Justia Texas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff fell while mopping a restroom floor at a Kroger store. Plaintiff’s employer, Kroger Texas, LP, had elected not to subscribe to the Texas workers’ compensation system. Plaintiff filed suit against Kroger in state court, alleging negligence, gross negligence, and premises liability. Kroger removed the case to federal district court. The court granted summary judgment to Kroger. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part. At issue in this appeal was Plaintiff’s premises-liability claim. The Fifth Circuit concluded that the nature and scope of an employer’s duty to provide its employees with a safe workplace is unclear under Texas law when an employee is aware of the hazard or risk at issue and certified a question of law regarding the issue to the Texas Supreme Court. The Supreme Court answered that, under Texas law (1) an employer generally does not have a duty to warn or protect its employees from unreasonably dangerous premises conditions that are open and obvious or known to the employee; and (2) under this rule, the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act’s waiver of a nonsubscribing employer’s common law defenses does not eliminate an employee’s burden of proving that the employer owed him a duty as an element of a premises liability claim. View "Austin v. Kroger Texas, LP" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a cardiothoracic surgeon who practiced at Memorial Hermann Memorial City Medical Center until 2012. When Plaintiff agreed to practice at Methodist West, Defendants - Memorial Hermann and certain healthcare practitioners - began conducting a “whisper campaign” against Plaintiff to cast doubt on Plaintiff’s heart surgery procedures. Plaintiff brought suit, asserting claims for business disparagement, defamation, tortious interference with prospective business relationship, and improper restraint of trade. When Plaintiff moved to compel the production of certain documents, Memorial Hermann asserted the documents were protected from discovery under the medical committee privilege and the medical peer review committee privilege. The trial court ordered Defendants to produce the documents. After the court of appeals denied Defendants’ petition for writ of mandamus, Defendants sought mandamus relief in the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court conditionally granted mandamus relief as to some of the documents that the Court determined were protected but denied relief as to the remainder of the documents, holding that they were not confidential under either the medical committee privilege or the medical peer review committee privilege. View "In re Memorial Hermann Hosp. Sys." on Justia Law

After Shell Oil Company and Shell International, E&P, Inc. (collectively, Shell) received notice from the Department of Justice (DOJ) regarding possible violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act by one of its contractors, Shell performed an internal investigation and reported the results to the DOJ. Shell employee Robert Writt was terminated following the investigation. Writt sued Shell for wrongful termination and defamation. Writt’s defamation claim was based on allegations that, in the report provided to the DOJ, Shell falsely accused him of approving bribery payments and participating in illegal conduct. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Shell, concluding that Shell was absolutely privileged to prove the investigative report to the DOJ. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the report was only conditionally, not absolutely, privileged because the evidence did not conclusively establish that at the time Shell provided its report to the DOJ a criminal judicial proceeding was under serious consideration. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Shell’s statements were made preliminarily to a proposed judicial proceeding, and thus, the statements in the report were absolutely privileged. View "Shell Oil Co. v. Writt" on Justia Law

Elias Alvarado filed a complaint against the City of McCamey for negligence and negligence per se, claiming that governmental employee Jesus Molina was driving a city vehicle under the influence of alcohol when he struck Alvarado’s vehicle. The City asserted immunity from suit. Alvarado then filed an amended petition naming Molina as an additional defendant. Molina moved for summary judgment seeking dismissal under the Texas Tort Claims Act (TTCA)’s election-of-remedies provision, alleging that Alvarado had previously made an irrevocable election to sue the City and was thus barred from suing him as well. The trial court denied the summary judgment motion. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that material fact questions existed regarding whether Molina was actually driving the City’s vehicle within the scope of his employment or under the influence of alcohol. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under the TTCA, Alvarado’s choice to sue only the City, not its employee, constituted an irrevocable election and barred any future suit against Molina, an individual employee of the City, regarding the same subject matter. View "Molina v. Alvarado" on Justia Law

Cuahutemoc Gonzalez contracted with several companies, including a company owned by Robert Garcia, to transport silage from a farm. Garcia brought to the farm a tandem truck and a new driver, Raymond Ramierz. During the tandem truck’s first trip, Ramirez collided with a car in which a mother and daughter were traveling. The collision killed all three. Samuel Jackson, the daughter’s father and mother’s former husband, filed suit against Gonzalez, seeking to hold him vicariously liable for the actions of Garcia and Ramirez based on Gonzalez’s alleged status as a motor carrier under both the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations (Federal Regulations) and their Texas counterparts (Texas Regulations). Ramirez’s family (the Ramirezes) intervened and asserted negligence claims against Gonzalez under common-law theories of retained control over an independent contract and joint enterprise. The trial court granted Gonzalez’s no-evidence motions for summary judgment as to both the Ramirezes’ and Jackson’s claims. The court of appeals reversed as to the no-evidence summary judgment on Jackson’s claim under the Texas Regulations and on the Ramirezes’ negligence claims based on retained control. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Gonzalez cannot be held liable as a motor carrier under either the Federal Regulations or the Texas Regulations; and (2) the evidence was legally insufficient to show that the same party retained sufficient control over the transportation in which the truck was engaged to owe Ramirez a common-law duty. View "Gonzalez v. Ramirez" on Justia Law

