Justia Texas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs in this case were more than 400 residents and homeowners in the upper White Oak Bayou watershed in Harris County. From 1998 to 2002, most of Plaintiffs’ homes were inundated in three successive floods. Plaintiffs filed an inverse condemnation suit against several government entities, arguing that Defendants knew that harm was substantially certain to result to Plaintiffs’ homes when Defendants approved private development in the White Oak Bayou watershed without mitigating its consequences. Defendants responded with a combined plea to the jurisdiction and motion for summary judgment, contending that no genuine issue of material fact had been raised on the elements of the takings claim. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals affirmed the denial of the plea to the jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a fact question existed as to each element of Plaintiffs’ takings claim, and therefore, the government entities’ plea to the jurisdiction was properly denied. View "Harris County Flood Control Dist. v. Kerr" on Justia Law

To suspend execution of a money judgment on appeal, a judgment debtor must post security as required by Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 52.006 and Tex. R. App. P. 24. The security must cover compensatory damages, interest, and costs, but is subject to caps. In this case, Longview Energy Company obtained a judgment against five defendants for breach of fiduciary duty. Defendants appealed and together posted a $25 million bond as security to supersede enforcement of the judgment. The trial court applied the caps separately to each of four jointly and severally liable defendants, requiring the four defendants to post security equal to the lesser of $25 million or fifty percent of Defendants’ net worth. The court of appeals reversed the security order, concluding that Defendants were together required to post only $25 million in security to supersede the judgment as to them all. All parties petitioned the Supreme Court for relief by mandamus. The Supreme Court denied mandamus relief, holding (1) the money judgment award at issue was not for “compensatory damages,” and therefore, the Court need not consider whether the court of appeals correctly applied the caps on security; and (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering post-judgment discovery. View "In re Longview Energy Co." on Justia Law

Respondent, a former employee of San Antonio Water System (SAWS), sued SAWS under the Texas Commission on Human Rights (TCHRA), alleging that SAWS retaliated against her for opposing a discriminatory employment practice. Specifically, Respondent contended that she was terminated because she confronted a male vice president about his repeated lunch invitations to two female employees outside his department. The jury awarded Respondent nearly $1 million in damages. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and dismissed the claim, holding that no reasonable person could have believed that sexual harassment under the TCHRA occurred, and therefore, Respondent did not engage in a protected activity under the TCHRA when she confronted the vice president. View "San Antonio Water Sys. v. Nichols" on Justia Law

After an investigation, the City of Houston declared the Park Memorial condominiums uninhabitable. Because the condominium owners did not apply for an occupancy certificate or make necessary repairs within the requisite period of time, the City ordered all residents to vacate the complex. A group of owners later brought this inverse-condemnation action, alleging that their property was taken when they were forced to vacate. The trial court sustained the City’s plea to the jurisdiction, concluding that the owners had not alleged a taking. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the condominium owners’ claim failed because they did not allege a taking. View "City of Houston v. Carlson" on Justia Law

Tex. R. Civ. P. 202 allows a “proper court” to authorize a deposition to investigate a potential claim before it is filed. In this case, “the Trooper,” an anonymous blogger, launched an online attack on The Reynolds & Reynolds Co. and its chairman (collectively, Reynolds). To discover the Trooper’s identity, Reynolds filed a Rule 202 petition in the Harris County district court seeking to depose Google, Inc., which hosts the blog, and requesting that Google disclose the contact information of the owner of the blog website. Reynolds stated that it anticipated the institution of litigation against the Trooper. The Trooper opposed Reynolds’ petition, arguing that because he did not have minimal contacts with Texas sufficient for a Texas court to exercise personal jurisdiction over him, there was no “proper court” under Rule 202 to order a deposition to investigate a suit in which he may be a defendant. The trial court ordered that Google be deposed. The Supreme Court conditionally granted the Trooper’s petition for writ of mandamus and directed the trial court to vacate its order, holding that the trial court’s order exceeded its authority under Rule 202 because a “proper court” must have personal jurisdiction over the potential defendant. View "In re John Doe A/K/A “Trooper”" on Justia Law

