Justia Texas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Greater Houston Partnership (GHP) is a nonprofit corporation providing economic development services to the City and other clients pursuant to quid pro quo contracts. A Houston area resident submitted to GHP a request seeking a copy of GHP’s check register. The resident claimed that GHP is an organization that spends or is supported in whole or in part by public funds, and therefore, GHP is subject to the Texas Public Information Act (TPIA) in the same manner as a governmental body. GHP did not disclose the requested information, claiming that it did not qualify as a “governmental body” under the TPIA because the public funds it received were compensation for services provided to the City of Houston pursuant to a contract. The Attorney General concluded that GHP was subject to the TPIA’s disclosure requirements. The trial court agreed, and the court of appeals affirmed the trial court. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that GHP is not a “governmental body” under the TPIA because it is not wholly or partially sustained by public funds. View "Greater Houston P’ship v. Paxton" on Justia Law

Certain provisions of the Texas Occupations Code and Texas Commission of Licensing and Regulation rules promulgated pursuant to that Code require eyebrow threaders to undergo 750 hours of training in order to obtain a license before practicing commercial threading. Plaintiffs, several individuals practicing commercial eyebrow threading and the salon owners employing them, filed this declaratory judgment action asserting that, as applied to them, Texas’s licensing statutes and regulations violate the state Constitution’s due course of law provision. Specifically, Plaintiffs alleged that the number of hours required for a license to practice commercial eyebrow threading are not related to health or safety or to what threaders actually do. The trial court granted summary judgment for the State. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the large number of required hours that are not arguably related to the actual practice of threading, the associated costs of those hours, and the delayed employment opportunities while taking the hours make the licensing requirements as a whole reach the level of being so burdensome that they are oppressive in light of the governmental interest. View "Patel v. Dep’t of Licensing & Regulation" on Justia Law

This premises-liability case arose from the drowning deaths of a young father and his twin daughters at a man-made beach. The mother and surviving spouse of the decedents (Plaintiff) filed suit against the City of Texas City alleging that the deaths resulted from a peculiar risk of harm created by a confluence of artificial and natural conditions at the beach and that the the City was grossly negligent in failing to warn or protect the public against those dangers. In bringing suit against Texas City, Plaintiff averred that governmental immunity was waived. The City filed a plea to the jurisdiction, asserting that Plaintiff’s pleadings and evidence were insufficient to support jurisdiction. The trial court denied the jurisdictional plea. The court of appeals reversed and dismissed the claims for want of jurisdiction. At issue on appeal was whether there was evidence of the City’s liability to invoke the Texas Tort Claims Act’s waiver of governmental immunity, as limited by the recreational use statute. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff failed to produce sufficient evidence to invoke the Texas Tort Claims Act’s waiver of immunity from suit. View "Suarez v. City of Texas City" on Justia Law

Candelario Lopez, who was hired by Interstate Treating to work on the installation of a gas processing plant, was transporting two other Interstate Treating employees to the job site when he died in an automobile accident. Lopez’s wife, Maximina Lopez, sought death benefits from Interstate Treating’s workers’ compensation insurance carrier, SeaBright Insurance Co. SeaBright denied coverage, concluding that Lopez was not acting in the course and scope of his employment at the time of the accident. A hearing officer, however, determined that Lopez was acting in the course and scope of his employment and ordered SeaBright to pay death benefits. The trial court affirmed the administrative decision. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Lopez was acting in the course and scope of his employment when he died, and Maximina was entitled to benefits. View "Seabright Ins. Co. v. Lopez" on Justia Law

In 1998, Glenn Johnson suffered serious work-related injuries. In separate administrative proceedings, the parties contested the details and amounts of the lifetime workers’ compensation benefits Johnson was entitled to. Johnson and his wife filed the instant suit against his employer’s workers’ compensation insurance provider and related individuals and entities (collectively, Crawford), alleging that Crawford engaged in a plan to delay and deny benefits that the Johnsons were entitled to receive. Crawford filed a plea to the jurisdiction and motion for summary judgment, arguing that the Texas Department of Insurance Division of Workers’ Compensation had exclusive jurisdiction over all of the Johnsons’ claims because they arose out of the workers’ compensation claims-handling process. The trial court dismissed the Johnsons’ claims for breach of the common law duty of good faith and fair dealing and for violations of the Texas Insurance Code but refused to dismiss any of the other claims. The Supreme Court conditionally granted mandamus relief, holding that all of the Johnsons’ claims arose out of Crawford’s investigation, handling, and settling of claims for workers’ compensation benefits, and therefore, the Division had exclusive jurisdiction over the Johnsons’ claims. View "In re Crawford & Co." on Justia Law

