Justia Texas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Medical Malpractice
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Dorothy Hampton was released from the Medical Center of Southeast Texas after an abdominal hernia surgery. Later that night, she fell at home, becoming confused and disoriented, and was readmitted to the hospital. She filed a health care liability claim against Dr. Leonard Thome, alleging that she was released prematurely from the hospital which led to her fall and subsequent mental and physical injuries. Hampton's lawyer sent a pre-suit notice to Dr. Thome along with a medical authorization form as required under Texas law before filing a suit. The form listed only two providers and omitted future health care providers.Hampton filed her suit outside the usual two-year statute of limitations but within the 75-day tolling period provided by the law. Dr. Thome argued that the lawsuit was filed outside the limitations period as the medical authorization form served by Hampton was deficient, and hence the 75-day tolling period was not applicable. The trial court rejected this argument, but the court of appeals reversed the decision.The Supreme Court of Texas held that an imperfect medical authorization form is still a medical authorization form, which is sufficient to toll the statute of limitations for 75 days. The court emphasized that the limitations period should be established with clarity at the outset. Any defects or omissions in the medical authorization form that came to light during the litigation could have been adequately addressed by the statutory remedy of abatement, additional discovery, or even sanctions. The judgment of the court of appeals was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "HAMPTON v. THOME" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court of Texas considered a medical negligence case where a 13-year-old girl, Raynee Dunnick, was bitten by a rattlesnake and was treated by Dr. Kristy Marsillo at a local hospital. The hospital had a specific guideline for snakebite treatment, which was followed by Dr. Marsillo. This guideline recommends administering antivenom, a treatment for snakebite, only when certain clinical parameters are met. According to the guideline, the risk of side effects from the antivenom should also be considered.Raynee and her parents sued Dr. Marsillo, claiming that her adherence to the guidelines and her decision not to immediately administer the antivenom upon Raynee's arrival at the hospital was negligent and resulted in Raynee's pain, suffering, impairment, and disfigurement. The trial court granted Dr. Marsillo's motion for summary judgment on the grounds of no-evidence of breach of duty and causation. The court of appeals reversed this decision, but Dr. Marsillo appealed to the Supreme Court of Texas.In its decision, the Supreme Court of Texas held that under section 74.153(a) of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, a heightened standard of proof is required for a patient's negligence claim against a physician for injuries arising out of the provision of emergency medical care. The claimant must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the physician acted with willful and wanton negligence, which is at least equivalent to gross negligence.The court found that the evidence presented by Raynee did not meet this standard. Specifically, the court found that the expert affidavit provided by Raynee was conclusory and did not adequately explain why the guidelines should have been disregarded or why doing so would have posed an extreme degree of risk to Raynee. Therefore, the court reversed the court of appeals’ judgment and reinstated the trial court’s summary judgment in favor of Dr. Marsillo. View "MARSILLO v. DUNNICK" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the trial court that two expert reports provided to support Plaintiff's claims for negligence provided the information required by the Texas Medical Liability Act, Tex. Civ. Proc. & Rem. Code 74.351(a), (l), (r)(6), holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's motion to dismiss.Plaintiff, the guardian of a care facility resident, sued Defendant, the facility, alleging negligence. The trial court concluded that the two expert reports provided by Plaintiff to support the claims provided a fair summary of the experts' opinion regarding the standard of care, breach, and the cause of injury, as required by the Act. The court of appeals reversed on the ground that the reports lacked sufficient detail regarding the appropriate standard of care and breach. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the proffered reports provided a fair summary of the experts' opinions as to the appropriate standard of care and breach of that standard. View "Uriegas v. Kenmar Residential HCS Services, Inc." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court conditionally granted Defendants' petition for mandamus relief from the trial court's order striking their counteraffidavit served under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 18.001, holding that the trial court's order was an abuse of discretion for which Defendants lacked an adequate remedy by appeal.Plaintiff sued Defendants for negligence. At issue was the counteraffidavit and testimony of Dr. Benny Sanchez, who was retained by Defendants as an expert witness. Plaintiff moved to strike Dr. Sanchez's counteraffidavit and testimony, arguing that the counteraffidavit improperly challenged the cause of Plaintiff's injuries, not the necessity of his treatment. The trial court granted the motion. Thereafter, the trial court issued its opinion in Allstate. Defendants later brought this petition seeking a writ of mandamus and citing In re Allstate Indemnity Insurance Co., 622 S.W.3d 870 (Tex. 2021), in support of their argument that the trial court abused its discretion. The Supreme Court agreed and conditionally granted the writ, holding that the trial court clearly abused its discretion by striking Dr. Sanchez's counteraffidavit and testimony, and Defendants lacked an adequate remedy to address this error by way of appeal. View "In re Chefs' Product of Houston, Inc." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court affirming a verdict for the family of a teenager who committed suicide after seeking treatment for depression from her pediatric healthcare providers, holding that the testimony did not establish the necessary but-for causation required by precedent.The expert testimony at trial established negligence on the part of the teen's medical providers but did not establish that, but for the negligence, the teen would not have committed suicide. Plaintiffs sued their daughter's providers for negligence and gross negligence. The jury found that certain providers were liable, and the trial court awarded $1.285 million to Plaintiffs. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was no evidence that the providers' care proximately caused the teen's suicide. View "Pediatrics Cool Care v. Thompson" on Justia Law