A trial court may substitute a regular juror with an alternate if the regular juror is unable to fulfill or is disqualified from fulfilling his duties. A trial court may only dismiss a juror and proceed with fewer than twelve jurors if the dismissed juror is constitutionally disabled. In this child custody dispute, the trial court empaneled twelve jurors and retained one alternate. The trial court subsequently substituted the alternate juror for a regular juror whom it found to be disqualified. During the trial, the trial court found that one of the jurors had become disabled and proceeded with eleven jurors. The eleven-member jury returned a unanimous verdict. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that dismissal of the disqualified juror resulted in an eleven-member jury in violation of the constitutional right to a jury trial. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals failed to property examine the two dismissals under their appropriate standards. Remanded. View "In re Interest of M.G.N." on Justia Law

The Porretto family owned several acres of property between the Galveston Seawall and the Gulf of Mexico. Due to the State’s repeated recharacterization of the Porretto’s property as public property, the Porrettos had difficulty selling the property. The Porrettos sued the State, arguing that the State’s claims made it impossible for them to sell their property and therefore amounted to a compensable taking. The trial court held that the State’s actions had resulted in a compensable taking and awarded the Porrettos $5.012 million as damages for the lost market value of the property taken. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the State’s actions did not constitute a taking. The Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeals' conclusion that the State’s conduct did not constitute a taking and affirmed. View "Porretto v. Tex. Gen. Land Office" on Justia Law

Shayn Proler, a firefighter with the Houston fire department, filed an administrative grievance seeking reassignment to a fire suppression unit under the terms of a collective bargaining agreement. After a hearing, Proler was reassigned to fire suppression. The City appealed, and Proler counterclaimed for disability discrimination. The trial court granted Proler’s plea to the jurisdiction. After a trial, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Proler on his disability claim. The court of appeals (1) reversed the order granting Proler’s plea to the jurisdiction insofar as the City claimed the hearing examiner exceeded his jurisdiction by awarding overtime compensation and insofar as the City requested declaratory judgment relief on this issue; and (2) affirmed the trial court’s judgment awarding injunctive relief and attorney fees to Proler on his disability discrimination claim. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the court of appeals’ judgment reversing the order granting Proler’s plea to the jurisdiction; and (2) reversed the court of appeals’ judgment insofar as it affirmed the trial court’s judgment granting injunctive relief and attorney fees to Proler on his disability discrimination claim, as there was no evidence Proler was discriminated against on account of a disability. View "City of Houston v. Proler" on Justia Law

The city of Laredo filed suit to condemn Respondents' property. A jury found that the City had no authorized public use for the property and awarded Respondents attorney's fees and expenses under Tex. Prop. Code 21.019(c), a fee-shifting statute that authorizes the trial court to award a property owner reasonable and necessary fees and expenses when condemnation is denied. The court of appeals reformed the award in part and, as reformed, affirmed. The City appealed, asking the Supreme Court to remand the attorney's fees award for reconsideration because of inadequacies in Respondents' proof. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that deficiencies remained in Respondents' proof of attorney's fees. Remanded. View "City of Laredo v. Montano" on Justia Law

The Time Cole Act (Act) entitles a person who has been wrongfully imprisoned to compensation from the State. Payments terminate, however, if, after the date the person becomes eligible for compensation, the person is convicted of a crime punishable as a felony. Michael Blair had a lengthy criminal record. Blair was first convicted in 1988. In 1993, Blair was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. In 2004, Blair pleaded guilty to four indictments of indecency with a child, for which he was given three consecutive life sentences. In 2008, the court of criminal appeals set aside Blair's murder conviction based on DNA evidence, and the State dismissed the charge. Defendant subsequently applied for compensation for having been wrongfully incarcerated from 1993 to 2004. The Comptroller denied compensation. The Supreme Court concluded that the Comptroller correctly denied Blair's claim for compensation, holding that the Act does not require payments to a felon who remains incarcerated for a conviction that occurred before he became eligible for compensation. View "In re Blair" on Justia Law