Justia Texas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner granted Respondent a right of way to construct a pipeline across Petitioner’s property. The parties signed an agreement requiring Respondent to install the pipeline by boring underground in order to preserve the trees on the property. The construction company Respondent hired, however, cut down several hundred feet of trees. A jury found Respondent liable for damage to Petitioner’s property on both breach of contract and trespass theories and awarded damages both to compensate Petitioner for the reasonable cost to restore the property and for the intrinsic value of the destroyed trees. The court of appeals reversed based on the trial court’s failure to submit a jury question on whether the injury to the property was temporary or permanent. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the general rule that temporary injury to real property entitles the owner to damages commensurate with the cost of restoring the property and permanent injury to the property entitles the owner commensurate with the loss in the fair market value to the property as a whole applies when the wrongful conduct causing the injury stems from breach of contract rather than tort; (2) the common law exception to this general rule that entitles the landowner to damages in keeping with the intrinsic value of the destroyed trees applies in this case; and (3) any error in the jury charge related to such damages was harmless. Remanded. View "Gilbert Wheeler, Inc. v. Enbridge Pipelines, LP" on Justia Law

William Drennan worked as an executive with Exxon Mobil Corporation (ExxonMobil), a Texas-based corporation. During his employment, Drennan received several forms of compensation through the corporation’s executive bonus-compensation Incentive Programs. The Incentive Programs included choice-of-law provisions providing for application of New York Law and allowed forfeiture of an executive’s bonus awards for engaging in “detrimental activity.” After Drennan retired he accepted a position at Hess Corporation, another large energy company. Drennan’s incentive awards were subsequently forfeited on the grounds that “there was a material conflict of interest, constituting detrimental activity” under the Incentive Programs. Drennan sued. The trial court entered judgment for ExxonMobil. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the choice-of-law provisions were unenforceable, that Texas law applied, and that the detrimental-activity provisions, as forfeiture conditions, were unenforceable covenants not to compete under Texas law. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the New York choice-of-law provisions in the executive compensation plan were enforceable and that the detrimental-activity provisions were enforceable under New York law. View "Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Drennen" on Justia Law

Homeowner lived in a house that she insured with Farmers Insurance Exchange. The policy contained a clause suspending dwelling coverage if the house was vacant for more than sixty days. Homeowner subsequently moved into a retirement community. While the policy was still effective, fire from a neighboring house spread to Homeowner’s house and damaged it. Farmers denied Homeowner’s claim on the basis that the house had been vacant for more than sixty days. Homeowner sued Farmers for breach of contract. The trial court granted summary judgment for Homeowner on the contract claim. The court of appeals reversed and rendered judgment for Farmers, concluding that Farmers was not required to establish that the vacancy contributed to cause the loss in order to assert the vacancy clause as a defense. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Farmers was not precluded from relying on language in the vacancy clause in response to Homeowner’s claim, and the vacancy provision must be applied according to its terms. View "Greene v. Farmers Ins. Exch." on Justia Law

A Homeowner contracted with a Builder to build a home on property owned by the Homeowner. The Builder contracted with a Plumber to put in the plumbing at the house. After the home was completed, the Builder and the Homeowner sued the Plumber for damages allegedly caused by plumbing leaks, alleging breach of contract, breach of express warranty, and negligence. The trial court granted summary judgment for the Plumber, reasoning (1) the Homeowner could not recover contract damages because it was not a party to the plumbing subcontract, nor could the Builder recover contract damages because it had not suffered any compensable damage; and (2) the plaintiffs did not have a negligence claim because they did not allege violation of any tort duty independent of the contract. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals erred in concluding that the pleadings and summary judgment evidence negated the existence of a negligence claim. View "Chapman Custom Homes, Inc. v. Dallas Plumbing Co." on Justia Law

Bill Head, doing business as Bill Head Enterprises (Head), hired Petroleum Solutions, Inc. to manufacture and install an underground fuel system at the truck stop Head owned and operated. After a major diesel-fuel leak occurred, Respondents sued Petroleum Solutions for its damages. The trial rendered judgment in favor of Head and in favor of third-party defendant Titeflex, Inc., the alleged manufacturer of a component part incorporated into the fuel system, on Titeflex’s counterclaim against Petroleum Solutions for statutory indemnity. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the judgment as to Head, holding that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing the sanctions of charging the jury with a spoliation instruction and striking Petroleum Solutions’ statute-of-limitations defense, and the trial court’s abuse of discretion was harmful; and (2) affirmed the judgment as to Titeflex’s indemnity claim, holding that Titeflex was entitled to statutory indemnity from Petroleum Solutions. Remanded for further proceedings between Respondents and Petroleum Solutions. View "Petroleum Solutions, Inc. v. Head" on Justia Law

