Justia Texas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A baby died after being delivered by emergency caesarean section. About six months before actually filing suit, the plaintiffs voluntarily served an expert report concurrently with a pre-suit notice letter. After filing suit, the plaintiffs attempted to serve the same previously served expert report on the defendant but mistakenly served another report— from the same expert but addressing a different patient, doctor, and claim. The defendant made no objection, but waited for passage of the 120-day deadline before moving to dismiss under the Texas Medical Liability Act (Act), Tex. Civ. Prac. & Remedy Code 74.051, which requires claimants pursuing a healthcare liability claim to serve an expert report on each party no later than the 120th day after filing an original petition. The trial court denied that motion. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the plaintiffs failed to timely serve a qualifying expert report. The Supreme Court reversed, reinstating denial of defendants’ motion. Nothing in the Act compels the conclusion that a plaintiff cannot satisfy the expert-report requirement through pre-suit service of an otherwise satisfactory expert report. Moreover, the court of appeals’ conclusion frustrates the Act’s purpose, which is to eliminate frivolous healthcare liability​ claims, not potentially meritorious ones. View "Hebner v. Reddy" on Justia Law

Carswell’s estate alleged that CHRISTUS St. Catherine Hospital and others committed medical malpractice causing him to die in the hospital in 2004 and that the hospital took post-mortem actions to cover up the malpractice, including failing to properly notify the county medical examiner of the patient’s death and improperly obtaining the widow’s consent for a private autopsy. The jury did not find against the hospital on the malpractice claim, but found that the hospital improperly obtained the widow’s consent and awarded damages on that claim. The trial court concluded the autopsy claims were not health care liability claims and, therefore, not untimely. The court of appeals affirmed the damages award but reduced the amount of prejudgment interest and vacated discovery sanctions. The Texas Supreme Court held that the claims based on the hospital’s post-mortem actions were health care liability claims and were barred by limitations because they were not asserted until over three years after the operative facts took place. The court of appeals did not err by reversing and rendering as to the discovery sanctions. View "CHRISTUS Health Gulf Coast v. Carswell" on Justia Law

Following their two-month-old’s death from whooping cough, Plaintiffs sued Kristin Ault, D.O. and her employer, ETMC First Physicians, alleging that Dr. Ault’s negligence caused the infant’s death and that ETMC was vicariously liable for the negligence. After Plaintiffs served Defendants with an amended expert report, Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, alleging that the expert’s opinions as to causation were conclusory because the report failed to link the expert's opinions to the underlying facts. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals reversed and ordered the lawsuit dismissed in light of conflicting statements in the report, which the court held failed to link the expert’s conclusions to the underlying facts. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by determining that the report was not conclusory but was a good faith effort to comply with the Texas Medical Liability Act’s requirements. View "Van Ness v. ETMC First Physicians" on Justia Law

Plaintiff suffered a severe adverse reaction to a compounded drug administered by her physician that left her permanently blind in both eyes. Plaintiff sued the compounding pharmacy and several of its licensed-pharmacist employees. Taking the position that Plaintiff had asserted health care liability claims governed by the Texas Medical Liability Act (Act), the defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims for failure to serve them with an expert report. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the pharmacist defendants were not health care providers, the claims against them were not health care liability claims, and therefore, the Act did not apply. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Act applies to Plaintiff’s claims against the pharmacist defendants; (2) under the applicable version of that Act, Plaintiff was required to serve the defendants with an expert report within 120 days of filing suit; and (3) because Plaintiff failed to do so, her claims must be dismissed. Remanded. View "Randol Mill Pharmacy v. Miller" on Justia Law

In 2003, the Legislature enacted the Medical Liability Act, which contains a statute of repose that operates as a bar to claims that are not brought within ten years of the date of the medical treatment. In this case, alleged negligence occurred during the birth of a child in 1996. No suit was filed until 2011, five years after the repose statute’s deadline. The hospital moved for summary judgment, asserting that the repose statute barred the claim. The mother responded that the Act’s ten-year statute of repose violates the open court and retroactivity provisions of the Texas Constitution. The Supreme Court upheld the Act’s repose statute against the mother’s as-applied constitutional challenges, holding (1) the mother’s open courts challenge failed due to the mother’s lack of diligence in filing suit; and (2) the mother’s retroactivity challenge failed because a compelling public purpose justified the legislation and granted the mother a three-year grace period to file suit. View "Tenet Hosps. Ltd. v. Rivera" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Defendant, which provided laser hair removal services, for negligence after she allegedly suffered burns and scarring on her face and neck while receiving laser hair removal treatments. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss because Plaintiff had not served an expert report as required by the Medical Liability Act for health care liability claims. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Plaintiff did not rebut the presumption that her claim for improper laser hair removal was a health care liability claim, and therefore, Plaintiff’s failure to serve an expert report precluded her suit. View "Rio Grande Valley Vein Clinic, P.A. v. Guerrero" on Justia Law

