Justia Texas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

At issue in this case was the interpretation a land description in an option contract between Landowners and an oil and gas company (Company). Landowners argued that the description excluded a 400-acre tract. Company argued that the description included the 400-acre tract. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Company. The court of appeals reversed and remanded, concluding that the option contract was ambiguous and that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed on different grounds, holding that Landowners’ interpretation of the contract was the only reasonable interpretation, and therefore, the court of appeals erred in holding that the contract was ambiguous. Remanded. View "North Shore Energy, L.L.C. v. Harkins" on Justia Law

RSL Funding, LLC had arbitration agreements with three individuals (collectively, Individuals) who owned annuity contracts they agreed to sell to RSL or its designee. Neither RSL nor the Individuals had arbitration agreements with the companies that wrote the annuity contracts (collectively, MetLife). After MetLife refused to honor contracts by which the Individuals sold their annuities, RSL sued MetLife and the Individuals in the County Court at Law (CCL) for a declaratory judgment. A district court suit was also initiated involving the same parties and subject matter. The Individuals initially joined forces with RSL but disputes subsequently arose. RSL initiated arbitration with the Individuals and moved to stay the CCL suit pending completion of arbitration. The CCL denied the motion. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that RSL waived its right to arbitrate through its litigation conduct in the trial courts. The First Circuit affirmed but on different grounds, holding (1) the court of appeals erred by determining that RSL waived its right to arbitrate by litigation conduct; but (2) RSL did not challenge a separate ground on which the trial court court have denied RSL’s motion to stay the litigation - that RSL failed to join its assignees in the arbitration. View "RSL Funding, LLC v. Pippins" on Justia Law

Brian Bresch entered into a contract with Nationwide Insurance Company that contained a forum-selection clause. The clause designated Franklin County, Ohio as the place to settle disputes arising from the agreement. Bresch later sued several Nationwide affiliates for, among other causes of action, breach of contract. Bresch filed the underlying lawsuit in Travis County, Texas. Nationwide sought to enforce the forum-selection clause by moving to dismiss the Texas litigation. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. Nationwide subsequently sought mandamus relief in the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court conditionally granted Nationwide’s petition and directed the trial court to enforce the parties’ forum-selection clause, holding that because Bresch failed to establish that the clause was waived or otherwise unenforceable, the trial court abused its discretion by not enforcing it. View "In re Nationwide Ins. Co. of Am." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a reservoir engineer, purported to identify ten localized areas in oil-and-gas formations in East Texas that offered optimized production. Plaintiff sued Southwestern Energy Production Company (SEPCO), an oil and gas operator, alleging that SEPCO misused the proprietary information about the ten “sweet spots” acquired under a confidentiality agreement and profited from its use. After a trial, the jury awarded $11.445 as tort damages for misappropriate and contact damages for breach of the confidentiality agreement and $23.89 million in equitable disgorgement of past profits. The court of appeals affirmed the actual damages award for misappropriation but reversed and rendered a take-nothing judgment on the disgorgement and breach-of-contract awards. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the breach-of-contract and misappropriation-of-trade-secret claims and remanded for a new trial, concluding that limitations was not conclusively established and that there was insufficient evidence to sustain the entire jury award; and (2) the equitable disgorgement issue need not be addressed because the trial court must determine the issue anew on remand following a new trial. View "Southwestern Energy Prod. Co. v. Berry" on Justia Law

The Texas Optometry Act prohibits commercial retailers of ophthalmic goods from attempting to control the practice of optometry; authorizes the Optometry Board and the Attorney General to sue a violator for a civil penalty; and provides that “[a] person injured as a result of a violation . . . is entitled to the remedies. In 1992, Wal-Mart opened “Vision Centers” in its Texas retail stores, selling ophthalmic goods. Wal-Mart leased office space to optometrists. A typical lease required the optometrist to keep the office open at least 45 hours per week or pay liquidated damages. In 1995, the Board advised Wal-Mart that the requirement violated the Act. Wal-Mart dropped the requirement and changed its lease form, allowing the optometrist to insert hours of operation. In 1998, the Board opined that any commercial lease referencing an optometrist’s hours violated the Act; in 2003, the Board notified Wal-Mart that it violated the Act by informing optometrists that customers were requesting longer hours. Optometrists sued, alleging that during lease negotiations, Wal-Mart indicated what hours they should include in the lease and that they were pressured to work longer hours. They did not claim actual harm. A jury awarded civil penalties and attorney fees. The Fifth Circuit certified the question of whether such civil penalties, when sought by a private person, are exemplary damages limited by the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Chapter 41. The Texas Supreme Court responded in the affirmative, noting that “the certified questions assume, perhaps incorrectly, that the Act authorizes recovery of civil penalties by a private person, rather than only by the Board or the Attorney General.” View "Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Forte" on Justia Law