A lessee leased a marina from a governmental entity providing that the premises be used only as a "marina, restaurant, gasoline and sundry sales and as a recreational facility.” When the governmental entity terminated the lease the business sued for breach of contract. The government entity filed a plea to the jurisdiction asserting governmental immunity. At issue in this case was whether Chapter 271 of the Texas Local Government Code waived the governmental entity’s immunity from suit. The trial court concluded that it did, and the court of appeals agreed. The Supreme Court disagreed with the lower courts and dismissed the lessee’s claims for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the parties’ lease agreement did not constitute a written contract stating the essential terms of an agreement for providing goods or services to a local government entity, and therefore, Chapter 271 did not waive the governmental entity’s immunity from suit. View "Lubbock County Water Control & Improvement Dist. v. Church & Akin, LLC" on Justia Law

An owner contracted with an Architect to prepare plans and specifications for the construction of a light rail. A General Contractor was awarded the contract to construct the project. The Architect and General Contractor had no contract with each other. Because the Architect’s plans were full of errors, the General Contractor lost nearly $14 million on the project. The General Contractor filed a tort suit against the Architect, alleging negligent misrepresentation. The trial court rendered judgment for the General Contractor for $2.25 million plus interest. The Architect appealed, arguing that the economic loss rule barred the General Contractor’s claim. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the economic loss rule applied in this case to preclude the General Contractor from recovering delay damages from the Architect. View "LAN/STV v. Martin K. Eby Constr. Co., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sued Ford Motor Company for injuries they sustained in a roll-over accident. The case was submitted to a jury. After the jury began its deliberations, the parties agreed to settle the case. Ford, however, later refused to pay the settlement amount to Plaintiffs, and Plaintiffs sued for breach of contract. After hearing all of the evidence, the jury found the settlement agreement was invalid because of fraudulent inducement and mutual mistake. The court of appeals reversed the trial court’s take-nothing judgment, concluding that the circumstantial evidence of fraud in the case was legally insufficient. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals’ judgment and reinstated the judgment of the trial court, holding that the circumstantial evidence was legally sufficient to support the jury’s verdict. View "Ford Motor Co. v. Castillo" on Justia Law

Respondents sold a collection of insurance companies to Petitioners in an agreement that contained an arbitration clause. Petitioners later invoked arbitration, alleging breach of contract. After Respondents complained about Petitioners’ first and second choice arbitrators the American Arbitration Association (AAA) struck the arbitrators. Petitioners’ third appointee was not challenged, and the arbitration proceeding resulted in an award in Respondents’ favor. When Respondents filed a motion to confirm the award in the trial court, Petitioners renewed their previous objection to the disqualification of their first-choice arbitrator. Ultimately, the court of appeals held that the arbitration panel was properly appointed under the terms of the arbitration agreement and the AAA rules. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because the AAA disqualified Petitioners’ first-choice arbitrator for partiality, the arbitration panel was formed contrary to the express terms of the arbitration agreement; (2) therefore, the arbitration panel exceeded its authority when it resolved the parties’ dispute; and (3) accordingly, the arbitration award must be vacated. View "Americo Life, Inc. v. Myer" on Justia Law

Borrower borrowed $696,000 from Lenders. The note was secured by a deed of trust covering real property. Guarantor guaranteed the loan under a guaranty agreement that included a general waiver of defenses. Borrower subsequently defaulted on the loan, and Purchaser purchased the secured property in a nonjudicial foreclosure sale for $487,200. The fair market value of the property was $840,000. Purchaser sued Guarantor to recover the $266,748 balance remaining on the note after applying all credits and the proceeds from the sale. Guarantor argued that under Tex. Prop. Code Ann. 51.003 any deficiency owed should be offset by the difference between the fair market value and the foreclosure price. The trial court granted summary judgment for Guarantor. The court of appeals reversed, holding (1) section 51.003 creates an affirmative defense, and (2) by agreeing to a general waiver of defenses in the guaranty agreement Guarantor waived his right of offset. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Guarantor waived his statutory right to an offset. View "Mehrdad v. Interstate 35/Chisam Road, L.P." on Justia Law