Justia Texas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed a complaint against her former employer (Defendant), claiming assault, sexual assault, and battery, among other causes of action. Defendant moved for summary judgment on all claims, arguing, in part, that the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act’s (TCHRA) statutory cause of action preempted Plaintiff’s common law claims. The trial court granted the motion without providing a basis for its ruling. Plaintiff appealed only the trial court’s ruling on her assault claim against Defendant. The court of appeals affirmed on the ground that the TCHRA preempted Plaintiff’s assault claim. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) where the gravamen of a plaintiff’s claim is not harassment, but rather, assault, the TCHRA does not preempt the plaintiff’s common law assault claim; and (2) because the gravamen of Plaintiff’s complaint in this case was assault, Defendant did not establish, as a matter of law, that Plaintiff’s claim was preempted by the TCHRA. Remanded. View "B.C. v. Steak N Shake Operations, Inc." on Justia Law

Under Chapter 614, Subchapter B of the Texas Government Code, a covered peace officer cannot be disciplined based on a complaint unless certain procedural requirements are met. At issue in this case was whether Subchapter B’s disciplinary procedures apply to at-will employment relationships, whether those procedures apply to any complaint of misconduct or only citizen-generated complaints, and whether a complaint must be signed by the victim of the alleged misconduct and presented to the employee before discipline is imposed. When a deputy sheriff’s (Employee) employment was terminated, Employee appealed to the sheriff, complaining of procedural irregularities in the process leading to his discharge. The sheriff summarily upheld the termination decision. The employee then sued the sheriff and the county (collectively, Employer), alleging that the sheriff’s department violated Government Code sections 614.022 and 614.023 by terminating his employment without giving him a copy of a signed complaint and without allowing him an opportunity to respond to the allegations before he was disciplined. The trial court granted partial summary judgment for Employer. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Employer violated Chapter 614. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, assuming that Chapter 614, Subchapter B applied under these circumstances, Employer complied with the statute. View "Colorado County, Texas v. Staff" on Justia Law

Bonnie Jones was injured during the course of her employment. Her employer’s comp carrier, American Home Assurance Company, paid her various benefits but did not pay her supplemental income benefits (SIBs) for the fourteenth quarter of 2011. Jones sued, and the parties settled. Under the Texas workers’ compensation regime, where SIBs are concerned, settlements cannot bypass a statutory formula or facilitate benefits were none were due as a matter of law. In this case, the settlement was noncompliant. The trial court approved the proposed settlement, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a court cannot condone a noncompliant settlement regarding an SIBs award. View "Tex. Dep’t of Ins., Div. of Workers’ Comp. v. Jones" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an employee of Union Pacific Railroad, contracted West Nile virus from a mosquito bite. Plaintiff sued Union Pacific under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA) for failing to provide a safe workplace. The jury found that both Plaintiff and Union Pacific negligently caused his disease and attributed eighty percent responsibility to Union Pacific. The trial court rendered judgment on the verdict. Union Pacific appealed, arguing that under the common-law doctrine of ferae naturae, which limits a property owner’s liability for harm from indigenous animals that he has not attracted to the property, it owed Plaintiff no legal duty to protect him from mosquitoes. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the doctrine of ferae naturae applied in this case and precluded Union Pacific’s liability. View "Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Nami" on Justia Law

Union Carbide employed Martin at its Seadrift facility. Martin lost his leg in a workplace accident and recovered workers’ compensation benefits through an owner-controlled insurance program (OCIP) administered by Union Carbide’s parent company, Dow. Martin subsequently sued TIC, a subcontractor providing maintenance services at Seadrift, alleging TIC’s employees negligently caused his injury. TIC cited Labor Code section 406.123, which deems a general contractor the statutory employer of a subcontractor and its employees when the general contractor agrees in writing to provide workers’ compensation insurance to the subcontractor. TIC had a written agreement with Union Carbide that extended workers’ compensation insurance coverage under the OCIP to TIC and its employees. Martin argued, under section 406.122(b), that the exclusive-remedy provision did not apply because TIC was an independent contractor and had a written contract with Union Carbide under which TIC “assume[d] the responsibilities of an employer for the performance of work.” The court denied TIC’s summary-judgment motion; the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court of Texas entered judgment for TIC, reasoning that the independent contractor provision (406.122(b)) is a general rule, and 406.123, which confers statutory-employer status on general contractors who provide workers’ compensation insurance to their subcontractors, is a permissive exception. The record established that, under section 406.123, TIC is Carbide’s deemed employee for purposes of the exclusive-remedy defense. View "TIC Energy & Chem., Inc. v. Martin" on Justia Law