Reginald Lane, individually and as personal representative of Decedent's estate, filed suit under the Texas Medical Liability Act (TMLA) against anesthesiologist Michael Zanchi, alleging negligence. Zanchi was not served with process until September 16. In the meantime, Lane mailed the expert report to Zanchi on August 19. Zanchi filed a motion to dismiss for failure to timely serve an expert report as required by Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 74.351(a), arguing that he was not a "party" to Lane's suit until he was served with process. The trial court denied the motion, and the court of appeals affirmed, holding that one is a "party" if so named in a pleading, whether or not one has been served with process. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the term "party" in section 74.351(a) means one named in a lawsuit; (2) therefore, a claimant asserting a health care liability claim complies with section 74.351(a) by serving the report on a defendant who has not yet been served with process; and (3) "service" of an expert report on such a defendant need not comport with the service requirements of Tex. R. Civ. P. 106 that apply specifically to service of citation.View "Zanchi v. Lane" on Justia Law

Respondents filed this health care liability action against Petitioner. The trial court awarded Respondents $9 million in actual damages and $3 million in punitive damages. The court of appeals reversed the punitive damages award. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' judgment affirmance of the actual damages award, finding that Petitioner's liability was statutorily capped. On remand, the trial court vacated the original judgment and awarded Respondents actual damages capped according to the relevant statute plus postjudgment interest calculated from the date of the remand judgment. The court of appeals reversed the remand judgment, holding that the trial court erred by vacating its original judgment and by calculating the postjudgment interest from the date of the remand judgment rather than the date of the original judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the court of appeals had jurisdiction to review the trial court's remand judgment; (2) postjudgment interest must be calculated from the date of the original judgment; and (3) the trial court's order vacating the original judgment was error, but it was not reversible error. Remanded. View "Phillips v. Bramlett" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, as next friends of their daughter (Daughter) sued Hospital for injuries sustained by Daughter following her premature birth. One hundred and sixteen days after filing their original petition, Plaintiffs nonsuited their claim. Plaintiffs later filed a new lawsuit against Hospital and other health care providers and served an expert report on Hospital. Hospital objected to the report as untimely and moved to dismiss the claim against it. The trial court overruled the objection and denied the motion to dismiss. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that Plaintiffs timely served their expert report. At issue on appeal was the Texas Medical Liability Act's (TMLA) expert-report requirement, which requires a claimant to serve an expert report on health care providers against whom the claim is asserted 120 days after the original petition is filed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a claimant's nonsuit of a health care liability claim before the expiration of the 120-day period tolls the expert-report period until suit is refiled. View "CHCA Woman's Hosp., LP v. Lidji" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued the hospital (Hospital) where she gave birth to a newborn and the two doctors who assisted in delivery, alleging that Hospital was liable for injuries to the newborn because of its own direct negligence as well as its vicarious liability for the negligence of the two doctors. Plaintiff served Hospital with three expert reports, all of which Hospital objected to. The trial court determined that when the three reports were read in concert, Plaintiff had met the requirements of the Texas Medical Liability Act (TMLA). The court of appeals concluded Plaintiff's reports were adequate as to the vicarious liability claim but remanded to the trial court to consider granting an extension to cure other deficiencies. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the court of appeals' judgment as to the adequacy of the reports regarding the claim that Hospital was vicariously liable for the doctors' actions; and (2) did not address whether the court of appeals erred by remanding the case for the trial court to consider granting an extension of time for Plaintiff to cure deficiencies, as the expert reports satisfied the TMLA requirements as to one theory of liability alleged against Hospital. View "TTHR Ltd P'ship v. Moreno" on Justia Law