Justia Texas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Stephanie Lee and Benjamin Redus were the parents and joint managing conservators of their minor daughter. A 2007 order adjudicating parentage gave Stephanie the exclusive right to designate the child's primary residence. Benjamin sought to modify that order. The parties executed a mediated settlement agreement (MSA) modifying the 2007 order. Stephanie moved to enter judgment on the MSA, but Benjamin withdrew his consent to the MSA, arguing that it was not in the best interest of the child. The district court refused to enter judgment on the MSA, concluding that it was not in the best interest of the child. Stephanie unsuccessfully petitioned the court of appeals for a writ of mandamus ordering the trial court to enter judgment on the MSA. The Supreme Court conditionally granted the writ of mandamus, holding (1) a trial court may not deny a motion to enter judgment on a properly executed MSA on the grounds that the MSA was not in a child's best interest; and (2) because the MSA in this case met the Family Code's requirements for a binding agreement, the trial court abused its discretion by denying the motion to enter judgment on the MSA. View "In re Lee" on Justia Law

Tara and Gregory were granted a divorce on October 18, 2010 after a jury trial. On December 22, 2010, the trial court signed a second judgment. Tara filed her notice of appeal seventy-five days after the trial court's second judgment. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal as untimely. However, Tara had timely filed a motion to modify the first judgment, and the trial court's second judgment did not grant all the relief Tara requested. Tara appealed the order dismissing her appeal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals erred in dismissing the appeal because the motion to modify operated to extend the appellate timetable after the second judgment, and therefore, the notice of appeal was timely. Remanded. View "Brighton v. Koss" on Justia Law

When Father and Mother divorced, the divorce decree awarded Mother sole physical custody of Child and ordered Father to pay monthly child support. Years later, Mother and Father agreed Father's support obligation would cease if he voluntarily relinquished his parental rights. Father signed the necessary paperwork, but Mother's attorney never filed it in court. Nine years later, Father received notice from the Office of the Attorney General (OAG) that he had failed to comply with the child support order and owed $81,450 in arrearages. Father denied that he owed the money, claiming that Mother, and thus the OAG, was estopped from pursuing child support payments because Mother led him to believe his parental rights had been terminated years earlier. The trial court rejected Father's estoppel defense and ordered him to pay arrearages. The court of appeals reversed and instructed the trial court to conduct a hearing on Father's estoppel defense. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that estoppel is not a defense to a child support enforcement proceeding. View "Office of Attorney Gen. v. Scholer" on Justia Law

Mother was seen punching and dragging her four-year-old daughter (Daughter) by her ponytail down the street. Mother's eight-month-old son (Son) was not present during the incident. The police arrested Mother, who later pleaded guilty to bodily injury to a child. The Department of Family and Protective Services took possession of Son under Tex. Fam. Code Ann. 262.104 because he faced a "continuing danger to his physical health or safety" if returned to Mother. Later, the trial court terminated Mother's parental rights to Son under Tex. Fam. Code Ann. 161.001(1). The court of appeals reversed, holding (1) for a trial court to terminate parental rights under section 161.001(1)(O), it must find the child who was the subject of the suit was removed as a result of the abuse or neglect of that specific child; and (2) Mother's abuse of Daughter was not evidence that Mother abused or neglected Son. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that abuse or neglect includes placing the child's physical health or safety at substantial risk, and the parent's abuse or neglect of another child is relevant to that determination. Remanded. View "In re Interest of E.C.R." on Justia Law

Husband sued Wife for divorce and custody of their children. Wife hired Law Firm to represent her in the proceedings. After the jury verdict, Law Firm sued both Wife and Husband for its fees. After a hearing, Husband and Wife agreed that the final decree would award Law Firm attorney fees against Wife only and would not award Wife attorney fees against Husband. The trial court rendered judgment in accordance with their agreement. Wife subsequently sought the protection of bankruptcy and was discharged. Law Firm appealed. The court of appeals rendered judgment for Law Firm against Husband and Wife jointly and severally, holding that Husband was liable for Wife's Legal fees because (1) the obligation was a "community debt," and (2) the legal fees were "necessaries" for which Husband was liable to the firm. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Husband was not liable to pay Law Firm for legal services rendered to Wife unless those services were necessaries; and (2) legal services provided to one spouse in a divorce proceeding are not necessaries for which the other spouse is statutorily liable to pay the attorney. View "Tedder v. Gardner Aldrich, LLP" on Justia Law

