Justia Texas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner granted Respondent a right of way to construct a pipeline across Petitioner’s property. The parties signed an agreement requiring Respondent to install the pipeline by boring underground in order to preserve the trees on the property. The construction company Respondent hired, however, cut down several hundred feet of trees. A jury found Respondent liable for damage to Petitioner’s property on both breach of contract and trespass theories and awarded damages both to compensate Petitioner for the reasonable cost to restore the property and for the intrinsic value of the destroyed trees. The court of appeals reversed based on the trial court’s failure to submit a jury question on whether the injury to the property was temporary or permanent. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the general rule that temporary injury to real property entitles the owner to damages commensurate with the cost of restoring the property and permanent injury to the property entitles the owner commensurate with the loss in the fair market value to the property as a whole applies when the wrongful conduct causing the injury stems from breach of contract rather than tort; (2) the common law exception to this general rule that entitles the landowner to damages in keeping with the intrinsic value of the destroyed trees applies in this case; and (3) any error in the jury charge related to such damages was harmless. Remanded. View "Gilbert Wheeler, Inc. v. Enbridge Pipelines, LP" on Justia Law

W. Kirk Burbage (Kirk) and the Burbage Funeral Home sued Allan Chadwick Burbage (Chad), Kirk’s brother, for defamation after Chad created a website to air his grievances with Kirk and sent letters to family friends containing disparaging statements about Kirk. After a trial, a jury assessed compensatory and exemplary damages against Chad for ten statements defaming Kirk and permanently enjoined Chad from making similar statements. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the trial court abused its discretion by issuing the permanent injunction, which operated as an impermissible prior restraint on freedom of speech; and (2) no evidence supported the compensatory damage award, and exemplary damages cannot stand. View "Burbage v. Burbage" on Justia Law

A trial court may substitute a regular juror with an alternate if the regular juror is unable to fulfill or is disqualified from fulfilling his duties. A trial court may only dismiss a juror and proceed with fewer than twelve jurors if the dismissed juror is constitutionally disabled. In this child custody dispute, the trial court empaneled twelve jurors and retained one alternate. The trial court subsequently substituted the alternate juror for a regular juror whom it found to be disqualified. During the trial, the trial court found that one of the jurors had become disabled and proceeded with eleven jurors. The eleven-member jury returned a unanimous verdict. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that dismissal of the disqualified juror resulted in an eleven-member jury in violation of the constitutional right to a jury trial. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals failed to property examine the two dismissals under their appropriate standards. Remanded. View "In re Interest of M.G.N." on Justia Law

The question presented to the Supreme Court in this case was whether Texas recognizes a legal right to stigma damages, which represent damage to the reputation of realty. Plaintiff, a ranch owner, sued Defendant, the owner of a metal processing facility, for nuisance, trespass and damages after the Commission found that Defendant had committed an unauthorized discharge of industrial hazardous waste that had affected Plaintiff’s property. As to damages, Plaintiff sought only a loss of the fair market value of the ranch and relied on an expert witness who testified that, in her opinion, the ranch had suffered a loss of market value due to stigma resulting from fear, risk, and negative public perceptions. A jury found that Defendant was negligent and that negligence caused the property to lose $349,312 of its market value. The trial court entered judgment on the verdict, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that even if Texas law permits recovery of stigma damages, Plaintiff’s evidence was legally insufficient to prove them. View "Houston Unlimited, Inc. Metal Processing v. Mel Acres Ranch" on Justia Law

On a cold winter day, Plaintiff, a mail carrier, had just delivered mail to the home of Homeowners when he slipped on the Homeowners' sidewalk and fell, allegedly injuring himself. One of the Homeowners had said “don’t slip” to Plaintiff before he reached the sidewalk. Plaintiff sued the Homeowners, alleging that the Homeowners were aware of ice on the sidewalk but failed to warn Plaintiff of any potential danger. The trial court granted the Homeowners’ motion for summary judgment, concluding that the “don’t slip” statement was adequate as a matter of law to warn Plaintiff of an icy sidewalk. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that a “general instruction not to slip or trip or fall is not conclusive evidence of a warning.” The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding that even if ice on the Homeowners’ sidewalk created an unreasonably dangerous condition, the Homeowners adequately warned Plaintiff of it. Remanded. View "Henkel v. Norman" on Justia Law

