Justia Texas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

When Mother and Father divorced, the decree gave Mother the exclusive right to determine the primary residence of the couple’s two sons and ordered Father to pay monthly child support. After Mother moved to another city with the children, Father filed a motion to modify the divorce decree to obtain the right to determine the children’s residence and to reduce his child support. The trial court granted Father’s petition. After the trial court’s plenary jurisdiction had expired, Mother filed a motion to reopen and vacate order, arguing that she had not been given notice of Father’s motion to modify because she did not live at the address where the citation was posted. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals dismissed Mother’s appeal for want of jurisdiction, concluding that Mother’s motion did not extend the trial court’s plenary jurisdiction and post-judgment deadlines to run from the date she received notice of the trial court’s order because it was not captioned a motion under Tex. R. Civ. P. 306a. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that justice plainly required the trial court and court of appeals to treat Mother’s motion as extending post-judgment deadlines and that Mother's appeal was timely filed. Remanded. View "In re Interest of J.Z.P." on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the scope of attorneys’ immunity from civil liability to non-clients. Philip Byrd and Nancy Simenstad commenced divorce proceedings. Simenstad was represented in the proceedings by Cantey Hanger, LLP. The parties eventually settled. The decree awarded Simenstad three aircraft as her separate property, including a Piper Seminole that had been owned by Lucy Leasing, Co., LLC. Byrd and two of the companies awarded to Byrd in the decree later sued Simenstad and Cantey Hanger alleging that after the decree was entered, Defendants falsified a bill of sale transferring the Piper Seminole from Lucy Leasing to a third party in order to shift tax liability for the aircraft to Byrd in contravention of the divorce decree. The trial court granted summary judgment to Cantey Hanger on attorney-immunity grounds. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the firm’s alleged misconduct was unrelated to the divorce litigation and that the firm had not conclusively established its entitlement to immunity. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the trial court’s judgment, holding that Canter Hanger conclusively established that it is immune from civil liability to Plaintiffs, and therefore, the trial court’s grant of summary judgment was proper. View "Cantey Hanger, LLP v. Byrd" on Justia Law

Respondents, a same-sex couple who were married in Massachusetts, sought a divorce in Texas. The two women settled their differences, and the trial court orally granted an ostensible divorce pursuant to the parties’ agreement. The State filed a petition in intervention seeking to oppose the petition for divorce and to defend the constitutionality of Texas law that limits divorce actions to persons of the opposite sex who are married to one another. The State argued that the court lacked jurisdiction to render a divorce. The trial court ultimately decided not to entertain the State’s petition, concluding that the attempted intervention was untimely. The court of appeals dismissed the State’s appeal for want of jurisdiction, also ruling that the intervention was untimely. The State sought the Supreme Court’s review, asking the Court to allow the intervention and to vacate the divorce. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals and denied the State’s petition for writ of mandamus, holding that the State failed to secure standing by properly presenting its arguments to the trial court and court of appeals, and consequently, the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction to reach those issues. View "State v. Naylor" on Justia Law

When Wayne Ventling initiated divorce proceedings seeking to end a common-law marriage to Patricia Johnson the parties entered into an agreement that included contractual alimony payments to Johnson. Thereafter, Ventling argued that he and Johnson had never been married, and therefore, his contractual obligations were invalid. The dispute over the agreed divorce decree spawned eighteen years of litigation and was now on its third appeal. The remaining issues were when postjudgment interest began accruing, whether Johnson was correctly denied both prejudgment and postjudgment interest for a portion of the proceedings, and whether the trial court erred in denying Johnson’s request for conditional appellate attorney fees. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the court of appeals’ judgment, holding (1) June 16, 2009 was the date of the final judgment for purposes of calculating prejudgment and postjudgment interest on the award of damages on Johnson’s underlying claim; (2) March 21, 2012 was the date of final judgment for purposes of calculating postjudgment interest on the severable award of past attorney’s fees; (3) the trial court erred in creating a gap between the accrual of prejudgment and postjudgment interest; and (3) the court erred in denying Johnson’s request for conditional appellate attorney fees. Remanded. View "Ventling v. Johnson" on Justia Law

