Justia Texas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this "double-fraction" dilemma arising from antique mineral conveyances in which the parties used two fractions, the Supreme Court held that the meaning of a 1924 deed's mineral reservation of "one-half of one-eighth" equalled one-half of the mineral estate.The parties in this case were the parties who derived from the grantees (White parties) and the parties whose interests derived from the grantors (Mulkey parties). The ownership of certain royalties turned on which side correctly interpreted the 1924 deed's mineral reservation of "one-half of one-eighth." The trial court entered an order granting the White parties' motion for partial summary judgment on the construction of the deed, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the lower courts erred in holding that the Mulkey parties did not have a one-half interest in the minerals because (1) the presumption that "1/8" was used as a term of art to refer to the "mineral estate" was not rebutted in this case; and (2) alternatively, the presumed-grant doctrine would confirm that the Mulkey parties had title to one-half of the mineral estate. View "Van Dyke v. Navigator Group" on Justia Law

In this oil and gas case, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the trial court's summary judgment, holding that a fact issue remained on Plaintiffs' claim for breach of the lease and that Plaintiffs' argument was not barred by res judicata but that the court of appeals erred by reversing a take-nothing summary judgment as to Plaintiffs' tort and statutory claims.At issue was the meaning and application of an express covenant to protect against drainage that appeared in a lease addendum that expressly limited the location of wells that may trigger Defendant-Lessee's obligation to protect against drainage but did not directly address the location of wells that may cause drainage. Plaintiffs-Lessors argued that the covenant allowed for separate triggering and draining wells and that Defendant breached the covenant by failing to protect against drainage from a non-triggering well. In response, Defendant argued that it had a duty to protect only against drainage from the limited class of triggering wells. The Supreme Court held (1) the addendum was ambiguous because both interpretations of the covenant were reasonable; (2) the court of appeals improperly reversed the trial court's take-nothing summary judgment on Plaintiffs' tort and statutory claims; and (3) remand was required for further proceedings on Plaintiffs' claim for breach of the lease. View "Rosetta Resources Operating, LP v. Martin" on Justia Law

