Justia Texas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Michael McMillen, an attorney who served as Deputy Counsel for the Texas Health and Human Services Commission’s Office of the Inspector General (OIG), prepared a memorandum concluding that the Commission’s practice of obtaining payments from certain recipients of Medicaid benefits lacked legal justification. McMillen submitted the memorandum to the Deputy Inspector General for the Commission and asserted that he made a noter report to the head of the OIG Internal Affairs Division and to the Commission’s Executive Commissioner. McMiller was later terminated. McMillen sued the Commission and its Executive Commissioner under the Whistleblower Act, alleging retaliatory discharge. Defendants filed a plea to the jurisdiction, arguing that McMillen’s allegations were not sufficient to invoke the Act and waive immunity. The trial court denied the plea. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that McMillen did not report to an appropriate law-enforcement authority under the Act. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the reported-to persons in this case were an appropriate law-enforcement authority under the Act. Remanded. View "McMillen v. Tex. Health & Human Servs. Comm’n" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued BNSF Railway Company, his employer, under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act and the Locomotive Inspection Act to recover damages for a latent occupational injury. After a jury trial, the trial court rendered judgment awarding Plaintiff $1.9 million in costs and damages. BNSF appealed, arguing that Plaintiff’s lawsuit was untimely. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that because there was conflicting evidence in the record concerning when the injury occurred, the jury was entitled to weigh that evidence and reach its finding that Plaintiff’s lawsuit was timely filed. The Supreme Court reversed and rendered judgment that Plaintiff take nothing, holding that no evidence supported the jury’s finding that Plaintiff timely filed his lawsuit. View "BNSF Ry. Co. v. Phillips" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Defendant for breach of contract and for wrongfully discharging him in retaliation for filing a workers’ compensation claim in good faith. Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim related to Defendant’s failure to remit accrued vacation pay upon his termination. A jury found in Plaintiff’s favor. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Plaintiff, awarding him past and future lost earnings, employee benefits, and other damages. Defendant appealed the portion of the judgment on the retaliation claim. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and rendered a take-nothing judgment in favor of Defendant on Plaintiff’s retaliation claim, holding that no evidence supported the jury’s verdict on that claim. View "Kingsaire, Inc. v. Melendez" on Justia Law

After Ginger Weatherspoon was fired from her position as an assistant attorney general at the Office of the Attorney General (OAG), Weatherspoon sued the OAG under the Whistleblower Act. The OAG filed a plea to the jurisdiction, arguing that Weatherspoon’s allegations were not sufficient to invoke the Act and waive the state entity’s immunity from suit for retaliatory discharge. The trial court denied the OAG’s plea. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted the OAG’s petition for review, reversed the court of appeals’ judgment, and dismissed the case, holding that Weatherspoon could not show that her reports met the Act’s requirements, and therefore, the OAG remained immune from suit. View "Office of Attorney Gen. v. Weatherspoon" on Justia Law

In 2004, Employee was working for Employer when she fell, injuring her left knee and back. In 2009, Employee filed a claim for lifetime income benefits (LIBs) pursuant to section 408.161 of the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act claiming that her 2004 injury caused the total loss of use of both her feet at or above the ankle and that the loss of use was permanent. A hearing officer with the Division of Workers’ Compensation determined that Employee was not entitled to LIBs. The district court reversed and awarded LIBs. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and rendered judgment denying Employee’s claim for LIBs, concluding that the court of appeals erred in determining that the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court’s judgment. View "Dallas Nat’l Ins. Co. v. De La Cruz" on Justia Law

Certain provisions of the Texas Occupations Code and Texas Commission of Licensing and Regulation rules promulgated pursuant to that Code require eyebrow threaders to undergo 750 hours of training in order to obtain a license before practicing commercial threading. Plaintiffs, several individuals practicing commercial eyebrow threading and the salon owners employing them, filed this declaratory judgment action asserting that, as applied to them, Texas’s licensing statutes and regulations violate the state Constitution’s due course of law provision. Specifically, Plaintiffs alleged that the number of hours required for a license to practice commercial eyebrow threading are not related to health or safety or to what threaders actually do. The trial court granted summary judgment for the State. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the large number of required hours that are not arguably related to the actual practice of threading, the associated costs of those hours, and the delayed employment opportunities while taking the hours make the licensing requirements as a whole reach the level of being so burdensome that they are oppressive in light of the governmental interest. View "Patel v. Dep’t of Licensing & Regulation" on Justia Law

