Justia Texas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This case involved a boundary dispute between the City of Ingleside and the City of Corpus Christi over the scope of an ordinance establishing the adjacent bay waters’ “shoreline” as the common border. Each city claimed that several piers, bulkheads, wharves, and artificial structures affixed to Ingleside’s shore and projecting into bay waters fell within its jurisdictional boundaries. Ingleside sued Corpus Christi seeking a declaration that the structures were functionally part of the land and therefore were within the jurisdiction of the land side of the shoreline. The court of appeals concluded that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to establish the boundary between the two cities because the issue was a purely political question not subject to judicial review. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that whether natural and artificial conditions are protrusions of the “shoreline” is a justiciable issue materially distinct from a legislative determination about where to establish a municipal boundary line, and therefore, Ingelside’s declaration did not require the court to address a political question beyond the Court’s competence or authority. Remanded. View "City of Ingleside v. City of Corpus Christi" on Justia Law

In 2011, Respondents sued Petitioner over two acres of land that Petitioner purchased from Respondents in 2006 through a trust. The deed mistakenly - but unambiguously - failed to reserve mineral rights. When Respondents discovered the error, they demanded that Petitioner issue a correction deed, but Petitioner claimed that the statute of limitations barred Respondents’ claims over the deed. Respondents urged the trial court to declare as a matter of law that the deed did not convey mineral rights and argued that Petitioner breached the sales contract by refusing to execute a correction deed. The trial court ruled that Respondents’ claims were time-barred. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the discovery rule delayed the accrual of limitations for a deed-reformation claim. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a plainly obvious and material omission in an unambiguous deed is not a type of injury for which the discovery rule is available because it charges parties with irrefutable notice for limitations purposes; (2) Tex. Prop. Code Ann. 13.002 provides all persons, including the grantor, with notice of the deed’s contents as well; and (3) therefore, a grantor who signs an unambiguous deed is presumed as a matter of law to have immediate knowledge of material omissions. Accordingly, Respondents’ suit was untimely. View "Cosgrove v. Cade" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs in this case were more than 400 residents and homeowners in the upper White Oak Bayou watershed in Harris County. From 1998 to 2002, most of Plaintiffs’ homes were inundated in three successive floods. Plaintiffs filed an inverse condemnation suit against several government entities, arguing that Defendants knew that harm was substantially certain to result to Plaintiffs’ homes when Defendants approved private development in the White Oak Bayou watershed without mitigating its consequences. Defendants responded with a combined plea to the jurisdiction and motion for summary judgment, contending that no genuine issue of material fact had been raised on the elements of the takings claim. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals affirmed the denial of the plea to the jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a fact question existed as to each element of Plaintiffs’ takings claim, and therefore, the government entities’ plea to the jurisdiction was properly denied. View "Harris County Flood Control Dist. v. Kerr" on Justia Law

As a general matter, an overriding royalty on oil and gas production is free of production costs but must bear its share of postproduction costs unless the parties agree otherwise. In this case, the Hyder family leased 948 mineral acres. Chesapeake Exploration, LLC acquired the lessee’s interest. The Hyders and Chesapeake agreed that the overriding royalty was free of production costs under the lease but disputed whether it was also free of postproduction costs. The trial court rendered judgment for the Hyders, awarding them $575,359 in postproduction costs that Chesapeake wrongfully deducted from their overriding royalty. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the lease in this case clearly freed the gas royalty of postproduction costs and did the same for the overriding royalty. View "Chesapeake Exploration, LLC v. Hyder" on Justia Law

The State condemned two adjacent parcels of property that the owners had leased to Clear Channel Outdoor Inc. for outdoor advertising. Clear Channel had built a billboard on each parcel. The State maintained that its condemnation of the realty did not include the billboards themselves because they were removable property for which no compensation was due. Consistent with the State’s position, the special commissioners’ awards included no compensation for the billboard structures. The landowners and Clear Channel objected to the awards. In addition, Clear Channel counterclaimed for inverse condemnation of the sign structures. After a jury trial, the trial court awarded Clear Channel $268,235.27 for the billboards less credits for the amounts already received from the commissioners’ award, concluding that a billboard may be a fixture to be valued with the land. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Clear Channel’s billboard structures were fixtures and should have been valued as part of the land; and (2) while Clear Channel was due compensation for the sign structures, it was not entitled to value the structures based on the income from its advertising operations, and evidence of that income was inadmissible. Remanded. View "State v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc." on Justia Law

