Justia Texas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a trial, the trial court ordered the termination of Mother's parental rights to her two children. Before the trial court signed the termination order, Mother's trial counsel filed a "motion for a new trial or, in the alternative, notice of appeal." Two days later, Mother's trial counsel filed a motion to withdraw. Approximately a month later, the trial court signed the termination order, granted the motion to withdraw, and appointed appellate counsel. The court of appeals dismissed the motion for a new trial or notice of appeal for want of jurisdiction, holding that Mother's combined filing was not a bona fide attempt to invoke its appellate jurisdiction. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the present filing expressed an intent to appeal to the court of appeals and was partially entitled a notice of appeal, which constituted a bona fide attempt to invoke appellate jurisdiction upon its filing with the trial court clerk. Remanded. View "In re J.M." on Justia Law

After Mother became pregnant with Father's child, Mother moved from Texas to New Mexico, where she lived with Child since his birth. Father filed for divorce and subsequently filed a petition requesting shared custody and seeking Mother's compelled return to Texas with Child. Mother petitioned a New Mexico court to adjudicate custody, asserting that court had jurisdiction because New Mexico was Child's home state. The New Mexico court dismissed Mother's case, concluding that Texas had jurisdiction over the proceedings because Father filed his divorce petition in Texas first. After unsuccessfully seeking mandamus relief from the court of appeals in the Texas case, Mother petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus. The Court conditionally granted relief, holding that because New Mexico, not Texas, was child's home state under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, and because there were no other exclusive, continuing jurisdictional bases under the Act, the Texas court improperly assumed jurisdiction. View "In re Dean" on Justia Law

A court cannot terminate a person's rights unless the State proves by clear and convincing evidence that the parent engaged in certain proscribed conduct, as specified in the Family Code, and that termination is in the best interest of the children. In this case, an immigrant convicted in another state of unlawful conduct with a minor and given a probated sentence years before his children were born was later deported to Mexico. The State relied on these facts in petitioning to terminate this father's parental rights, yet put on no evidence concerning the offense committed years earlier, nor the circumstances of his deportation. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' judgment in part, holding that the evidence was legally insufficient to support termination of this father's parental rights under these facts. Remanded. View "In re E.N.C." on Justia Law

G.W., David Gray and Lucy Wood's nine-year-old daughter, had lived with her maternal grandmother, Ann Shook, for her entire life. The trial court appointed Shook as G.W.'s sole managing conservator and named Gray and Wood as G.W.'s possessory conservators. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the trial court abused its discretion in naming Shook, a nonparent, as G.W.'s sole managing conservator because Shook failed to present any evidence that could overcome the presumption that a parent should be named as managing conservator. The court then remanded the case to the trial court to determine the custody and visitation rights as between Gray and Wood only. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' judgment remanding the case but reversed to the extent the judgment limited the trial court's consideration of the role Shook should play in G.W.'s life, whether as conservator or a person with defined access rights. View "Shook v. Gray" on Justia Law

Several months after removing Mother's four children from her home and becoming their temporary managing conservator, the Department of Family Protective Services petitioned the trial court to terminate Mother's parental rights. After an unsuccessful attempt at personal service, the Department decided to serve Mother by publication, a decision the trial court authorized. After a final hearing at which Mother did not appear, the trial court terminated Mother's parental rights to her children. Mother moved for a new trial within two years of the judgment. The trial court denied the motion, and the court of appeals affirmed, holding that the motion was untimely filed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that under the circumstances of this case, the substituted service was poor, hopeless, and unjustifiable. Remanded to the trial court to determine whether Mother unreasonably failed to act after knowing that a final judgment had taken away her children, and if so, whether granting relief would impair another person's substantial interest in reliance on that judgment. View "In re E.R." on Justia Law

This case involved a mediated settlement agreement (MSA) from a divorce. At issue was whether the court of appeals erred in setting aside the underlying MSA, which the trial court purported to follow in its divorce decree. The court did not agree with the court of appeals that the MSA unambiguously required wife's substitution as a limited partner nor did it agree that the MSA should be set aside merely because the parties interpret their agreement differently. The court agreed with the decision to remand, however, because the MSA's ambiguity must be resolved before an agreed judgment could be rendered. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed. View "Milner v. Milner" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from a divorce action between relator and his wife. The relator asked the court to decide whether a trial court abused its discretion when it issued an order granting a motion for new trial "based on all grounds in the motion." The court held that because the successor trial court judge in this case did not state sufficient reasons for his ruling, contrary to the court's holding in In re Columbia, the court conditionally granted relief. View "In re Jeffrey Cook" on Justia Law

The State Office of Administrative Hearings (SOAH) refused to disclose certain decisions and orders in license suspension cases related to delinquent child support. At issue was whether the information was expressly excepted from disclosure by the Texas Public Information Act, Tex. Gov't Code 552.101-,148. The court declined to read the language of the statute broader than it was written and concluded that the purpose and intent of the statute could be fulfilled by disclosing the requested documents. Accordingly, the court held that the decisions and orders must be disclosed after redaction of information expressly excepted from disclosure and not already in a public record or otherwise in the public domain. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Jackson v. State Office of Administrative Hearings, et al." on Justia Law

While married, Petitioner James Iliff was the principal breadwinner for his family of five, and earned approximately $100,000 in salary. He held a Bachelor's Degree in chemistry, and a Masters in Business Administration. In January, 2006, Petitioner voluntarily quit his job, moved in with his mother, and worked intermittently, earning approximately $200 per month. In June, Respondent Jerilyn Iliff filed for divorce. Determining that Petitioner's gross earning potential was not less than $5,000 per month, the divorce court ordered him to pay $1,295 in monthly child support. Petitioner appealed the support order, arguing that under state law, the trial court was required to determine whether his unemployment or underemployment was used primarily to avoid paying child support. The Supreme Court granted Respondent's petition to resolve a split among state courts of appeal on interpretation of state law and the issue of avoiding child support. On review of the underlying cases, the Supreme Court found no requirement that a person owing child support be intentionally unemployed or underemployed to avoid child support, and affirmed the lower courts' decisions against Petitioner.