A Homeowner contracted with a Builder to build a home on property owned by the Homeowner. The Builder contracted with a Plumber to put in the plumbing at the house. After the home was completed, the Builder and the Homeowner sued the Plumber for damages allegedly caused by plumbing leaks, alleging breach of contract, breach of express warranty, and negligence. The trial court granted summary judgment for the Plumber, reasoning (1) the Homeowner could not recover contract damages because it was not a party to the plumbing subcontract, nor could the Builder recover contract damages because it had not suffered any compensable damage; and (2) the plaintiffs did not have a negligence claim because they did not allege violation of any tort duty independent of the contract. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals erred in concluding that the pleadings and summary judgment evidence negated the existence of a negligence claim. View "Chapman Custom Homes, Inc. v. Dallas Plumbing Co." on Justia Law

Bill Head, doing business as Bill Head Enterprises (Head), hired Petroleum Solutions, Inc. to manufacture and install an underground fuel system at the truck stop Head owned and operated. After a major diesel-fuel leak occurred, Respondents sued Petroleum Solutions for its damages. The trial rendered judgment in favor of Head and in favor of third-party defendant Titeflex, Inc., the alleged manufacturer of a component part incorporated into the fuel system, on Titeflex’s counterclaim against Petroleum Solutions for statutory indemnity. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the judgment as to Head, holding that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing the sanctions of charging the jury with a spoliation instruction and striking Petroleum Solutions’ statute-of-limitations defense, and the trial court’s abuse of discretion was harmful; and (2) affirmed the judgment as to Titeflex’s indemnity claim, holding that Titeflex was entitled to statutory indemnity from Petroleum Solutions. Remanded for further proceedings between Respondents and Petroleum Solutions. View "Petroleum Solutions, Inc. v. Head" on Justia Law

Timothy Bostic died from mesothelioma, which can be caused by asbestos. Plaintiffs, Bostic’s family members, sued Georgia-Pacific Corporation and thirty-nine other defendants, alleging that Bostic had been exposed to asbestos as a child and teenager while using Georgia-Pacific drywall joint compound. A jury found Georgia-Pacific liable under negligence and marketing defect theories and awarded Plaintiffs $6.8 million in compensatory damages and $4.8 million in punitive damages. The court of appeals held that the causation evidence was legally insufficient and rendered a take-nothing judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the standard of substantial factor causation established in Borg-Warner Corp. v. Flores, an asbestosis case, applies to mesothelioma cases; (2) Plaintiffs were not required to prove that but for Bostic’s exposure to Georgia-Pacific’s asbestos-containing joint compound, Bostic would not have contracted mesothelioma; and (3) the evidence of causation was legally insufficient to sustain the verdict in this case. View "Bostic v. Georgia-Pacific Corp." on Justia Law

Joseph Emmite worked as an insulator at Union Carbide Corporation for approximately forty years before he died in 2005. In 2007, the Emmites filed a wrongful death suit against Union Carbide. Union Carbide filed a motion to dismiss based on the Emmites alleged failure to timely serve a physician report that complied with Chapter 90 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. The Multi-District Litigation pretrial court denied the motion. The court of appeals affirmed on interlocutory appeal, holding that the report filed by the Emmites did not satisfy the requirements of Chapter 90 but that Chapter 90 was unconstitutionally retroactive as applied to the Emmites’ claims. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and rendered judgment dismissing the Emmites’ suit, holding that a statutorily compliant report was not filed in this case and that Chapter 90, as applied to the Emmites, does not violate the Texas Constitution’s prohibition against retroactive laws. View "Union Carbide Corp. v. Synatzske" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the Texas-resident exception to the forum non conveniens statute, which allows “plaintiffs” who are legal residents of Texas to bring a case in a Texas forum even if forum non conveniens would otherwise favor dismissal. Here an estate was sued in Texas regarding a Mexican decedent’s alleged responsibility for a car accident that occurred in Mexico. The estate in turn filed a third-party claim against Ford Motor Company. Wrongful-death beneficiaries, three of whom were legal residents of Texas, intervened in the lawsuit and also filed claims against Ford. Ford moved to dismiss under forum non conveniens, and the trial court denied the motion. Ford then moved for mandamus relief. The court of appeals denied relief, reasoning that, because at least one of the beneficiaries was a legal resident of Texas, the wrongful-death beneficiaries were “plaintiffs” that could take advantage of the Texas-resident exception to forum non conveniens. The Supreme Court denied mandamus relief, holding that the wrongful-death beneficiaries are distinct plaintiffs that can rely on the Texas-resident exception. View "In re Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law