Justia Texas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

An employee of Texas Tech University Health Sciences Center–El Paso applied for the position of chief of staff to the university president but was not selected. Instead, a significantly younger candidate was chosen. The employee alleged that she was not selected due to age discrimination, in violation of Chapter 21 of the Texas Labor Code. The university argued that the president hired the more qualified candidate and that there was no evidence of pretext for discrimination.The trial court denied the university’s plea to the jurisdiction, and the Court of Appeals for the Eighth District of Texas affirmed the trial court’s decision regarding the age-discrimination claim. The court of appeals held that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether age was a motivating factor in the university’s decision not to select the employee for the chief-of-staff position. However, the court of appeals reversed the trial court’s decision regarding the retaliation claim, which the employee did not challenge further.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and held that the employee did not present sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact that the university’s stated reasons for not selecting her were a pretext for age discrimination. The court concluded that the university’s reasons for hiring the younger candidate were legitimate and nondiscriminatory, and the employee failed to show that these reasons were false or that age was a motivating factor in the decision. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Texas reversed the court of appeals’ judgment regarding the age-discrimination claim and rendered judgment dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction. View "TEXAS TECH UNIVERSITY HEALTH SCIENCES CENTER-EL PASO v. FLORES" on Justia Law

A police officer in Buffalo, Texas, was terminated by the City Council after engaging in a high-speed chase with a civilian in his patrol vehicle, resulting in an accident. The officer, Gregory Moliere, received a written reprimand from the Chief of Police, which he accepted. Subsequently, the City Council voted to terminate his employment. Moliere sued, claiming the City Council lacked the authority to fire him and that his due process rights were violated.The trial court dismissed Moliere's suit, finding that the City Council had the authority to terminate him. Moliere appealed, and the Court of Appeals for the Tenth District of Texas reversed the trial court's decision, concluding that there was a fact issue regarding the City Council's authority to terminate Moliere. The appellate court noted ambiguities in the City's employee manual and the police department's policy-and-procedure manual and remanded the case for further proceedings without addressing Moliere's due process claim.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and determined that the City Council had the authority to terminate Moliere under Texas Local Government Code Section 341.001, which allows the governing body of a Type A general-law municipality to establish and regulate a municipal police force. The court held that the City Council's authority to regulate the police force included the power to terminate officers for cause. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Texas reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment and reinstated the trial court's judgment dismissing Moliere's claims based on the alleged lack of authority to fire him.However, the Supreme Court of Texas remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to address Moliere's due process claim, which had not been considered previously. View "City of Buffalo v. Moliere" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute over a provision in a collective bargaining agreement between the City of Austin and the Austin Firefighters Association. The provision, known as Article 10, grants 5,600 hours of "Association Business Leave" (ABL) annually for firefighters to conduct union-related activities. The petitioners, including the State of Texas and several individuals, argued that Article 10 violates the "Gift Clauses" of the Texas Constitution, which prohibit governmental entities from making gifts of public resources to private parties. They contended that the ABL provision improperly benefits the union by allowing firefighters to use paid time off for union activities, some of which they alleged were misused for improper purposes.The case was initially dismissed under the Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA), with the trial court granting relief to the Association, including the award of fees and sanctions. On appeal, the trial court's findings of fact went unchallenged, and the focus was primarily on whether the agreement itself violated the Gift Clauses.The Supreme Court of Texas held that Article 10 does not violate the Gift Clauses. The court found that the provision is not a gratuitous gift but brings a public benefit, serves a legitimate public purpose, and the government retains control over the funds to ensure that the public purpose is achieved. The court emphasized that the ABL must be used for activities that directly support the mission of the Fire Department or the Association and are consistent with the Association’s purposes. The court also reversed the trial court's order granting the Association's TCPA motion to dismiss and its award of sanctions and fees against the original plaintiffs. View "BORGELT v. AUSTIN FIREFIGHTERS ASSOCIATION, IAFF LOCAL 975" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between Mary Alice Keyes and Sean Leo