Justia Texas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff was involved in two car accidents three months apart. After the second accident, Plaintiff sued the opposing driver in the first accident, alleging that the first collision caused her injuries. Defendant contended that the second accident caused Plaintiff’s injuries. Because of the lack of expert testimony supporting Defendant’s theory and on Plaintiff’s pretrial request, the trial court excluded all evidence of the second accident on relevance grounds. The jury rendered a verdict for Plaintiff. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that evidence of the second accident was relevant to whether Defendant’s negligence caused Plaintiff’s damages, and the trial court committed harmful error in excluding the evidence and in refusing to allow cross-examination of Plaintiff’s expert on the subject. Remanded for a new trial. View "JLG Trucking, LLC v. Garza" on Justia Law

Steven Lipsky, concerned that an oil and gas operator close to his property (“Range”), had some responsibility for contaminating his ground water, complained about the gas in his well to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Texas Railroad Commission, and the media. Alisa Rich, an environmental consultant, confirmed the presence of gases in the well. The Railroad Commission concluded that Range’s operations were not the source of the contamination. Lipsky and his wife, Shyla, sued Range, alleging negligence. Range counterclaimed against the Lipskys and filed a third-party claim against Rich, alleging defamation, among other claims. The trial court dismissed the Lipskys’ claims as an improper collateral attack on the Commission’s determination and declined to dismiss Range’s claims against the Lipskys and Rich. The court of appeals granted mandamus relief in part, concluding that the Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA) required the dismissal of Range’s claims against Shyla and Rich but did not require dismissal of Range’s claims against Lipsky. Both Range and Lipsky sought mandamus relief in the Supreme Court. The Court denied relief, holding (1) the trial court properly considered circumstantial evidence when considering Lipskys’ motion to dismiss under the TCPA; and (2) the court of appeals did not err in its disposition of the proceedings below. View "In re Lipsky" on Justia Law

Petitioners, administrators at a healthcare facility, allegedly made disparaging comments about Respondent, a certified nurse anesthetist. Respondent filed suit against Petitioners for defamation, among other claims, providing as proof of Petitioners’ disparaging comments several emails Petitioners had sent to four recipients. Petitioners moved to dismiss the claims based on the Texas Citizen Participation Act. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss in part and denied it in part. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the Act was inapplicable to this case because it does not apply to private communications. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the communications in this case were made in connection with a matter of public concern, and therefore, the Act was applicable to Petitioners’ claims. Remanded. View "Lippincott v. Whisenhunt" on Justia Law

In this commercial dispute, Petitioner obtained a $6 million breach-of-contract and tort judgment against Respondents. After filing the lawsuit, Petitioner assigned its claims to its commercial lender. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, alleging that Petitioner had no standing to pursue the litigation because it had assigned the claims to the lender. The trial court concluded that Petitioner had standing. The court of appeals vacated the judgment and dismissed for want of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals failed to consider pertinent evidence before the trial court, and therefore, the cause must be remanded to the trial court for reconsideration. View "Vernco Constr., Inc. v. Nelson" on Justia Law

The Fort Bend County Toll Road Authority (the Authority) was a local government corporation created to design, build, and operate the Westpark Tollway. The Authority lawfully contracted with Brown & Gay Engineering, Inc. (Brown & Gay), a private engineering firm, to design and construct the Ford Bend County portion of the Tollway. In 2007, an intoxicated driver entered an exit ramp of the Tollway and collided with a car driven by Pedro Olivares, who was killed in the accident. Plaintiffs sued the Authority and Brown & Gay, alleging that the failure to design and install proper traffic-control devices around the exit ramp proximately caused the decedent’s death. The court of appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of the Authority’s plea to the jurisdiction on governmental-immunity grounds, concluding that the Authority was immune from suit. Brown & Gay then filed its own plea to the jurisdiction seeking the same sovereign-immunity protection that the Authority would enjoy had it performed the work itself. The court of appeals denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that sovereign immunity does not extend to private contractors based solely on the nature of the contractors’ work. View "Brown & Gay Eng’g, Inc. v. Olivares" on Justia Law

