Justia Texas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner owned and operated a charter bus that collided with a car driven by Respondent. Respondent filed this negligence action against Petitioner seeking damages for the injuries he sustained in the collision. Before trial, Respondent filed a motion for spoliation of evidence requesting that Petitioner be sanctioned because it destroyed a video recording of the accident. The trial court orally ruled that Petitioner had negligently spoliated evidence and ordered the inclusion of a spoliation instruction in the jury charge. The jury found in Respondent’s favor. Petitioner appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in submitting the spoliation instruction. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that Petitioner waived any complaint it had about the instruction. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Petitioner preserved error by responding to the pretrial motion for sanctions, even while failing to formally object to the instruction’s inclusion in the jury charge until after it was read to the jury; and (2) the trial court committed reversible error by submitting the instruction. Remanded for a new trial. View "Wackenhut Corp. v. Gutierrez" on Justia Law

Elisa Zapata died while under the care of the Fredericksburg Care Company, LP, a nursing home. Zapata’s death and survival beneficiaries sued Fredericksburg, alleging negligent care and wrongful death. Fredericksburg filed a motion to compel arbitration based on an arbitration clause contained in an agreement that Zapata signed prior to her admission in the nursing home. The trial court denied the motion to compel arbitration, concluding (1) the pre-admission agreement’s arbitration clause did not comply with Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. 74.451 and was therefore invalid; and (2) the McCarran-Ferguson Act (MFA) applied in this case, thus triggering the exemption under which the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) would not preempt the state statute. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the MFA does not exempt section 74.451 from preemption by the FAA, and the trial court should have granted Fredericksburg’s motion to compel arbitration. View "Fredericksburg Care Co., LP v. Perez" on Justia Law

Donald and Crystal Peel were traveling in their van when they were struck by a truck driven by Michael Conner and owned by Conner's employer. In 2004, the Peels sued Conner and his employer (collectively, Conner). Conner timely answered and requested discovery. The Peels did not respond. In 2013, when the Peels had done nothing to pursue their claims, Conner moved to dismiss for want of prosecution. The trial court refused to dismiss and directed the Peels to respond to Conner’s requests for discovery served more than eight years earlier. Conner filed a petition for mandamus directing the trial court to dismiss the case. The court of appeals denied relief. Conner subsequently petitioned the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court conditionally granted the petition for writ of mandamus and directed the trial court to vacate its order denying Conner’s motion to dismiss and directed the court to dismiss this suit for want of prosecution. View "In re Conner" on Justia Law

A property developer filed suit against several defendants involved in a construction project asserting claims for negligence and breach of contract. Defendants filed motions to compel arbitration, which the trial court denied. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court held that the developer must arbitrate its claims against the general contractor but not its claims against the other defendants, as (1) the developer agreed to arbitrate its claims against the general contractor, and the general contractor did not waive its right to demand arbitration; (2) the developer’s argument that a contractual deadline barred the general contractor’s demand for arbitration was itself a claim that must be arbitrated; (3) the developer did not agree in the general contract to arbitrate its claims against the other defendants; (4) the developer was not equitably estopped from denying its assent to its purported agreement that the other defendants could enforce the general contract’s arbitration provisions; and (5) the subcontracts did not require the parties to arbitrate these claims. View "G.T. Leach Builders, LLC v. Sapphire V.P., L.P." on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court overruled its long-standing rule prohibiting self belt evidence in car accident cases. This ruling was the result of the Legislature’s overhaul of Texas’s system for apportioning fault in negligence cases and the change in law requiring seat belt use. The trial court in the instant case relied on the Court’s precedent in prohibiting seat belt evidence. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment solely on the ground that seat belt evidence was properly excluded. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that relevant evidence of use or nonuse of seat belts is admissible for the purpose of apportioning responsibility in civil lawsuits, provided that the plaintiff’s conduct caused or was a cause of his damages. Remanded. View "Nabors Well Servs., Ltd. v. Romero" on Justia Law