Nadeau, who are the owners and agents of MonoCoque Diversified Interests, LLC, and David Weller, who provides aviation consulting services through his company, IntegriTech Advisors, LLC. Weller was discussing a potential employment relationship with MonoCoque. After several discussions and email exchanges outlining the agreed terms, Weller accepted MonoCoque’s offer and began working for them. However, disagreements arose over the terms of Weller's compensation, leading to Weller's resignation. Weller and IntegriTech sued MonoCoque, Keyes, and Nadeau, asserting various fraud claims and a Texas Securities Act claim against all three defendants.The defendants argued that they were shielded from liability by Section 21.223 of the Texas Business Organizations Code because they were acting as agents of the company and there was no evidence that they were seeking a direct personal benefit. The trial court granted the defendants' motion for partial summary judgment on the fraud claims. On appeal, the court of appeals reversed the trial court’s decision, holding that Section 21.223 does not abrogate the common law principle that individuals are directly liable for their own tortious conduct, even if committed in the course and scope of their employment.The Supreme Court of Texas affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. The court held that Section 21.223 does not limit an individual’s liability under the common law for tortious acts allegedly committed while acting as a corporate officer or agent, even when the individual is also a shareholder or member. The court concluded that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the fraud claims against Keyes and Nadeau and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "KEYES v. WELLER" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a sexual harassment claim brought by Nicole Harris against her former employer, Fossil Group, Inc. Harris alleged that she was sexually harassed by an assistant store manager, Leland Brown, during her employment at a Fossil store in Frisco, Texas. The harassment primarily occurred through social media and included obscene and sexually explicit videos, photos, and messages. Harris claimed that she sent an email reporting the harassment through Fossil's anonymous reporting system in late April 2019, but received no response. She resigned from her position in early May 2019.The trial court granted Fossil's motion for summary judgment, ruling in favor of the company. The court found that there was no evidence that Fossil knew or should have known about the harassment but failed to remedy the situation. Harris appealed this decision.The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's judgment. The appellate court held that Harris's testimony about her email was some evidence that Fossil knew or should have known about Brown's misconduct. The court also stated that Fossil took no remedial action after Harris sent the email.The Supreme Court of Texas disagreed with the Court of Appeals' decision. The court held that even if Fossil had received Harris's email, there was no evidence that its subsequent actions were not prompt and remedial. The court noted that mere days after Harris sent the email, she voluntarily resigned, and she did not identify any instances of interim harassment. The following week, the store manager reported the matter to human resources after learning about the harassment from another source. By the end of the month, Fossil had fired Brown. The court also held that Harris did not raise a fact issue that Fossil knew or should have known about the harassment before the date of the email. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Texas reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment and reinstated the trial court's judgment in favor of Fossil. View "Fossil Group, Inc. v. Harris" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Pureza “Didit” Martinez, who was terminated from her position at the Texas Tech University Health Sciences Center at the age of 72. She filed a lawsuit alleging age discrimination against the Health Sciences Center, the Texas Tech University System, and the Texas Tech University System’s Board of Regents. The Texas Tech University System and the Board of Regents argued that they were not Martinez's employer and thus retained sovereign immunity.Previously, the trial court denied the plea to the jurisdiction filed by the Texas Tech University System and the Board of Regents, and the court of appeals affirmed this decision. The defendants argued that Martinez failed to plead allegations that could make them liable for age discrimination under the Labor Code, essentially denying being Martinez’s employer.The Supreme Court of Texas disagreed with the lower courts' decisions. The court found that Martinez's petition did not allege facts demonstrating that the Texas Tech University System or the Board of Regents employed Martinez directly or that either one controlled access to and interfered with her employment. Therefore, the court concluded that Martinez failed to allege a waiver of sovereign immunity, and the plea to the jurisdiction of the Texas Tech University System and the Board of Regents should have been granted. However, the court remanded the case to the trial court to give Martinez an opportunity to replead, as her petition did not foreclose a valid claim against those defendants. View "Texas Tech University System v. Martinez" on Justia Law

