Justia Texas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this health care liability claim, the trial court denied Rusk State Hospital's challenge to the plaintiffs' expert reports. The hospital filed an interlocutory appeal from that ruling. On appeal, the hospital, for the first time, asserted it was immune from suit. The court of appeals refused to consider the immunity issue because it had not been presented to the trial court. After addressing the merits of the hospital's challenge to the expert reports, the court of appeals remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the court of appeals erred by refusing to consider the immunity claim because immunity from suit implicates courts' subject-matter jurisdiction; but (2) the case was properly remanded, as (i) the pleadings and record neither established a waiver of the hospital's immunity nor conclusively negated such a waiver, and (ii) the hospital had not shown conclusively that either the plaintiffs had a full, fair opportunity in the trial court to develop the record as to immunity and amend their pleadings, or that if the case was remanded and the plaintiffs were given such an opportunity they could not show immunity had been waived. View "Rusk State Hosp. v. Black" on Justia Law

Respondent, a professor at Prairie View A&M University, filed a complaint with the EEOC and the Texas Workforce Commission civil rights division (TWC), alleging race and nationality-based pay discrimination, about two years after her promotion to full professor. Respondent subsequently filed suit against the University in state court under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (TCHRA). The University filed a plea to the jurisdiction, asserting Respondent's complaint was untimely filed pursuant to the 180-day limitations period under the TCHRA. The trial court denied the University's plea. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the federal Ledbetter Act, which provides that the limitations period begins anew each time a claimant receives a paycheck containing a discriminatory amount, applies to claims brought under the TCHRA, and Respondent's claim was therefore timely because she received a paycheck containing an alleged discriminatory amount within 180 days of the date she filed her complain with the TWC. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Ledbetter Act does not apply to a claim brought under the TCHRA; and (2) because Respondent failed to timely file her complaint with the TWC, her suit was jurisdictionally barred. View "Prairie View A&M Univ. v. Chatha " on Justia Law

Michael Wayne Bohannan pleaded guilty to two counts of aggravated rape with a deadly weapon. Upon being released on mandatory supervision, Bohannan was thrice returned to prison for sexual crimes. After receiving a psychologist's report that Bohannan was a sexually violent predator (SVP), the State petitioned for his commitment. After a jury trial, the trial court issued an order of civil commitment. Bohannan appealed, contending that the trial court's exclusion of certain testimony on the basis that the expert was "not qualified to present an opinion" on whether someone is an SVP was error. The court of appeals determined that the exclusion of the testimony was harmful error and remanded the case for a new trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, though for different reasons, holding that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the testimony on the grounds that the expert was not a physician or psychologist rather than examining her experience and training, and the exclusion was harmful. View "In re Commitment of Bohannan" on Justia Law

As tasked by the Legislature, the Texas Water Development Board (TWDB) identified potential reservoir sites. Hearts Bluff Game Ranch, Inc. purchased some of the wetlands on one of the sites identified by the TWDB as a potential reservoir location. When the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers denied its application for a mitigation banking permit because the State had identified the site as a potential reservoir, Hearts Bluff sued the State and the Corps for a taking for interfering with its asserted right to commercially develop the land as a mitigation bank. At issue was whether a takings claim against the State may be predicated on the denial of a permit by the federal government when the State had no authority to grant or deny the permit. The trial court denied the State's plea to the jurisdiction, which alleged that Hearts Bluff failed to plead a valid takings claim. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that absent demonstrating bad faith, Hearts Bluff did not establish the existence of jurisdiction in this case because it did not establish a viable takings claim. View "Hearts Bluff Game Ranch, Inc. v. State" on Justia Law

This was an appeal from the City of Austin's condemnation of property to build a parking garage for a nearby convention center and a facility to chill water to cool nearby buildings. A jury found the City's determination that the property was necessary for public use was fraudulent, in bad faith, and arbitrary and capricious, and the trial court entered judgment on the verdict, invalidating the taking. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the City's determination that the property was necessary for public use was not fraudulent, in bad faith, or arbitrary and capricious. Remanded. View "City of Austin v. Whittington" on Justia Law