Plaintiff fell while mopping a restroom floor at a Kroger store. Plaintiff’s employer, Kroger Texas, LP, had elected not to subscribe to the Texas workers’ compensation system. Plaintiff filed suit against Kroger in state court, alleging negligence, gross negligence, and premises liability. Kroger removed the case to federal district court. The court granted summary judgment to Kroger. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part. At issue in this appeal was Plaintiff’s premises-liability claim. The Fifth Circuit concluded that the nature and scope of an employer’s duty to provide its employees with a safe workplace is unclear under Texas law when an employee is aware of the hazard or risk at issue and certified a question of law regarding the issue to the Texas Supreme Court. The Supreme Court answered that, under Texas law (1) an employer generally does not have a duty to warn or protect its employees from unreasonably dangerous premises conditions that are open and obvious or known to the employee; and (2) under this rule, the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act’s waiver of a nonsubscribing employer’s common law defenses does not eliminate an employee’s burden of proving that the employer owed him a duty as an element of a premises liability claim. View "Austin v. Kroger Texas, LP" on Justia Law

Candelario Lopez, who was hired by Interstate Treating to work on the installation of a gas processing plant, was transporting two other Interstate Treating employees to the job site when he died in an automobile accident. Lopez’s wife, Maximina Lopez, sought death benefits from Interstate Treating’s workers’ compensation insurance carrier, SeaBright Insurance Co. SeaBright denied coverage, concluding that Lopez was not acting in the course and scope of his employment at the time of the accident. A hearing officer, however, determined that Lopez was acting in the course and scope of his employment and ordered SeaBright to pay death benefits. The trial court affirmed the administrative decision. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Lopez was acting in the course and scope of his employment when he died, and Maximina was entitled to benefits. View "Seabright Ins. Co. v. Lopez" on Justia Law

Respondent, a former employee of San Antonio Water System (SAWS), sued SAWS under the Texas Commission on Human Rights (TCHRA), alleging that SAWS retaliated against her for opposing a discriminatory employment practice. Specifically, Respondent contended that she was terminated because she confronted a male vice president about his repeated lunch invitations to two female employees outside his department. The jury awarded Respondent nearly $1 million in damages. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and dismissed the claim, holding that no reasonable person could have believed that sexual harassment under the TCHRA occurred, and therefore, Respondent did not engage in a protected activity under the TCHRA when she confronted the vice president. View "San Antonio Water Sys. v. Nichols" on Justia Law

In 1998, Glenn Johnson suffered serious work-related injuries. In separate administrative proceedings, the parties contested the details and amounts of the lifetime workers’ compensation benefits Johnson was entitled to. Johnson and his wife filed the instant suit against his employer’s workers’ compensation insurance provider and related individuals and entities (collectively, Crawford), alleging that Crawford engaged in a plan to delay and deny benefits that the Johnsons were entitled to receive. Crawford filed a plea to the jurisdiction and motion for summary judgment, arguing that the Texas Department of Insurance Division of Workers’ Compensation had exclusive jurisdiction over all of the Johnsons’ claims because they arose out of the workers’ compensation claims-handling process. The trial court dismissed the Johnsons’ claims for breach of the common law duty of good faith and fair dealing and for violations of the Texas Insurance Code but refused to dismiss any of the other claims. The Supreme Court conditionally granted mandamus relief, holding that all of the Johnsons’ claims arose out of Crawford’s investigation, handling, and settling of claims for workers’ compensation benefits, and therefore, the Division had exclusive jurisdiction over the Johnsons’ claims. View "In re Crawford & Co." on Justia Law