After Tenant moved into her apartment, her apartment and several adjoining units were severely damaged in a fire that originated in Tenant’s clothes dryer. Insurer paid Landlord’s insurance claim and then sued Tenant for negligence and breach of the Apartment Lease Contract. The jury found that Tenant breached the lease agreement and awarded $93,498 in actual damages and attorney’s fees from Insurer. Tenant filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, asserting several grounds for avoiding enforcement of the contract. The trial court granted Tenant’s motion and rendered a take-nothing judgment. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the residential-lease provision imposing liability on Tenant for property losses resulting from “any other cause not due to [the landlord’s] negligence or fault” was void and unenforceable because it broadly and unambiguously shifted liability for repairs beyond legislatively authorized bounds. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the court of appeals properly rejected Tenant’s ambiguity defense; but (2) the court of appeals erred in invalidating the lease provision on public-policy grounds. Remanded. View "Philadelphia Indem. Ins. Co. v. White" on Justia Law

Plaintiff entered into an agreement with Defendant, a municipality, to install pollution control equipment at a power plant. Plaintiff fully performed the agreement, but Defendant withheld the retainage from Plaintiff. Consequently, Plaintiff filed a breach of contract action against Defendant and requested reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees, costs, and interest. Defendant filed a plea to the jurisdiction seeking dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims for attorney’s fees for lack of jurisdiction, arguing that attorney’s fees were outside the scope of statutorily-waived immunity as Tex. Local Gov’t Code 271.152 was written at the time of the agreement. In response, Plaintiff argued that Defendant had no immunity from suit because it was performing a proprietary function in its dealings with Plaintiff. The trial court granted Defendant’s plea to the jurisdiction and dismissed Plaintiff’s claims for attorney’s fees. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Defendant was performing a proprietary function and, therefore, was not immune from suit based on governmental immunity; and (2) a claim for attorney’s fees arising from those proprietary actions does not implicate governmental immunity. View "Wheelabrator Air Pollution Control, Inc. v. City of San Antonio" on Justia Law

In the 1990s, the Wassons assumed an existing ninety-nine-year lease of property owned by the City of Jacksonville that specified that the property was to be used for residential purposes only. In 2009, the Wassons conveyed their interest in the lease to Wasson Interests, Ltd (WIL), which violated the lease terms. The city sent WIL an eviction notice, but the City and WIL subsequently entered into a reinstatement agreement that required WIL to cease and desist all commercial activity in violation of the lease. Later, the City sent WIL yet another eviction notice, contending that WIL’s use of the property violated the reinstatement agreement. WIL sued for breach of contract. The City filed a combined motion for traditional and no-evidence summary judgment on several grounds, including governmental immunity. The trial court granted the motion. The court of appeals affirmed based on governmental immunity. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the common-law distinction between proprietary and governmental acts applies to contract claims; and (2) the court of appeals erred in holding that in a breach of contract action, a City has immunity for proprietary acts. Remanded for a determination as to whether the lease contract was entered into in the City’s proprietary or governmental capacity. View "Wasson Interests, Ltd. v. City of Jacksonville" on Justia Law

Four oil and gas leases were assigned in one instrument. At issue in this case was how to calculate a production payment reserved in the assignment of the four leaseholds. When two of the leases terminated, the payor asserted that the production payment should be reduced to reflect the loss of the underlying mineral-lease interests. The payee responded by asserting that the production payment burdened the four leases jointly and that the assignment included authorization to adjust the payment. The trial court construed the assignment as allowing for the production payment’s adjustment based on the expiration of an underlying lease. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the production payment could not be reduced because the assignment failed to include “express language providing for a piecemeal reduction of the production payment.” The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court rendered the correct judgment in this case. View "Apache Deepwater, LLC v. McDaniel Partners, Ltd." on Justia Law

In general, an overriding royalty on oil and gas production must bear its share of postproduction costs unless the parties agree otherwise. The Hyder family leased 948 mineral acres to Chespeake Exploration, LLC. The Hyders and Chesapeake agreed that the overriding royalty in the parties’ lease was free of production costs but disputed whether it was also free of postproduction costs. The trial court rendered judgment for the Hyders, awarding them postproduction costs that Chesapeake wrongfully deducted from their overriding royalty. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the parties’ lease clearly freed the overriding royalty of postproduction costs. View "Chesapeake Exploration, LLC v. Hyder" on Justia Law