Two years after their child was born, Mother obtained a default judgment establishing Father's paternity and ordering child support to be paid until the child reached the age of eighteen. Father made child-support payments after receiving notices from the Office of the Attorney General (OAG). When the child was six years old, the OAG erroneously closed Father's case, and Father stopped making payments. Mother subsequently sought to enforce the order, and Father sought a determination of arrearages. The trial court ultimately found Father owed only $500 in arrearages. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that no evidence existed to support the trial court's specific finding of $500 in arrearages, as an OAG clerical error served as a basis for modifying the child-support obligation. Remanded. View "Granado v. Meza" on Justia Law

Father was ordered to pay child support each month to Mother. Father failed to make payments for several months, resulting in an arrearage of thousands of dollars. The Tarrant County Domestic Relations Office filed a motion to enforce the support order, asserting six counts of contempt. Before a hearing was held, Father paid the entire arrearage but then accumulated a new arrearage of an even greater amount. The trial court held Father in contempt for the failures to make timely child support payments and sentenced him to serve 174 days in jail. The court of appeals ordered the trial court to vacate its contempt order, holding that Defendant could invoke Tex. Fam. Code 157.162(d) at the hearing, despite the outstanding arrearage, because he had become "current" on the missed payments that were pled in the motion. The Supreme Court instructed the appellate court to vacate its judgment, thus reinstating the trial court's order, holding that, pursuant to section 157.162(d), an obligor must be current on court-ordered child support payments due at the time of the enforcement hearing, regardless of whether those payments have been pled in the motion for enforcement, in order to avoid a finding of contempt. View "In re Office of Attorney Gen." on Justia Law

After a trial, the trial court ordered the termination of Mother's parental rights to her two children. Before the trial court signed the termination order, Mother's trial counsel filed a "motion for a new trial or, in the alternative, notice of appeal." Two days later, Mother's trial counsel filed a motion to withdraw. Approximately a month later, the trial court signed the termination order, granted the motion to withdraw, and appointed appellate counsel. The court of appeals dismissed the motion for a new trial or notice of appeal for want of jurisdiction, holding that Mother's combined filing was not a bona fide attempt to invoke its appellate jurisdiction. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the present filing expressed an intent to appeal to the court of appeals and was partially entitled a notice of appeal, which constituted a bona fide attempt to invoke appellate jurisdiction upon its filing with the trial court clerk. Remanded. View "In re J.M." on Justia Law

After Mother became pregnant with Father's child, Mother moved from Texas to New Mexico, where she lived with Child since his birth. Father filed for divorce and subsequently filed a petition requesting shared custody and seeking Mother's compelled return to Texas with Child. Mother petitioned a New Mexico court to adjudicate custody, asserting that court had jurisdiction because New Mexico was Child's home state. The New Mexico court dismissed Mother's case, concluding that Texas had jurisdiction over the proceedings because Father filed his divorce petition in Texas first. After unsuccessfully seeking mandamus relief from the court of appeals in the Texas case, Mother petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus. The Court conditionally granted relief, holding that because New Mexico, not Texas, was child's home state under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, and because there were no other exclusive, continuing jurisdictional bases under the Act, the Texas court improperly assumed jurisdiction. View "In re Dean" on Justia Law

A court cannot terminate a person's rights unless the State proves by clear and convincing evidence that the parent engaged in certain proscribed conduct, as specified in the Family Code, and that termination is in the best interest of the children. In this case, an immigrant convicted in another state of unlawful conduct with a minor and given a probated sentence years before his children were born was later deported to Mexico. The State relied on these facts in petitioning to terminate this father's parental rights, yet put on no evidence concerning the offense committed years earlier, nor the circumstances of his deportation. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' judgment in part, holding that the evidence was legally insufficient to support termination of this father's parental rights under these facts. Remanded. View "In re E.N.C." on Justia Law