P. 239a, Respondent certified Petitioners’ outdated address as their last known mailing address, even though there was some evidence Respondent had actual notice of Petitioners’ current address. Petitioners failed to receive notice of the default judgment. Petitioners filed a petition for an equitable bill of review, asserting that Respondent had not properly served them with process and not had properly certified their last known mailing address for notice of the default judgment. The trial court granted Respondent’s motion for summary judgment. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because Petitioners presented some evidence that their failure to receive notice of the default judgment resulted solely from Respondent’s failure to properly certify Petitioners’ last known mailing address, and not from any negligence or fault on Petitioners’ part, Petitioners raised a genuine issue of material fact in their bill-of-review claim. View "Kay Venture, Ltd. v. Cremona Bistro Corp." on Justia Law

The Court of Criminal Appeals held David Dow, a post-trial capital defense attorney, in contempt for violating Court of Criminal Appeals Miscellaneous Rule 11-003 and suspended him from practicing before it for one year. Dow filed this original proceeding seeking mandamus and declaratory relief in the Supreme Court, contending that the Court of Criminal Appeals exceeded its authority in imposing the sanction. The Supreme Court dismissed Dow’s petition, holding (1) the Court does not have jurisdiction under the Constitution over Dow’s petition for mandamus relief; and (2) because the Court lacked mandamus jurisdiction, it also lacked jurisdiction to grant declaratory relief. View "In re Dow" on Justia Law

At issue in this residential construction dispute was whether the statutory cap on exemplary damages is waived if not pleaded as an affirmative defense or avoidance. The trial court affirmed an exemplary damages award in excess of the statutory cap because Petitioner did not assert the cap until her motion for a new trial. The court of appeals affirmed the exemplary damages award, concluding that the statutory cap on exemplary damages did not apply because Petitioner failed to expressly plead the cap as an affirmative defense. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the court of appeals’ judgment in relation to the exemplary cap, holding (i) the exemplary damages cap is not a matter ”constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense” and need not be affirmatively pleaded because it applies automatically when invoked and does not require proof of additional facts, and (ii) because Petitioner timely asserted the cap in her motion for new trial, the exemplary damages must be capped at $200,000; and (2) affirmed in all other respects. View "Zorilla v. Aypco Constr. II, LLC" on Justia Law

William Marsh Rice University (Rice University), a private institution of higher education, employed Officer Gary Spears as a commissioned peace officer at its police department. Officer Spears arrested Rasheed Rafaey for driving while intoxicated and other charges. The charges against Rafaey were later dismissed. Thereafter, Rafaey sued Officer Spears and Rice University (collectively, Defendants) alleging that the arrest and detention were unlawful. Defendants moved for summary judgment on the affirmative defense that Officer Spears was entitled to official immunity. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals dismissed Defendants’ interlocutory appeal without determining whether Officer Spears was entitled to official immunity, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction over the matter because Officer Spears was not an “officer or employee of the state” that may invoke a court of appeals’ interlocutory jurisdiction under Tex. Civil. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. 51.014(a)(5). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals had jurisdiction under section 51.014(a)(5) to consider the appeals of both Officer Spears and Rice University because the “officer…of the state” language in the statute applies to university peace officers. View "William Marsh Rice Univ. v. Rafael" on Justia Law

In this commercial dispute, Petitioner obtained a $6 million breach-of-contract and tort judgment against Respondents. After filing the lawsuit, Petitioner assigned its claims to its commercial lender. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, alleging that Petitioner had no standing to pursue the litigation because it had assigned the claims to the lender. The trial court concluded that Petitioner had standing. The court of appeals vacated the judgment and dismissed for want of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals failed to consider pertinent evidence before the trial court, and therefore, the cause must be remanded to the trial court for reconsideration. View "Vernco Constr., Inc. v. Nelson" on Justia Law

Two nonresident minors filed suit against Bridgestone Americas Tire Operations, LLC, the manufacturer of an allegedly defective tire that failed, causing a rollover that killed the children’s parents. The minors sued by a next friend - their uncle - who was a Texas resident. The residents resided in Mexico with their grandparents, who became the children’s legal guardians. Bridgestone filed a motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens, asserting that the case belonged in Mexico, not Texas. The trial court denied the motion. Bridgestone petitioned for writ of mandamus in the court of appeals. The court denied relief, concluding that because the next-friend was a Texas resident the case may not be dismissed on forum-non-conveniens grounds. Bridgestone subsequently sought mandamus relief in the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court conditionally granted Bridgestone’s petition for writ of mandamus and ordered the trial court to dismiss the action, holding (1) Texas law allows minors to sue by next friend when they have a legal guardian who is not authorized to sue in Texas in that capacity; (2) a next friend is not a plaintiff for purposes of the forum-non-conveniens statute’s Texas-resident exception; and (3) therefore, this case must be dismissed as a matter of law. View "In re Bridgestone Americas Tire Operations, LLC" on Justia Law

Farm Bureau County Mutual Insurance Company filed this declaratory judgment action against Cristil Rogers, Farm Bureau’s insured, seeking a declaration that it had no duty to defend or indemnify Rogers in an underlying tort action and requesting court costs and attorney fees. Rogers answered and prayed for recovery of her court costs and attorney fees. The trial court denied Farm Bureau’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that Farm Bureau had a duty to defend Rogers in the tort action. The order did not expressly address the parties’ claims for attorney’s fees. The court of appeals dismissed Farm Bureau’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction, concluding that the order denying Farm Bureau’s motion for summary judgment was not final and appealable because Rogers did not file a cross-motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the fact that Rogers did not file a cross-motion for summary judgment did not preclude the trial court from entering a final judgment; but (2) in the absence of the trial court’s intent with respect to the parties’ claims for attorney’s fees, the order at issue did not dispose of all parties and claims. View "Farm Bureau County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rogers" on Justia Law