The case involves two plaintiffs, Michael Grim and Jim Maynard, who were employees of the Denton Municipal Electric (DME), a local electric utility owned by the City of Denton. The plaintiffs supported the construction of a controversial new power plant, the Denton Energy Center (DEC). Keely Briggs, a member of the Denton city council, opposed the new plant and leaked internal city documents about the project to a local newspaper. The plaintiffs reported Briggs's leak of confidential vendor information, alleging it violated the Public Information Act and the Open Meetings Act. They claimed that this report triggered the protections of the Whistleblower Act. The plaintiffs were later fired, which they alleged was retaliation for their report about Briggs.The case was initially heard in the district court, where the city argued that the Whistleblower Act did not apply because the plaintiffs did not report a violation of law "by the employing governmental entity or another public employee." The court was not convinced, and the case proceeded to a jury trial, which resulted in a $4 million judgment for the plaintiffs. The city appealed, raising several issues, including the legal question of whether the Whistleblower Act applied in this case. The court of appeals affirmed the district court's decision.The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the judgment of the court of appeals. The court held that the Whistleblower Act did not protect the plaintiffs because they reported a violation of law by a lone city council member, not by the employing governmental entity or another public employee. The court found that the lone city council member lacked any authority to act on behalf of the city, and her actions could not be imputed to the city. Therefore, her violation of law was not a "violation of law by the employing governmental entity." The court concluded that the plaintiffs did not allege a viable claim under the Whistleblower Act, and rendered judgment for the city. View "CITY OF DENTON v. GRIM" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Texas handled a case in which a nurse claimed her employer, Scott & White Memorial Hospital, wrongfully terminated her employment in retaliation for reporting potential child abuse or neglect to the Texas Child Protective Services (CPS), which is considered a protected conduct under Section 261.110(b) of the Texas Family Code.The nurse, Dawn Thompson, had previously received two written reprimands for violating the hospital's personal-conduct policy. On the third occasion, she disclosed a child patient's protected health information to a school nurse without the parents' authorization. This was considered by the hospital as a violation of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) and a breach of the patient's rights. Consequently, Thompson was terminated.Thompson filed a lawsuit against the hospital, asserting that her termination was in violation of Family Code Section 261.110(b), which protects professionals who report child abuse or neglect in good faith from adverse employment actions.The Supreme Court of Texas ruled that Section 261.110 imposes a "but-for causation" requirement, which means that the protected conduct must be such that without it, the adverse employment action would not have occurred when it did. In this case, the court found that Thompson would have been terminated when she was due to her HIPAA violation, regardless of her report to CPS. Therefore, the court rejected Thompson's retaliation claim and reinstated the trial court's summary judgment in favor of the hospital. View "SCOTT & WHITE MEMORIAL HOSPITAL v. THOMPSON" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the trial court in this declaratory judgment suit, holding that a corporate resolution did not authorize the law firm to redeem a departing shareholder's shares on terms unilaterally set by the firm's founders.Under Tex. Bus. Orgs. Code 21.801 , a professional corporation may redeem corporate shares, which are personal property, if one of three conditions is met. After the firm in this case terminated a shareholder's employment the founders purported to redeem his shares at no cost. The trial court concluded that a resolution generally authorizing the founders to take affirmative action on behalf of the firm unambiguously encompassed redemption. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the resolution did not authorize redemption of the departing shareholder's shares on terms dictated by the founders. View "Skeels v. Suder" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the trial court granting no-evidence summary-judgment motions in this action alleging that Defendants negligently collected, transported, tested, and reported the results of Plaintiff's hair sample used for a drug and alcohol screening, holding that third-party testing entities hired by an employer do not owe a common-law negligence duty to their clients' employees.Plaintiff, a pipefitter, was directed to report to the Houston Area Safety Council to provide hair and urine samples for drug and alcohol screenings. The Safety Council collected the samples and delivered them to Defendant for laboratory testing. Defendant reported that Plaintiff's hair sample tested positive for cocaine and a cocaine metabolite. Subsequent samples tested positive, but Defendant was required to find work with a different employer. Plaintiff later brought this action. The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendant, concluding that Defendant did not owe Plaintiff a legal duty. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed after considering the competing factors and well-established tort principles, holding that Plaintiff failed to establish that Defendant owed him a legal duty under the circumstances of this case. View "Houston Area Safety Council, Inc. v. Mendez" on Justia Law