M-I and NOV compete, providing solid-control equipment to the oil-and-gas industry, including mesh screens that filter solid matter from drilling fluid. In 2012, Russo became business development manager of M-I’s screen division and obtained in-depth knowledge of M-I’s bidding strategies, pricing, customer preferences, solid-control systems, and deployment strategies. In 2014, Russo left M-I to become NOV’s screen division global product line manager. M-I sent Russo a letter, asserting breach of a non-compete agreement he executed when he joined M-I . Russo sought a declaration that the agreement was unenforceable. M-I counterclaimed for breach of the agreement, breach of fiduciary duty, misappropriation of trade secrets, and tortious interference, and asserted third-party claims against NOV. At a hearing on M-I’s application for a temporary injunction, M-I sought to establish its trade secrets by Moore’s oral testimony, and requested that everyone, except counsel, experts, and Russo be excluded from the courtroom. The trial court denied M-I’s request. Concerned about disclosing Moore’s testimony, M-I obtained a recess to petition the court of appeals for a writ of mandamus. M-I submitted, in camera to the court of appeals, Moore's affidavit detailing her proposed testimony . Russo and NOV objected to the affidavit as an ex parte communication. The court of appeals denied their motion for access, along with M-I’s mandamus petition. The Texas Supreme Court conditionally granted mandamus relief. The trial court erred in concluding that the exclusion of NOV’s designated representative from portions of the hearing involving trade secrets would violate due process without balancing the competing interests and must, on remand, conduct that balancing. The court also abused its discretion when it ordered the Moore affidavit disclosed without reviewing it in camera. View "In re M-I, L.L.C." on Justia Law

Plaintiff began working for BNSF Railway Company’s predecessor-in-interest in 1974 and, approximately five years later, began to ride on locomotives as a breakman. While riding on the locomotives, Plaintiff alleged that he suffered long-term vibratory exposure resulting in an occupational injury. Plaintiff sued BNSF under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA) and the Locomotive Inspection Act (LIA) to recover damages. After a jury trial, the trial court rendered judgment awarding Plaintiff $1.9 million in costs and damages. BNSF appealed, arguing that there was no evidence to support the jury’s finding that Plaintiff’s lawsuit was timely filed. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and rendered judgment that Plaintiff take nothing, holding that Plaintiff’s claim was time-barred. View "BNSF Railway Co. v. Phillips" on Justia Law

Michael McMillen, an attorney who served as Deputy Counsel for the Texas Health and Human Services Commission’s Office of the Inspector General (OIG), prepared a memorandum concluding that the Commission’s practice of obtaining payments from certain recipients of Medicaid benefits lacked legal justification. McMillen submitted the memorandum to the Deputy Inspector General for the Commission and asserted that he made a noter report to the head of the OIG Internal Affairs Division and to the Commission’s Executive Commissioner. McMiller was later terminated. McMillen sued the Commission and its Executive Commissioner under the Whistleblower Act, alleging retaliatory discharge. Defendants filed a plea to the jurisdiction, arguing that McMillen’s allegations were not sufficient to invoke the Act and waive immunity. The trial court denied the plea. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that McMillen did not report to an appropriate law-enforcement authority under the Act. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the reported-to persons in this case were an appropriate law-enforcement authority under the Act. Remanded. View "McMillen v. Tex. Health & Human Servs. Comm’n" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued BNSF Railway Company, his employer, under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act and the Locomotive Inspection Act to recover damages for a latent occupational injury. After a jury trial, the trial court rendered judgment awarding Plaintiff $1.9 million in costs and damages. BNSF appealed, arguing that Plaintiff’s lawsuit was untimely. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that because there was conflicting evidence in the record concerning when the injury occurred, the jury was entitled to weigh that evidence and reach its finding that Plaintiff’s lawsuit was timely filed. The Supreme Court reversed and rendered judgment that Plaintiff take nothing, holding that no evidence supported the jury’s finding that Plaintiff timely filed his lawsuit. View "BNSF Ry. Co. v. Phillips" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Defendant for breach of contract and for wrongfully discharging him in retaliation for filing a workers’ compensation claim in good faith. Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim related to Defendant’s failure to remit accrued vacation pay upon his termination. A jury found in Plaintiff’s favor. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Plaintiff, awarding him past and future lost earnings, employee benefits, and other damages. Defendant appealed the portion of the judgment on the retaliation claim. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and rendered a take-nothing judgment in favor of Defendant on Plaintiff’s retaliation claim, holding that no evidence supported the jury’s verdict on that claim. View "Kingsaire, Inc. v. Melendez" on Justia Law