Justia Texas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

An Insured obtained an insurance policy to reimburse its expenses in regaining control of an oil well in the event the well blew out. The well subsequently blew out and caught fire. The Insured represented to the Insurer that it owed 100 percent working interest in the well, andthe Insurer paid claims accordingly. After the Insurer discovered that the Insured might have possessed less than 100 percent working interest in the well, the Insurer filed a lawsuit for a return of its payments under breach of contract and equity claims. The court of appeals entered summary judgment in favor of the Insurer on its equity claims, but a different court of appeals overturned the prior rulings, concluding that the Insurer had no equitable right to reimbursement. The Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeals that the Insurer could not proceed on its equity claims but for different reasons, holding that because the insurance contract addressed the Insured’s conduct, the Insurer could not rely on its equity claims. Remanded to the court of appeals to address the contract claims. View "Gotham Ins. Co. v. Warren E&P, Inc." on Justia Law

TXU Portfolio Management Company (TXU) entered into a contract with FPL Energy, LLC to receive electricity and renewable energy credits (RECs) from wind farms owned by FPL. After FPL failed to provide the electricity and RECs, TXU filed a breach of contract action against FPL. FPL counterclaimed, arguing that TXU failed to provide it with sufficient transmission capacity. The trial court granted two partial summary judgments declaring (1) the contracts required TXU to provide transmission capacity, and (2) the contracts’ liquidated damages provisions were unenforceable. After a jury trial on the remaining issues, the trial court entered take-nothing judgments for both parties. The court of appeals reversed both summary judgment rulings. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the court of appeals’ holding that TXU owed no contractual duty to provide transmission capacity; but (2) reversed the portion of the court of appeals’ judgment regarding liquidated damages, holding that the liquidated damages provisions applied only to RECs and were unenforceable as a penalty. Remanded for a determination of damages. View "FPL Energy, LLC v. TXU Portfolio Mgmt. Co., L.P." on Justia Law

Mike Richey sold his interest in Richey Oilfield Construction, Inc. to Nighthawk Oilfield Services, Ltd. Richey remained employed as president of Richey Oil and became a limited partner in Nighthawk. The primary agreements regarding the transaction were a stock purchase agreement, an agreement for the purchase of Richey Oil’s goodwill, and a promissory note. Each of the acquisition agreements contained a forum selection clause naming Tarrant County as the venue for state court actions. When the business did not go as well as the parties had hoped, Richey filed suit in Wise County, where Richey resided, against two Nighthawk executives (together, Relators) for, among other claims, breach of fiduciary duty, common law fraud, statutory fraud, and violations of the Texas Securities Act. Relators responded by unsuccessfully moving the trial court to transfer venue to Tarrant County or dismiss the suit pursuant to the mandatory venue selection clauses in the acquisition agreements. Relators subsequently sought mandamus relief. The Supreme Court conditionally granted relief, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to enforce the forum selection clauses in the acquisition agreements. View "In re Fisher" on Justia Law

A commercial tenant (Tenant) remained in possession of property for over ten years after Tenant lost its lease when the property was sold through foreclosure. The new owner (Owner) continually insisted that Tenant vacate the premises, and Tenant ultimately conceded that it had become a tenant at sufferance. Owner filed suit against Tenant, alleging claims for breach of the terminated lease, for trespass and other torts, and for violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act (DTPA). The trial court entered summary judgment for Tenant on all claims. The court of appeals reversed and remanded in part. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding (1) a tenant at sufferance cannot be liable for breach of a previously terminated lease agreement; (2) a tenant at sufferance is trespassing and can be liable in tort, including tortious interference with prospective business relations; (3) Tenant in this case could not be liable under the DTPA; and (4) Owner in this case could not recover attorney’s fees under the Texas Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act. View "Coinmach Corp. v. Aspenwood Apartment Corp." on Justia Law