Robert Henderson, a pipeline insulation worker who had contracted mesothelioma, alleged that he was exposed to asbestos-containing products while working as an independent contractor at Dow Chemical Company’s facility. Henderson was allegedly exposed to asbestos both directly from his own insulation work and as a bystander to the insulation work of Dow employees. Dow moved for summary judgment, arguing that Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 95 applied to Plaintiffs’ negligence claims. Chapter 95 relates to limitations on a property owner’s liability for injury, death, or property damage to an independent contractor. The trial court concluded that Plaintiff’s negligence claims based on Dow’s negligent activities would go to a jury but not his claims based on injuries arising out of his own work. The jury found that Dow’s negligence proximately caused Henderson’s injuries. The court of appeals reversed and rendered a take-nothing judgment in favor of Dow, concluding that Chapter 95 applied to all of Plaintiffs’ claims against Dow and that Plaintiffs had failed to establish Dow’s liability under the standards set forth in Chapter 95. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Chapter 95 applies to all independent contractor claims for damages caused by a property owner’s negligence when the requirements of section 95.002(2) are satisfied. View "Abutahoun v. Dow Chemical Co." on Justia Law

This case arose out of a warehouse fire in Pasadena, Texas. Plaintiffs, the company that leased the warehouse and the company that stored materials in the warehouse, sued Defendants, the suppliers of the chlorpyrifos that the lessee used in the warehouse, for manufacturing and marketing defect, breach of contract, negligence, and other causes of action. The jury found that the chlorpyrifos was defective and that Defendants breached the parties’ contract. After the trial court entered judgment for Plaintiffs, Defendants moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The trial court granted the motion, concluding that the testimony of all four of Plaintiffs’ experts was unreliable and constituted no evidence of negligence, manufacturing defect, and causation. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that each expert’s individual testimony was reliable, and therefore, the experts’ collective testimony was reliable. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the testimony of all four experts was unreliable; and (2) consequently, there was no evidence of an essential element of Plaintiffs’ claims. View "Gharda USA, Inc. v. Control Solutions, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff and the main defendant (Defendant) both wanted an interest in a coalbed methane exploration prospect in Bulgaria. Plaintiff sued Defendant, alleging that Defendant obtained his interest by tortiously interfering with the owner’s contract to convey an interest to Plaintiff. Plaintiff claimed damages for the loss of its interest in the project. A jury found in favor of Plaintiff and awarded $66.5 million in actual damages. The trial court reduced the damages to $31.16 million. The court of appeals reversed in part and rendered judgment on the verdict, awarding Plaintiff the $66.5 million actual damages found by the jury, as well as exemplary damages. On appeal, Defendant argued that the evidence of the fair market value of Plaintiff’s lost interest was too speculative to support the jury’s award of damages. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that, under the rule that lost profits cannot be recovered as damages unless proven to a reasonable certainty, Plaintiff was not permitted to recover all of the damages found by the jury. View "Phillips v. Carlton Energy Group, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a visitor to St. Luke’s Episcopal Hospital, slipped and fell in an area of the lobby where the floor was being cleaned and buffed. Plaintiff sued the Hospital on a premises liability theory. The Hospital asserted that Plaintiff’s claim was a health care liability claim (HCLC) under the Texas Medical Liability Act and moved for dismissal of the complaint because Plaintiff failed to serve an expert report. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Plaintiff’s suit was not a HCLC because the record demonstrated that Plaintiff’s claim was based on safety standards that had no substantive relationship to the Hospital’s providing of health care; and (2) because Plaintiff’s claim was not an HCLC, Plaintiff was not required to serve an expert report to avoid dismissal of her suit. Remanded. View "Ross v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Hosp." on Justia Law

William Marsh Rice University (Rice University), a private institution of higher education, employed Officer Gary Spears as a commissioned peace officer at its police department. Officer Spears arrested Rasheed Rafaey for driving while intoxicated and other charges. The charges against Rafaey were later dismissed. Thereafter, Rafaey sued Officer Spears and Rice University (collectively, Defendants) alleging that the arrest and detention were unlawful. Defendants moved for summary judgment on the affirmative defense that Officer Spears was entitled to official immunity. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals dismissed Defendants’ interlocutory appeal without determining whether Officer Spears was entitled to official immunity, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction over the matter because Officer Spears was not an “officer or employee of the state” that may invoke a court of appeals’ interlocutory jurisdiction under Tex. Civil. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. 51.014(a)(5). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals had jurisdiction under section 51.014(a)(5) to consider the appeals of both Officer Spears and Rice University because the “officer…of the state” language in the statute applies to university peace officers. View "William Marsh Rice Univ. v. Rafael" on Justia Law