This dispute arose from the 2010 explosion and sinking of the Deepwater Horizon oil-drilling rig, which killed eleven people and resulted in extensive subsurface discharge of oil into the Gulf of Mexico for nearly three months. The issue in this case concerned the extent of insurance coverage afforded to the oil-field developer, BP, as an additional insured under primary- and excess-insurance policies procured by Deepwater’s owner, Transocean. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit certified to the Supreme Court two questions regarding the interplay between the insurance policies and provisions in a drilling contract giving rise to Transocean’s obligation to name BP as an additional insured. The Court held (1) BP is not entitled to coverage under the Transocean insurance policies for damages arising from the subsurface pollution because BP, not Transocean, assumed liability for such claims; and (2) based on the Court’s analysis of the first issue, it did not reach the second question. View "In re Deepwater Horizon" on Justia Law

A landowner sued its neighbor, the operator of an adjacent wastewater disposal facility, alleging that wastewater had migrated into the deep subsurface of its land, possibility contaminating the groundwater beneath it. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the wastewater disposal facility. After a series of appeals, the court of appeals reversed the jury’s verdict. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and reinstated the trial court’s judgment that the wastewater disposal facility take nothing, holding (1) the jury instruction properly included lack of consent as an element of a trespass cause of action that a plaintiff must prove; (2) the trial court properly denied the landowner’s motion for directed verdict on the issue of consent; and (3) there is no need to address the remaining question of whether deep subsurface wastewater migration is actionable as a common law trespass in Texas. View "Envtl. Processing Sys., LC v. FPL Farming Ltd." on Justia Law

This case arose from the deadly collision of two eighteen-wheeled commercial trucks. Petitioner filed this third-party claim against Fayette County, alleging that the collision was caused by a County deputy sheriff. Petitioner sought redress pursuant to Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 101.021, which provides a waiver of governmental immunity when an injury “arises from the operation or use” of a vehicle by a government employee. The trial court sustained the County’s plea to the jurisdiction, concluding that the county remained immune from suit because the accident did not arise from a government employee’s vehicle use. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Petitioner alleged an injury arising from a deputy sheriff’s vehicle use for the purpose of section 101.021. View "Ryder Integrated Logistics, Inc. v. Fayette County" on Justia Law

In 1998, Glenn Johnson suffered serious work-related injuries. In separate administrative proceedings, the parties contested the details and amounts of the lifetime workers’ compensation benefits Johnson was entitled to. Johnson and his wife filed the instant suit against his employer’s workers’ compensation insurance provider and related individuals and entities (collectively, Crawford), alleging that Crawford engaged in a plan to delay and deny benefits that the Johnsons were entitled to receive. Crawford filed a plea to the jurisdiction and motion for summary judgment, arguing that the Texas Department of Insurance Division of Workers’ Compensation had exclusive jurisdiction over all of the Johnsons’ claims because they arose out of the workers’ compensation claims-handling process. The trial court dismissed the Johnsons’ claims for breach of the common law duty of good faith and fair dealing and for violations of the Texas Insurance Code but refused to dismiss any of the other claims. The Supreme Court conditionally granted mandamus relief, holding that all of the Johnsons’ claims arose out of Crawford’s investigation, handling, and settling of claims for workers’ compensation benefits, and therefore, the Division had exclusive jurisdiction over the Johnsons’ claims. View "In re Crawford & Co." on Justia Law

This case stemmed from a collision between a tractor-trailer owned by Nabors Well Services, Ltd. and a pickup truck occupied by three family members (the Loeras). During trial, the court admitted evidence that the Loeras were not using seat belts. The jury found Nabors’s driver fifty percent at fault, Nabors ten percent at fault, and the driver of the pickup forty percent at fault. The jury awarded the Loeras approximately $450,000 in damages, but the trial court entered a take-nothing judgment, presumably based on the jury’s answers to two questions regarding the Loeras’ failure to use seat belts. The court of appeals remanded the case for a new trial, concluding that the admission of evidence of nonuse of seat belts was harmful error. While Nabors’ petition for review was pending, the Supreme Court decided Nabors Well Services, Ltd. v. Romero, in which the Court held that relevant evidence of use or nonuse of seat belts is admissible for the purpose of apportioning responsibility in civil lawsuits. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded for reconsideration in light of Romero. View "Nabors Well Servs., Ltd. v. Loera" on Justia Law