Justia Texas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was a public nonprofit organization that provided mental health care to county residents. Plaintiff was a patient who sued Defendant after being struck by a falling whiteboard. Defendant pled immunity under the Texas Tort Claims Act, arguing that Plaintiff's alleged injury did not arise from Defendant's "use" of personal property. The trial court denied Defendant's plea. Defendant appealed, arguing for the first time that the property's "condition" did not cause the accident. The court of appeals declined to consider this argument because Defendant had not originally asserted it in the trial court. The court of appeals then affirmed the judgment of the trial court, thus rejecting Defendant's arguments that Plaintiff's pleadings failed to demonstrate a waiver of Defendant's immunity. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) pursuant to Rusk State Hospital v. Black, the appellate court should have considered all of Defendant's immunity arguments; and (2) the patient's alleged injuries were not caused by the "use" of the whiteboard, and the court of appeals erred to the extent it held otherwise. Remanded. View "Dallas Metrocare Servs. v. Juarez" on Justia Law

A commercial tenant remained in possession of premises for six years after it lost its lease when the property was sold through foreclosure. The tenant ultimately conceded that the foreclosure terminated the lease and the tenant became a tenant at sufferance. The property owner sued the tenant for breach of the terminated lease, trespass and other torts, and violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act (DTPA). The trial court granted summary judgment for the tenant on all claims. The court of appeals reversed and remanded in part. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a tenant at sufferance cannot be liable for breach of the previously-terminated lease agreement; (2) a tenant at sufferance is a trespasser and can be liable in tort, including, in this case, tortious interference with prospective business relations; (3) the tenant here was not liable under the DTPA because the property owner was not a consumer; and (4) the owner in this case could not recover under the attorney's fees under the Texas Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act. Remanded. View "Coinmach Corp. v. Aspenwood Apartment Corp." on Justia Law

Stephen filed suit against a former business partner, Evan, in Nevada and prevailed on his claims. To collect on the judgment, Stephen filed another suit in Nevada against both Evan and Marc, alleging that Evan had fraudulently transferred assets to Marc in violation of the Nevada Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (Nevada UFTA). The Nevada court dismissed Stephen's claims, concluding that it lacked personal jurisdiction over Marc. Stephen then filed the present suit in a Texas court under the Texas UFTA (TUFTA), alleging that Evan had fraudulently transferred assets to Marc. The trial court granted summary judgment for Marc, concluding that TUFTA's four-year statute of repose extinguished Stephen's claim. The court of appeals reversed, holding that Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 16.064(a) suspended the expiration of TUFTA's statute of repose and allowed Stephen to file this suit within sixty days after the Nevada court dismissed the second Nevada suit for lack of personal jurisdiction. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the TUFTA provision that extinguished Stephen's claim was a statute of repose, and section 16.064 applies only to statutes of limitations, section 16.064 did not save or revive Stephen's claim. View "Nathan v. Wittington" on Justia Law

Employee was a psychiatric nurse employed by Employer, a health care provider. Employee was injured at work while restraining a psychiatric patient. Employee filed a negligence action against Employer, seeking damages for personal injuries. Employer moved to dismiss Employee's suit, asserting that the suit alleged a health care liability claim (HCLC) under the Texas Medical Liability Act (TMLA) and that Employee's failure to serve Employer with an expert report within the TMLA's 120-day deadline mandated dismissal of his suit. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Employee's claim that Employer provided improper security of the psychiatric patient and inadequate safety for Employee was an HCLC under the TMLA, and therefore, Employee was required to serve an expert report within 120 days of filing suit. Remanded with instructions to dismiss Employee's complaint. View "Psychiatric Solutions, Inc. v. Palit" on Justia Law

Respondents filed this health care liability action against Petitioner. The trial court awarded Respondents $9 million in actual damages and $3 million in punitive damages. The court of appeals reversed the punitive damages award. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' judgment affirmance of the actual damages award, finding that Petitioner's liability was statutorily capped. On remand, the trial court vacated the original judgment and awarded Respondents actual damages capped according to the relevant statute plus postjudgment interest calculated from the date of the remand judgment. The court of appeals reversed the remand judgment, holding that the trial court erred by vacating its original judgment and by calculating the postjudgment interest from the date of the remand judgment rather than the date of the original judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the court of appeals had jurisdiction to review the trial court's remand judgment; (2) postjudgment interest must be calculated from the date of the original judgment; and (3) the trial court's order vacating the original judgment was error, but it was not reversible error. Remanded. View "Phillips v. Bramlett" on Justia Law