Ewing Construction Company entered into a contract with a school district to serve as general contractor on a project. The school district later filed suit against Ewing for faulty construction. Ewing tendered defense of the underlying suit to Amerisure Insurance Company, Ewing's insurer under a commercial package policy that included commercial general liability coverage. Amerisure denied coverage, and Ewing filed suit in federal district court seeking a declaration that Amerisure breached its duty to defend and indemnify Ewing for damages awarded in the underlying suit. The district court granted summary judgment for Amerisure, concluding that the policy’s contractual liability exclusion applied to exclude coverage because Ewing assumed liability for its own construction work pursuant to the contract such that it would be liable for damages arising out of its defective work. On appeal, the court of appeals certified questions to the Texas Supreme Court, which answered that “a general contractor that enters into a contract in which it agrees to perform its construction work in a good and workmanlike manner, without more specific provisions enlarging this obligation, does not ‘assume liability’ for damages arising out of the contractor’s defective work so as to trigger the contractual liability exclusion.” View "Ewing Constr. Co., Inc. v. Amerisure Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Respondent was employed by the Canutillo Independent School District as executive director of facilities and transportation. After reporting alleged financial improprieties to the District authorities, Respondent was fired for allegedly making threatening personal phone calls to another man during work hours. Respondent subsequently sued the District for violation of the Texas Whistleblower Act and for breach of contract. The trial court granted Respondent's plea to the jurisdiction. The court of appeals held that the trial court erred in granting the plea as it related to Respondent's whistleblower claim but otherwise affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the court of appeals' judgment, holding that the trial court properly granted the plea to the jurisdiction, holding (1) Respondent's complaints to District authorities were not good-faith complaints of a violation of law to a "law enforcement authority" under the Whistleblower Act, and thus, the plea to the jurisdiction was well taken; and (2) Respondent's breach of contract claim failed because Respondent failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. View "Canutillo Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Farran" on Justia Law

Seller and Buyers entered into a contract for a deed. Buyers made payments to Seller for almost three years. Because Seller did not provide Buyers with all information required by Tex. Prop. Code 5(D), Buyers later told Seller they were exercising their statutory right to cancel and rescind the contract for deed. Seller sued Buyers for breach of contract. Buyers counterclaimed for violations under the Property Code, among other statutory violations. Seller, in turn, alleged he was entitled to a setoff in the amount of the fair market rental value of the property for the time Buyers occupied the house. The trial court entered judgment in favor of Buyers, awarding actual damages for cancellation and rescission of the contract for deed, among other damages. The Court reversed the trial court's awards of actual damages for cancellation and rescission, holding (1) subchapter D's cancellation-and-rescission remedy contemplates mutual restitution of benefits among the parties; and (2) thus, Buyers were required to restore to Seller supplemental enrichment in the form of rent for their interim occupation of the property upon cancellation and rescission of the contract for deed. Remanded. View "Morton v. Nguyen" on Justia Law

Respondents were successors-in-interest to 380 acres of land once owned by Baker, now deceased. Petitioners entered into a lease agreement with Baker that contained an option allowing Petitioners to buy the land if Baker decided to sell it. Petitioners and Baker subsequently agreed that Petitioners would purchase the 380 acres for $470,000. Petitioners attempted to exercise their right to buy the property under the agreement, but Respondents brought a declaratory judgment action to void the agreement. The trial court rendered a final judgment for Petitioners. The court of appeals reversed, concluding (1) the agreement was ambiguous as to whether it was a presently binding contract or merely an agreement to agree, and (2) therefore, the agreement's enforceability was a fact issue that should not have been determined by summary judgment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the agreement contained all material terms and was an enforceable contract as a matter of law. Remanded. View "McCalla v. Baker's Campground, Inc." on Justia Law

Homes built with an exterior insulation and finish system (EIFS) suffer serious water damage that worsens over time. Homebuilder began a remediation program in which it offered to homeowners to remove exterior EIFS from the homes it had built and to replace it with conventional stucco. Almost all the homeowners accepted Homebuilder's offer of remediation. Homebuilder sought indemnification for the costs from its insurers (Insurers). Insurers denied coverage, preferring instead to wait until the homeowners sued. This litigation ensued. Now, only one insurer remained. The court of appeals reversed the trial court's judgment in favor of Homebuilder, finding (1) Homebuilder failed to establish its legal liability to the homeowners to trigger Insurer's coverage; and (2) Homebuilder failed to offer evidence of damages covered by the policy. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Homebuilder's settlements with the homeowners established both Insurer's legal liability for the property damages and the basis for determining the amount of loss; and (2) Insurer's policy covered Homebuilder's entire remediation costs for damaged homes. View "Lennar Corp. v. Markel Am. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The family of a nursing home patient filed this action against the nursing home for, inter alia, medical negligence, negligence per se, breach of contract, and retaliation. Plaintiffs asserted the retaliation claim under the Texas Health & Safety Code, which creates a cause of action against a nursing facility that retaliates against a resident or family member who makes a complaint concerning the facility. Defendants moved to dismiss all of the claims pursuant to the Texas Medical Liability Act (TMLA) because the expert report was deficient. The trial court dismissed all of Plaintiffs' claims except for the retaliation claim, concluding that the claim was not a health care liability claim (HCLC) for which the TMLA requires a supporting expert report. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' judgment with respect to the retaliation claim, holding that because the retaliation claim was based on the same factual allegations on which one of Plaintiffs' HCLCs was based, the claim should have been dismissed for lack of a sufficient expert report. View "PM Management-Trinity NC, LLC v. Kumets" on Justia Law