Gordon Westergren was involved in a lawsuit regarding the purchase of highly desired property. The lawsuit went to mediation, which resulted in National Property Holdings, L.P. (NPH) agreeing to purchase the property. Separately, in exchange for Western’s agreement to settle the lawsuit, Russell Plank, the consultant for NPH, orally promised Westergren that he would receive $1 million plus an interest in the profits from NPH’s future sale of the property. Westergren subsequently signed a release stating that he agreed to relinquish all interest in the property and all claims against NPH and other listed parties in exchange for a total payment of $500,000. Westergren then filed suit, alleging, inter alia, breach of the oral contract and fraud. Defendants asserted that Westergren had released all claims by signing the release and that the oral contract was unenforceable. The jury found in Westergren’s favor on all claims, concluding that Plank fraudulently induced Westergren to sign the release. The Supreme Court held (1) Westergren’s fraudulent inducement failed as a matter of law because he had a reasonable opportunity to read the release before he signed it and elected not to do so; and (2) the oral side agreement did not satisfy the statute of frauds. View "Nat’l Prop. Holdings, L.P. v. Westergren" on Justia Law

Bill Head, who owns and operates the Silver Spur Truck Stop in Pharr, Texas, hired Petroleum Solutions, Inc. to manufacture and install an underground fuel system. After the discovery that a major diesel-fuel release leak had occurred, Head sued Petroleum Solutions for its resulting damages. Petroleum Solutions filed a third-party petition against Titeflex, Inc., the alleged manufacturer of a component part incorporated into the fuel system, claiming indemnity and contribution. Titeflex filed a counterclaim against Petroleum Solutions for statutory indemnity. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Head and in favor of Titeflex. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court (1) reversed as to Head’s claims against Petroleum Solutions, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by charging the jury with a spoliation instruction and striking Petroleum Solutions’ defenses, and the abuse of discretion was harmful; and (2) affirmed as to Titeflex’s indemnity claim, holding that Titeflex was entitled to statutory indemnity from Petroleum Solutions and that any error with respect to the indemnity claim was harmless. View "Petroleum Solutions, Inc. v. Head" on Justia Law

“In Texas, the general rule…is that an injured party cannot sue the tortfeasor’s insurer directly until the tortfeasor’s liability has been finally determined by agreement or judgment.” Plaintiff sued San Diego Tortilla (SDT) for personal injuries after he lost his hand operating a tortilla machine. Plaintiff then added a declaratory judgment claim against SDT’s liability insurer, Essex Insurance Company, seeking a declaration that Essex must indemnify SDT for its liability to Plaintiff. Essex filed motions to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims, arguing that the “no direct action” rule barred Plaintiff from suing Essex until SDT’s liability to Plaintiff was determined. The trial court denied the motions, and the court of appeals denied Essex’s petition for writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court conditionally granted mandamus and directed the trial court to grant Essex’s motions to dismiss, holding that no exception to the “no direct action” rule applied in this case. View "In re Essex Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Petitioner worked for a BCG Attorney Search, Inc. until he left and started a competing firm. BCG’s president, Andrew Barnes, posted a statement on two of his websites implicating Petitioner in a kickback scheme during his employment with BCG. Petitioner sued BDG, Barnes, two of Barnes’s companies for defamation, seeking a permanent injunction requiring Barnes to remove from his websites the defamatory speech and prohibiting Barnes from making similar statements, in any form, in the future. The trial court granted summary judgment for Barnes, concluding that the relief Petitioner sought would constitute an impermissible prior restraint on speech under the Texas Constitution. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a permanent injunction requiring the removal of posted speech that has been adjudicated defamatory is not a prior restraint; (2) a permanent injunction prohibiting future speech based on that adjudication is an unconstitutional infringement on Texans’ free-speech rights under the Texas Constitution; and (3) the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the extent Petitioner’s requested injunction did not constitute a prior restraint, View "Kinney v. Barnes" on Justia Law

This suit was between a physician and other medical providers. Finding that Plaintiff-physician filed baseless pleadings in bad faith and with an improper purpose, the trial court imposed sanctions in excess of one million dollars. This was one of the highest reported monetary sanctions awards in Texas and the United States. The court of appeals affirmed the awards. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) due process requires that sanctions be just, meaning that there be a direct nexus between the sanction and the sanctionable conduct, and be visited on the true offender; (2) the trial court’s sanctions award in this case met due process requirements because Plaintiff’s pleadings asserted time-barred claims and address matters irrelevant to the lawsuit in an attempt to leverage a more favorable settlement; and (3) because the trial court, when assessing the amount of sanctions, failed to examine the extent to which Defendants bore some responsibility for the expenses they incurred in litigating a variety of issues for over four years, remand is required for the trial court to reassess the amount of the sanctions award. View "Nath v. Tex. Children’s Hosp." on Justia Law