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In this medical malpractice case the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the trial court denying Defendants' motion to dismiss, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that a timely-served expert report demonstrated a good faith effort to comply with the requirements of the Texas Medical Liability Act.Plaintiffs brought this case alleging that negligent perinatal care during labor and delivery caused their infant's brain damage and other serious health conditions. On the infant's behalf, Plaintiffs sued their treating physician and other healthcare providers and served expert reports on Defendants, including a report by Dr. James Balducci, an obstetrician. Plaintiff's treating physician filed a motion to dismiss, which the trial court denied. The court of appeals reversed and dismissed the claims against the treating physician with prejudice on the grounds that Dr. Balducci's report was insufficient to support Plaintiffs' healthcare liability claims. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the expert report satisfied the "fair summary" standard in Tex. Civ. Proc. & Rem. Code 74.351(l), (r)(6). View "E.D. v Texas Health Care, PLLC" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed in part the judgment of the district court in favor of Plaintiff in this medical negligence action, holding that the district court erred in how it structured periodic payments after applying the periodic-payments statute in Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Chapter 74, Subchapter K to Plaintiff's award of future medical expenses.Plaintiff, the mother of A.M.A., brought this action on his behalf alleging that, upon A.M.A.'s delivery, the nurses' delay in summoning the obstetrician when A.M.A.'s heartrate dropped to nondetectable levels for extended periods caused his cerebral palsy. The jury found for A.M.A.and awarded $1.208 million for future healthcare expenses after he turns eighteen. The trial judge applied the periodic payment statute to the award. The Supreme Court remanded the case, holding that the district court erred in the way that it structured the periodic payments. View "Columbia Valley Healthcare System, L.P. v. A.M.A." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the trial court denying Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's medical negligence claims, holding that Texas Medical Liability Act applied, and therefore, Plaintiff's failure to serve an expert report on Defendants was fatal to her claims.At issue was (1) whether Plaintiff's claims that Defendants negligently administered various treatments that caused scarring and discoloration to her skin constituted "health care liability claims" under the Act, and (2) whether the Act prohibited Plaintiff from filing an amended petition after the Act's deadline for serving expert reports. The Supreme Court held (1) Plaintiff's claims constituted health care liability claims subject to the Act's expert report requirements; (2) the Act did not prohibit Plaintiff from filing an amended petition; and (3) because Plaintiff failed timely to serve an expert report, Plaintiff's claims must be dismissed under the Act. View "Lake Jackson Medical Spa, Ltd. v. Gaytan" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court conditionally granted a petition for a writ of mandamus and directed the court of appeals to vacate its order granting relief and to instruct the trial court to vacate the order it issued in compliance with the court of appeals' directive, holding that a facility's general policies and procedures fall outside the scope of pre-report discovery permitted in medical-liability cases.Kenneth Smith, on behalf of his wife, Donna Smith, brought this action alleging that Donna fell multiple times while in the care of a nursing facility owned by LCS SP, LLC. Before Smith served LCS with an expert report he requested LCS's general operating policies and procedures for the five years before he brought suit. When LCS objected, Smith moved to compel the discovery. The trial court denied the motion, delaying the discovery until after Smith served LCS with the expert report required by Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 74.351(s). Smith petitioned for mandamus relief, which the court of appeals conditionally granted. LCS then petitioned the Supreme Court for mandamus relief. The Supreme Court conditionally granted relief, holding that the trial court acted within its discretion when it declined to compel the requested discovery. View "In re LCS SP, LLC" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals concluding that 42 U.S.C. 1983 preempted the expert report requirement in the Texas Medical Liability Act (TMLA), set forth in Chapter 74 Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, holding that the court of appeals erred in this respect.The claims in this case were asserted against a state mental health facility and its employees arising from the death of a patient. The claims were pleaded as claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. In response, Defendants asserted that Plaintiff's claims were healthcare liability claims subject to the requirements of the TMLA. Defendants then moved to dismiss the claims for failure to serve an expert report under section 74.351(b). The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that all of Plaintiff's claims were healthcare liability claims but that section 1983 preempted the expert report requirement of the TMLA. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the court of appeals correctly determined that all of the causes of action Plaintiff asserted were healthcare liability claims under the TMLA; but (2) section 1983 does not preempt the TMLA's expert report requirement, and the court of appeals erred in holding otherwise. View "Rogers v. Bagley" on Justia Law