The Office of the Attorney General filed an action against Cornelius Jackson seeking to establish his paternity and to compel him to pay child support. The associate judge issued a temporary order establishing the parent-child relationship and ordering Jackson to pay child support. Additionally, the associate judge denied OAG’s request to prevent disclosure of certain of Jackson’s and the child’s personal information and, finding that no basis existed to show a history of family violence, ordered OAG to remove the family violence indicator from Jackson’s file and OAG’s system. The trial court affirmed and adopted the associate judge’s temporary order. OAG sought mandamus relief. The Supreme Court conditionally granted the writ of mandamus and directed the trial court to vacate its order, holding that the trial court lacked authority to order OAG to remove the indicator from its files. View "In re Office of the Attorney Gen. of Tex." on Justia Law

Husband filed for divorce from Wife in 2009. The first recital in the divorce decree indicated that the hearing resulting in the judgment occurred in November 2011 and that Wife attended the hearing. Another recital in the divorce decree, however, indicated that the final hearing, at which Wife did not appear, occurred in September 2011. Wife filed for a restricted appeal, claiming that she did not appear at the hearing that resulted in the divorce decree. The court of appeals dismissed the restricted appeal, concluding that Wife appeared at a hearing in November 2011, and therefore, her restricted appeal was foreclosed for want of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the record conclusively supported the recital that the final hearing resulting in the divorce decree occurred in September 2011, and neither Wife nor her attorney participated in the hearing; and (2) therefore, the court of appeals erred in concluding it had no jurisdiction over Wife’s restricted appeal. Remanded. View "Pike-Grant v. Grant" on Justia Law

An intellectually disabled and mentally ill mother (Mother) gave birth to a child when Mother was a teenager. When the child was two, she fell and suffered injuries to her teeth and jaw. The next day, the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (DFPS) removed the child from Mother and filed a petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights. Two months after the suit was filed, DFPS served Father by publication. John received no notice of the hearings in the case, nor did he receive notice of the trial. After proceedings in the termination suit began, Mother executed an affidavit of voluntary relinquishment naming DFPS as managing conservator of the child. The first day of trial, the State served Father with a subpoena to attend the trial. Father missed the first few hours of the trial. Following the trial, the jury found that termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. The court of appeals affirmed both terminations. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that termination of both parents’ rights was improper because there was legally insufficient evidence that Mother knowingly and intelligently executed the affidavit of voluntary relinquishment and because Father did not receive notice of trial and did not waive notice. View "In re Interest of K.M.L." on Justia Law

The Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (DFPS) removed a child from the custody of his Mother. After DFPS decided not to seek termination of Mother’s rights, the child’s Foster Parents filed suit, seeking appointment as the child’s joint managing conservators. After a jury trial, the trial court appointed the Foster Parents as the child’s sole managing conservators. The court of appeals reversed and awarded Mother managing conservatorship, concluding that the evidence was legally insufficient to support the jury’s finding that Mother’s appointment as the child’s conservator would significantly impair the child’s physical health or emotional development. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the court of appeals did not reach the question of whether the evidence was factually - as opposed to legally - sufficient to support the verdict, the case must be remanded for factual sufficiency review. View "Danet v. Bhan" on Justia Law

The trial court terminated Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to their three children on endangerment grounds and found that termination was in the children’s best interests. Father appealed the judgment. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that there was insufficient evidence to support the endangerment grounds. The Department of Family and Protective Services appealed, arguing that the court of appeals’ factual sufficiency review of the evidence contained several legal flaws. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals applied the appropriate standard of review, reviewed all the evidence, and explained its insufficiency. View "In re S.M.R." on Justia Law

In 2008, the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (DFPS) filed suit to terminate Father’s parental rights to his two children. Two trials resulted in the termination of Father’s parental rights. In both cases, the court of appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial on the grounds that there was factually insufficient evidence of endangerment. DFPS and intervenors filed motions for en banc reconsideration. The court of appeals granted the motion and affirmed the termination of Father’s parental rights, finding the evidence of endangerment factually sufficient to support termination. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals, in affirming the termination, adhered to the proper standard for conducting a factual sufficiency review. View "In re A.B." on Justia Law