Respondents obtained a home-equity loan from Wells Fargo Bank. After Respondents stopped making loan payments, Wells Fargo filed an application in the district court for an expedited court order authorizing foreclosure. Respondents filed a separate and original declaratory judgment action that invoked the automatic stay and dismissal provisions of Tex. R. Civ. P. 736.11. Wells Fargo filed an amended answer asserting a counterclaim for declaratory judgment and requesting attorney’s fees pursuant to the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act. The trial court granted Wells Fargo’s motion for summary judgment and awarded attorney’s fees, concluding that Respondents had defaulted on their home-equity loan. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary judgment but reversed the attorney’s fee award, concluding that neither party had pleaded a cognizable claim for declaratory relief, and the non-recourse status of the home-equity loan prohibited a personal judgment for attorney’s fees against Respondents. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) because Respondents failed to preserve any challenge to the characterization of their own claim for declaratory relief, the trial court was authorized to enter a judgment awarding Wells Fargo its attorney’s fees; and (2) neither the parties’ loan agreement nor the Texas Constitution prohibited a personal judgment against Respondents for attorney’s fees. View "Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Murphy" on Justia Law

Respondent borrowed money from Bank pursuant to a construction loan agreement and promissory note. Defendant secured his obligations by executing a deed of trust on property. After Respondent defaulted on the note, Bank foreclosed its contractual deed of trust lien on the property. Bank purchased the property for less than the secured debt. Respondent sued Bank, arguing that Tex. Prop. Code Ann. 51.003 required Bank to offset the property’s fair market value on the date of foreclosure against any judgment in favor of Bank. Bank counterclaimed for damages and attorney’s fees. The trial court rendered judgment for Bank, concluding that section 51.003 did not apply. The court of appeals reversed, determining (1) Respondent’s deficiency must be calculated pursuant to section 51.003, and the term “fair market value” as used in the statute is the historical willing-seller/willing-buyer definition of fair market value; and (2) a factual question existed requiring further proceedings. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) section 51.003 applies to this case, but the term “fair market value” in that section does not equate precisely to the historical definition; and (2) the trial court did not err in its finding as to the section 51.003 fair market value of the property on the date of the foreclosure sale. View "PlainsCapital Bank v. Martin" on Justia Law

Petitioners and Respondents were adjacent landowners who disputed ownership of a tract of land in a heavily wooded area. Respondents asserted record title to the tract. Petitioners asserted adverse possession. Respondents filed a suit to quiet title and a declaratory judgment action. The trial court granted summary judgment for Petitioners, concluding that Respondents did not have record title. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Respondents had record title to the tract, and remanded to the trial court to consider Petitioners’ adverse possession claim. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and affirmed that of the trial court, holding that Respondents did not have record title to the tract. View "Stribling v. Millican DPC Partners, LP" on Justia Law

After an investigation, the City of Houston declared the Park Memorial condominiums uninhabitable. Because the condominium owners did not apply for an occupancy certificate or make necessary repairs within the requisite period of time, the City ordered all residents to vacate the complex. A group of owners later brought this inverse-condemnation action, alleging that their property was taken when they were forced to vacate. The trial court sustained the City’s plea to the jurisdiction, concluding that the owners had not alleged a taking. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the condominium owners’ claim failed because they did not allege a taking. View "City of Houston v. Carlson" on Justia Law

Petitioner granted Respondent a right of way to construct a pipeline across Petitioner’s property. The parties signed an agreement requiring Respondent to install the pipeline by boring underground in order to preserve the trees on the property. The construction company Respondent hired, however, cut down several hundred feet of trees. A jury found Respondent liable for damage to Petitioner’s property on both breach of contract and trespass theories and awarded damages both to compensate Petitioner for the reasonable cost to restore the property and for the intrinsic value of the destroyed trees. The court of appeals reversed based on the trial court’s failure to submit a jury question on whether the injury to the property was temporary or permanent. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the general rule that temporary injury to real property entitles the owner to damages commensurate with the cost of restoring the property and permanent injury to the property entitles the owner commensurate with the loss in the fair market value to the property as a whole applies when the wrongful conduct causing the injury stems from breach of contract rather than tort; (2) the common law exception to this general rule that entitles the landowner to damages in keeping with the intrinsic value of the destroyed trees applies in this case; and (3) any error in the jury charge related to such damages was harmless. Remanded. View "Gilbert Wheeler, Inc. v. Enbridge Pipelines, LP" on Justia Law