Petitioners, former employees of the City of Houston, filed suit against the Houston Municipal Employees Pension System (HMEPS) board members, asserting that the board members violated HMEPS’s enabling statute by requiring Petitioners’ continued participation in the City’s defined-benefit pension plan. The trial court found jurisdiction to be lacking, and the court of appeals affirmed. As provided by statute, the pension board has exclusive authority to interpret and supplement omissions in the statute and to determine all questions of law and fact pertaining to eligibility for membership, services and benefits. The board’s actions with respect to these matters are final and binding and therefore not amenable to judicial review. To defeat this jurisdictional bar, Petitioners asserted that subject-matter jurisdiction exists when the pension board fundamentally alters the terms of the statute without the City’s consent. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the claims because (1) the pension board acted within the scope of its authority in construing the term “employee”; and (2) Petitioners failed to assert viable constitutional claims. View "Klumb v. Houston Municipal Employees Pension Sys." on Justia Law

Invoking the Texas Public Information Act (PIA), Randall Kallinen requested information from the City of Houston regarding a study of traffic light cameras the City had commissioned. The City withheld some documents and asked the Attorney General for an opinion as to whether the PIA excepted the withheld information from disclosure. Before the Attorney General ruled, Kallinen sued for a writ of mandamus to compel the City to disclose the withheld information. The City filed a plea to the jurisdiction, arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction over the suit until the Attorney General ruled. The district court overruled the plea, ordered disclosure of the withheld documents, and awarded Kallinen attorney fees. The court of appeals reversed, holding that a trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over this suit until the Attorney General ruled. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals erred in dismissing Kallinen’s suit for want of jurisdiction, as a requestor of information is not required to defer a suit for mandamus while awaiting the Attorney General’s decision. View "Kallinen v. City of Houston" on Justia Law

Petitioner was court-martialed for sexual abuse and assault and imprisoned for eighteen years. Approximately two decades after the conviction, Petitioner applied to the Texas Department of Licensing and Regulation for a tow truck operator’s license. The Department denied Petitioner’s application based on his conviction. Petitioner contested the denial. An administrative law judge (ALJ) from the State Office of Administrative Hearings recommended that the Department issue a license. The Department, however, revised the ALJ’s findings of fact and conclusions of law to reject Petitioner’s application. The trial court reversed the Department’s decision, concluding that the Department’s alterations of the findings and conclusions were unlawful. The court of appeals reversed, ruling that the Department’s modifications were improper because the ALJ misinterpreted a provision of the Texas Occupations Code concerning licensing restrictions where an applicant has previously been convicted of a crime. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Department’s revisions of the findings of fact and conclusions of law constituted error because the revisions were unsupported by the plain language of the statute. View "Thompson v. Tex. Dep’t of Licensing & Reg." on Justia Law

After the State Board for Educator Certification revoked the teaching certificate of a schoolteacher, the schoolteacher sued to overturn the revocation. The trial court concluded that the Board’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence and was arbitrary and capricious. The court issued a permanent injunction prohibiting the Board from revoking the schoolteacher’s revocation and refused to allow the Board to supersede the judgment pending appeal. The State sought mandamus relief challenging the trial court’s denial of supersedeas. The court of appeals denied mandamus relief and abated the merits of the Board’s appeal pending the Supreme Court resolution of a narrow procedural issue. The Supreme Court denied relief, holding that a trial court has discretion to prevent the Board from re-revoking a teacher’s professional license while the Board appeals the court’s rejection of the Board’s initial revocation. View "In re State Bd. for Educator Certification" on Justia Law

Respondent, a principal at a school in the Yesleta Independent School District (ISD), reported various "asbestos hazards" in the school to certain school officials. Eventually, the ISD indefinitely suspended Respondent. Respondent filed this whistleblower claim, alleging that the ISD violated the Asbestos Hazard Emergency Response Act (Act) by failing to respond to his asbestos reports. In so claiming, Respondent submitted no evidence showing that the ISD enforced the Act beyond its own internal compliance or that he reported the allegations to anyone other than school officials. The trial court denied the ISD's plea to the jurisdiction, concluding that Respondent produced sufficient evidence of his good faith belief that the ISD's superintendent and trustees were authorized to regulate under or enforce the Act. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and granted the plea to the jurisdiction, holding that a report to personnel whose only power is to oversee compliance within the entity itself is not enough to confer "law-enforcement authority" status. View "Ysleta Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Franco" on Justia Law