In this premises-defect case, the Supreme Court denied the petition for writ of mandamus brought by Eagleridge Operating, LLC seeking relief from a trial court order striking its responsible-third-party designation under Chapter 33 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, holding that Eagleridge failed to establish that it was entitled to the writ.In this action, Eagleridge argued that a former well site owner-operator bore continuing responsibility for injuries caused by a burst gas pipeline because the former owner acted as an independent contractor in constructing, installing, and maintaining the pipeline. The lower courts concluded that Occidental Chemical Corp. v. Jenkins, 478 S.W.3d 640 (Tex. 2016), was controlling and that the former owners' responsibility for premises defects did not survive the conveyance of its ownership interest. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that an agreement between tenants in common to allocate expenses, assign responsibilities, and compensate for disparate efforts in a joint endeavor does not create an exception to Occidental as to improvements each party would otherwise have been free to construct without the consent of the other. View "In re Eagleridge Operating, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals rendering judgment that delivery of the grantor's fractional share in the pipeline occurred in the gathering pipeline rather than the transportation pipeline, holding that the court of appeals did not err.A deed conveying the mineral estate in this case reserved a nonparticipating royalty interest in kind, meaning that the grantor retained ownership of a fractional share of all minerals in place. The deed required delivery of the grantor's fractional share "free of cost in the pipe line, if any, otherwise free of cost at the mouth of the well or mine[.]" The parties agreed that the royalty did not include production and postproduction costs incurred before delivery into the existing gas pipeline but disagreed about the pipeline's location under the terms of the deed. The trial court concluded that delivery occurred in the transportation pipeline. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that delivery occurs in the gathering pipeline. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals correctly interpreted the deed in this case. View "Nettye Engler Energy, LP v. Bluestone Natural Resources II, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the trial court's grant of summary judgment for Defendants in this trespass-to-try-title suit between the lessees of adjacent mineral estates, holding that the court of appeals erred.In its complaint, Plaintiff claimed that Defendants drilled wells either on Plaintiff's leasehold or closer to the lease line than allowed by Railroad Commission rules. Defendants argued in response that Plaintiff ratified an agreed boundary line, foreclosing Plaintiff's trespass claims. The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendants. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that a boundary stipulation between the fee owners of the two mineral estates, which Plaintiff accepted, was void and could not be ratified. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the boundary stipulation was valid and that Defendants conclusively established their ratification defense. View "Concho Resources, Inc. v. Ellison" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the Texas Propane Gas Association (TPGA) demonstrated standing to bring its suit against the City of Houston for a declaratory judgment that the City's ordinances regulating the liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) industry to include imposing criminal fines for violations were preempted by state law.The City brought two jurisdictional challenges to TPGA's suit: (1) the City argued that civil courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate TPGA's preemption claim because the local regulations it challenged carried criminal penalties; and (2) the City argued that TPGA could only challenge the City's LPG regulations that have injured at least one of its members. The trial court refused to dismiss the suit for lack of jurisdiction. The court of appeals remanded the case to the trial court for TPGA to amend its pleadings, agreeing that TPGA could not challenge the City's regulations en masse. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) TPGA's claim was not a criminal law matter that must be raised in defense to prosecution; and (2) the City's argument, while framed as a challenge to TPGA's standing, was in fact a merits challenge, and TPGA demonstrated standing to bring the preemption claim it pleaded. View "Texas Propane Gas Ass'n v. City of Houston" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals concluding that Petitioners (collectively, BPX) were not entitled to summary judgment on the issue of whether Margaret Strickhausen impliedly ratified an unauthorized pooling agreement, holding that BPX did not establish implied ratification as a matter of law.BPX was a lessee of Strickhausen's mineral interest. The lease required BPX to obtain Strickhausen's express written consent before pooling her tract with others. Strickhausen never gave express written consent to BPX, which meant that BPX could not pool "under any circumstances." Strickhausen sued BPX for breach of contract, among other claims, after BPX filed a certificate of pooling authority for a well on her tract. BPX filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Strickhausen impliedly ratified the pooling because she accepted royalty payments calculated on a pooled basis. The trial court granted an interlocutory summary judgment for BPX on Strickhausen's wrongful pooling, commingling, and failure to account claims. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that summary judgment for BPX on the issue of implied ratification was improper. View "BPX Operating Co v. Strickhausen" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed in part the judgment of the court of appeals holding that limitations barred a mineral estate lessee's claims for injuries to its interests in one of its nine separate leases but did not bar the lessee's claims for injuries to its interests in the other eight leases, holding that the evidence did not conclusively establish that the first legal injury occurred outside the limitations period.At issue was when, for purposes of the statute of limitations, the lessee's claim that hydrogen sulfide an operator injected back into the earth migrated beneath the surface and injured the lessee's interest in the minerals underlying nearby properties accrued. The trial court concluded that the lessee's claims occurred at least two years before the lessee first filed them and were therefore untimely. The court of appeals reversed in part. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendant did not establish a right to summary judgment based on limitations. View "Regency Field Services LLC v. Swift Energy Operating LLC" on Justia Law

In this interlocutory appeal concerning two jurisdictional challenges the City of Houston made to this suit brought by the Texas Propane Gas Association (TPGA) seeking a declaratory judgment that the City's ordinances regulating the liquefied petroleum gas industry to include imposing criminal fines for violations were preempted by state law, the Supreme Court held that the trial court did not lack jurisdiction on either ground asserted by the City.In challenging the court's jurisdiction the City argued (1) civil courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate TPGA's preemption claim because the local regulations it challenges carry criminal penalties, and (2) TPGA could challenge only those regulations that had injuries at least one of its members. The trial court refused to dismiss the matter for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held (1) TPGA's claim was not a criminal law matter that must be raised in defense to prosecution; and (2) TPGA's second argument, while framed as a challenge to TPGA's standing, was really a merits challenge, and TPGA demonstrated standing to bring its preemption claim. View "Texas Propane Gas Ass'n v. City of Houston" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the trial court's grant of summary judgment for Defendants in this trespass to try title suit, holding that the trial court properly granted summary judgment for Defendants.Plaintiff and Defendants were lessees of adjacent mineral estates. Plaintiff brought this suit alleging that Defendants drilled several wells either on Plaintiff's leasehold or closer to the lease line that allowed by Railroad Commission rules. Defendants claimed that Plaintiff ratified the boundary line through a boundary stipulation between the fee owners of the two mineral estates and Plaintiff's written acceptance of the stipulation, thus foreclosing the trespass claims. The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendants. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the boundary stipulation was void and therefore could not be ratified. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the boundary stipulation was valid; and (2) Defendants conclusively established their ratification defense. View "Concho Resources, Inc. v. Ellison" on Justia Law