Justia Texas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this labor dispute, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the order of the trial court granting Defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), holding that Defendant did not carry its burden to establish that Plaintiff was its borrowed employee.Plaintiff sued Defendant for negligence after he was injured while working on an offshore drilling rig owned by Defendant. Although Plaintiff was not Defendant's employee, Defendant claimed that workers' compensation benefits were Plaintiff's sole remedy because Plaintiff was acting as its "borrowed employee" under the federal Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA). The jury found that Plaintiff was not Defendant's borrowed employee and awarded damages to Plaintiff. The trial court granted Defendant's JNOV motion, finding that the submission of the borrowed-employee question to the jury was improper and that the evidence supported Defendant's borrowed-employee defense. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the borrowed-employee inquiry can be a fact question for the jury. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court correctly determined that the borrowed-employee inquiry was a legal question for the court, not a fact question for the jury; but (2) Defendant did not establish that Plaintiff was its borrowed employee. View "W&T Offshore, Inc. v. Fredieu" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the trial court granting the City of Madisonville's jurisdictional plea claiming that David Sims' Texas Whistleblower Act claim was time-barred because it was filed after the Act's ninety-day filing deadline, holding that, contrary to the ruling of the court of appeals, the filing deadline was jurisdictional.In reversing the trial court, the court of appeals held that the Act's ninety-day filing deadline was not jurisdictional because a statute of limitations may be raised as an affirmative defense at the summary-judgment stage but not as the basis for a jurisdictional plea. The Supreme Court reversed and dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, holding that because the claim here was against a governmental entity the filing deadline was jurisdictional. View "City of Madisonville v. Sims" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the trial court reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Education upholding the decision of the North East Independent School District board to end Respondent's continuing teaching contract, holding that the record supported the board's and Commissioner's decisions.At issue was whether state and federal laws requiring school districts to record grades and evaluate student progress provide standards of conduct for the teaching provision such that the teacher's failure to comply with district policies implementing those laws supports termination for "good cause." The Commissioner agreed that Respondent's conduct was "good cause per se" for termination. The trial court reversed. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that "good cause per se" has no basis in Tex. Educ. Code 21.156(a)'s good cause definition. The Supreme Court revered, holding (1) Respondent preserved her complaint for judicial review; (2) the Commissioner erred in employing the "good cause per se" test, which has no basis in the Education Code's plain text; and (3) evidence of a failure to meet a district policy that implements state law supports a good cause determination. View "North East Independent School District v. Riou" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals upholding the trial court's grant of summary judgment without addressing its legal merit, holding that the trial court's recital in its final summary judgment order that it considered "the pleadings, evidence, and arguments of counsel" included a late-filed response and attached evidence.Plaintiff sued Defendant alleging that she had been sexually assaulted at work. Defendant moved for summary judgment, presenting traditional and no evidence grounds. The trial court granted the motion. On remand from the Supreme Court, the court of appeals affirmed, concluding that Plaintiff failed to file a timely response to the no-evidence motion and that the trial court did not consider the late-filed response. The court of appeals declined to consider the evidence that Defendant had attached to its combined motion because no timely response pointed out a fact issue raised by that evidence. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court's recital that it considered the "evidence and arguments of counsel," without limitation, was an "affirmative indication" that the trial court considered Plaintiff's response and the evidence attached to it; and (2) therefore, the court of appeals should have considered that evidence as well in its review of the trial court's summary judgment. View "B.C. v. Stake N Shake Operations, Inc." on Justia Law

In this workers' compensation case involving the death of a deputy sheriff who died in a vehicular accident while driving his assigned patrol car the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the summary judgment rendered by the trial court for the deputy's widow, holding that, at the time of the accident, the deputy was engaged in law enforcement activity within the course and scope of his employment.In granting summary judgment fort he deputy's widow the trial court concluded that the deputy was in the course and scope of his duties at the time of his death. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that because the accident occurred during the deputy's travel home from an extra-duty assignment with a private employer the deputy was not in the course and scope of his employment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the deputy was operating the marked patrol car with the county's permission and under its authority at the time of his death; and (2) therefore, summary judgment was properly granted in the widow's favor. View "Orozco v. County of El Paso" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court considered two questions of Texas law certified from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concerning whether changes made by the Texas Legislature in 2017 to Deferred Retirement Option Plans (DROP) violate a Texas Constitution provision that prohibits the reduction or impairment of certain accrued retirement benefits, concluding that the 2017 legislative reforms do not violate the Constitution.Certain retirees challenged the 2017 statutory amendments, which eliminated their ability to request lump-sum distributions from their respective DROP accounts. The retirees argued that the funds in DROP are accrued service retirement benefits and that the change to how the funds may be withdrawn reduces or impaired the accrued benefit in violation of Tex. Const. art. XVI, 66(d). The Fifth Circuit certified questions to the Supreme Court, concluding that section 66's application in this case was unsettled under Texas law. The Supreme Court answered that the 2017 amendment does not violate section 66. View "Degan v. Board of Trustees of the Dallas Police" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed in part the judgment of the court of appeals concluding that a no-evidence motion for summary judgment is not a proper procedural vehicle to defeat jurisdiction on the ground of governmental immunity and that the Texas Open Meetings Act waives governmental immunity with respect to declaratory judgment claims, holding that the court of appeals erred in making both conclusions.Plaintiff sued the Town of Shady Shores alleging, among other things, that she was wrongfully terminated and seeking a declaratory judgment that the termination of her employment violated the Open Meetings Act and the Texas Constitution. The trial court denied the Town's traditional and no-evidence motions for summary judgment. The Town appealed, arguing that Plaintiff had not established a waiver of the Town's governmental immunity. The court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) a no-evidence summary judgment motion may be used to defeat jurisdiction on the basis of governmental immunity; (2) the Open Meetings Act does not waive governmental immunity with respect to declaratory judgment claims; and (3) the Open Meetings Act claims seeking injunctive and mandamus relief were sufficiently pled. View "Town of Shady Shores v. Swanson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed part and reversed in part the judgment of the court of appeals holding that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over Petitioner's appeal because she did not seek rehearing of an ALJ's ruling and that the agency in this case did not deprive Petitioner of due process, holding that the trial court lacked jurisdiction but that the agency violated Petitioner's right to due process.An ALJ sustained the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services' determination that Petitioner's name be submitted to the Employee Misconduct Registry unless she timely petitioned for judicial review. In its letter, the Health and Human Services Commission failed to explain that filing a motion for rehearing was a prerequisite for judicial review. The trial court overruled the agencies' plea to the jurisdiction but ruled for them on the merits of Petitioner's appeal. The court of appeals reversed the trial court's judgment on the jurisdictional plea and rendered judgment that Petitioner's failure to seek rehearing deprived the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held (1) the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider Petitioner's case; but (2) the agencies deprived Petitioner of her right to judicial review by misrepresenting the proper procedures to seek judicial review of the adverse order. View "Mosley v. Texas Health & Human Services Commission" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the trial court dismissing Plaintiff’s suit against Nueces County, holding that governmental immunity barred the suit.Plaintiff served as an assistant district attorney in Neuces County for two years. After he was fired, Plaintiff sued the County, the district attorney’s office, and the then-district attorney (collectively, the County), alleging wrongful termination and seeking actual damages and exemplary damages. The trial court dismissed the case on the ground that governmental immunity barred Plaintiff’s claims. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that neither Sabine Pilot Service, Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. 1985), nor the Michael Morton Act waived the County’s governmental immunity from Plaintiff’s claim. View "Hillman v. Nueces County, Texas" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the trial court in this case brought by three pensioners, holding that the Dallas Police and Fire Pension System did not violate Tex. Const. art. XVI, 66 by amending its pension plan to reduce the interest rate paid on Deferred Retirement Option Plan (DROP) accounts.Petitioners elected DROP before the amendment in this case and argued that the change in interest rate reduced or impaired service retirement benefits granted or accrued in violation of section 66. The trial court initially rendered judgment for Petitioners but, on reconsideration, ruled that reducing the DROP account interest rate prospectively did not violate section 66. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding the the pension plan amendments did not violate section 66 because the DROP account interest rate change was prospective and will not impact funds deposited before the amendments became effective. View "Eddington v. Dallas Police & Fire Pension System" on Justia Law