The family of a nursing home patient filed this action against the nursing home for, inter alia, medical negligence, negligence per se, breach of contract, and retaliation. Plaintiffs asserted the retaliation claim under the Texas Health & Safety Code, which creates a cause of action against a nursing facility that retaliates against a resident or family member who makes a complaint concerning the facility. Defendants moved to dismiss all of the claims pursuant to the Texas Medical Liability Act (TMLA) because the expert report was deficient. The trial court dismissed all of Plaintiffs' claims except for the retaliation claim, concluding that the claim was not a health care liability claim (HCLC) for which the TMLA requires a supporting expert report. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' judgment with respect to the retaliation claim, holding that because the retaliation claim was based on the same factual allegations on which one of Plaintiffs' HCLCs was based, the claim should have been dismissed for lack of a sufficient expert report. View "PM Management-Trinity NC, LLC v. Kumets" on Justia Law

After an investigation into allegations that Doctor had self-prescribed medications, the Board placed Doctor on probation. A media outlet subsequently aired an investigative broadcast suggesting that Doctor was disciplined for operating on patients while taking drugs. Doctor and his professional association (collectively Plaintiffs) sued Media Defendants for defamation. The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendants. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that under McIlvain v. Jacobs, none of Defendant's statements were actionable as a matter of law because the media outlet accurately reported third-party allegations. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Doctor raised a genuine issue of material fact as to the truth of falsity of the broadcast with evidence that he was not disciplined for taking drugs and had never performed surgery while taking them; and (2) therefore, Defendants could could avail themselves of the truth defense. Remanded. View "Neely v. Wilson" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed this action against Defendants for negligence based on an undertaking theory and for premises liability after he suffered personal injuries at a party at Defendants' residence. The trial court rendered summary judgment for Defendants as to Plaintiff's negligence claim. The court of appeals reversed, finding that summary judgment was improper because Defendants' summary judgment motion only addressed social host liability and failed to address the negligent-undertaking theory. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendants' summary judgment motion specifically addressed Plaintiff's negligent-undertaking claim by arguing that Graff v. Beard forecloses the assumption of any duty, i.e., an undertaking, by a social host under the facts of this case. View "Nall v. Plunkett" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, as next friends of their daughter (Daughter) sued Hospital for injuries sustained by Daughter following her premature birth. One hundred and sixteen days after filing their original petition, Plaintiffs nonsuited their claim. Plaintiffs later filed a new lawsuit against Hospital and other health care providers and served an expert report on Hospital. Hospital objected to the report as untimely and moved to dismiss the claim against it. The trial court overruled the objection and denied the motion to dismiss. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that Plaintiffs timely served their expert report. At issue on appeal was the Texas Medical Liability Act's (TMLA) expert-report requirement, which requires a claimant to serve an expert report on health care providers against whom the claim is asserted 120 days after the original petition is filed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a claimant's nonsuit of a health care liability claim before the expiration of the 120-day period tolls the expert-report period until suit is refiled. View "CHCA Woman's Hosp., LP v. Lidji" on Justia Law

In a letter sent to colleagues and others, Defendant, a physician, accused a fellow physician, Plaintiff, of lacking veracity and speaking in half truths. The trial court granted a directed verdict that the letter was defamatory per se. A jury awarded Plaintiff $90,000 in actual damages for mental anguish and loss of reputation and $85,000 in exemplary damages. The court of appeals affirmed the damages award. The Supreme Court reversed, rendering judgment that Plaintiff taking nothing, where (1) the statements did not defame the physician per se, and thus, the Court could not presume damages for mental anguish and loss of reputation, and consequently, Plaintiff was required to prove actual damages; (2) there was no evidence of mental anguish that rose to the level of a substantial disruption in daily routine or a high degree of mental pain and distress; (3) there was no evidence of loss of reputation because there was no indication that any recipient of the defamatory letter believed in its statements; and (4) because Plaintiff did not establish actual damages, he could not recover exemplary damages. View "Hancock v. Variyam" on Justia Law