The Texas Tort Claims Act imposes a lesser duty of care on the government when a premises liability claim does not involve a special defect. Plaintiff sued City, claiming that its negligence in creating and failing to repair, or warn of, a street's dangerous condition caused her to have an accident while bicycling. City moved for summary judgment, arguing that the street's condition was not a special defect but rather an ordinary premises defect of which Plaintiff was aware and the City was not. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that the condition was a special defect. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and dismissed the case, holding (1) the condition in this case was not a special defect; and (2) City was not liable for an ordinary premises defect because Plaintiff had no evidence that City knew about this hazard before her accident. View "City of Denton v. Paper" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought a Deceptive Trade Practices Act suit against Company and its co-operators for violating the terms of a contract. Through a process server, Plaintiff served all three Defendants with citations, but one citation contained an error in a co-operator's name. Defendants failed to file a timely answer, and Plaintiff obtained a default judgment. Defendants filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that service on the co-operator was improper and that Defendants established the necessary Craddock elements to set aside the default judgment. The trial court denied the motion, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendants asserted facts that, if true, established the first Craddock element, i.e., that the failure to appear was not intentional or the result of conscious indifference but was the result of a mistake or an accident. Remanded for consideration of the second and third elements of the Craddock test. View "Sutherland v. Spencer" on Justia Law

After Employer fired her, Plaintiff filed suit, alleging that she was discriminated against based on her race, national origin, age, and gender. Employer filed a plea to the jurisdiction, arguing that Plaintiff's pleadings failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination because Plaintiff was replaced by another Mexican-American woman who was three years older than Plaintiff. The trial court denied Employer's plea. The court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the plea should have been granted on the age-discrimination, as replacement by an older worker was not fatal to Plaintiff's claim. The Supreme Court reversed and dismissed the suit, holding (1) to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (TCHRA), a plaintiff in a true replacement case must show she was (i) a member of the protected class, (ii) qualified for her employment position, (iii) terminated by the employer, and (iv) replaced by someone younger; and (2) because Plaintiff here was replaced by an older worker, she failed to allege a prima facie case, and the trial court should have granted Defendant's plea to the jurisdiction. View "Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia" on Justia Law

Sarah Friend collapsed at a city-owned water park in North Richland Hills. City employees responded with oxygen masks and other airway equipment but did not retrieve an Automatic External Defibrillator device (AED) from a storage closet elsewhere on the park grounds. Sarah died later that day. Friend's estate sued several defendants, including the City and some of its employees, claiming their gross negligence in failing to retrieve and use the AED caused Sarah's untimely death. Pursuant to section 101.106(e) of the Texas Tort Claims Act, the trial court dismissed the employees. The trial court denied the City's plea to the jurisdiction on three alternative grounds. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and rendered judgment dismissing the Friends' claims against the City, holding that the City's immunity was not waived by section 101.021 of the Tort Claims Act, which permits a plaintiff to rely on the "condition or use of tangible personal property" waiver provision if the plaintiff alleges that the governmental unit used property that lacked an integral safety component. View "City of North Richland Hills v. Friend " on Justia Law

Petitioner claimed a trailer was his, but, upon evidence the trailer was stolen, the justice court awarded the trailer to the State. Later, Petitioner filed for bankruptcy and scheduled the trailer as an asset of his estate. Petitioner also sued for damages for the lost use of his property as a constitutionally compensable taking. The trial court dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction, concluding that the justice court judgment was not void but was only voidable, and the judgment was voidable only if the bankruptcy court made certain determinations. The court of appeals reversed, holding (1) a judgment rendered in violation of the automatic stay is void, not merely voidable, and a state court has jurisdiction to make that determination, even though the bankruptcy court might later disagree; and (2) as to Petitioner's takings claim, subsisting fact issues precluded dismissal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a judgment that violates the automatic stay is void and subject to collateral attack in state court; but (2) the judicial award of property to the State was not, in these circumstances, a taking. Remanded. View "York v. State" on Justia Law