Justia Texas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

At issue in this case was whether a non-hurricane windstorm case could be joined as a tag-along to a previously created pre-trial Hurricane Ike multidistrict litigation (MDL) court. A single pretrial judge remanded this case because it did not arise from a hurricane. The Supreme Court granted the motion for rehearing and vacated the single pretrial judge's order of remand, holding (1) the case was related to the MDL litigation because the issue of whether State Farm covered shingle damage arising from wind events during the period between 2008 and 2010 was common to all cases; and (2) transfer would promote efficiency and serve the convenience of parties and witnesses. View "In re State Farm Lloyds Hurricane Litig." on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether, for purposes of Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. 16.068, an action for cargo damage against a common carrier, brought under the Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act, relates back to an action for breach of an agreement to settle the cargo-damage claim. The answer depended on whether the cargo-damage claim was, in the words of section 16.068, "wholly based on a new, distinct, or different transaction or occurrence" than the breach-of-settlement claim. A divided court of appeals held that the cargo-damage claim did not relate back and was therefore barred by limitations. The Supreme Court reversed and rendered judgment for the plaintiff, holding that the cargo-damage claim and the breach-of-settlement claim both arose out of the same occurrence, and therefore, the cargo-damage claim was not barred by limitations. View "Lexington Ins. Co. v. Daybreak Express, Inc." on Justia Law

A corporation (Infodisc) and one of its subsidiaries (M-TX) defaulted on a loan from a bank. A California court placed the borrowers in receivership to liquidate their assets securing the loan, and an ancillary receivership was opened in Texas. Meanwhile, another Infodisc subsidiary, a California corporation (M-CA), declared bankruptcy. The receiver claimed and sold property in a Texas warehouse that the Landlord alleged was not leased to Infodisc or M-TX but to M-CA. The parties disputed who the tenant was and who owned the property and fixtures in the warehouse. After the trial court rejected almost all of the Landlord's claims, the Landlord appealed. The court vacated the trial court's judgment and dismissed the case, holding that the proceedings violated the automatic stay even though M-CA was not a party to the case. The Supreme Court granted review and reversed, holding that the court of appeals should have abated the appeal to allow the application of the automatic stay to be determined by the trial court in the first instance. Remanded. View "Evans v. Unit 82 Joint Venture" on Justia Law

This case involved a dispute over the fair market value of acreage on which a gas processing facility was located. At issue was whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting an expert's testimony that allegedly violated the value-to-the-taker rule, which prohibits measuring land's value by its unique value to a condemnor in determining a landowner's compensation. The court of appeals concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the expert's testimony violated the rule because it impermissibly focused on the condemnor's interest in retaining the property and was therefore inadmissible. Remanded. View "Enbridge Pipelines L.P. v. Avinger Timber, LLC" on Justia Law

The City notified a building owner that her property was in disrepair and that, unless she repaired it, the City might demolish it. After the owner failed to remedy the problem, the City declared the property a public nuisance and condemned it. Rather than appeal the nuisance determination, the property owner asserted a takings claim after the demolition. The City field an immunity-based plea to the jurisdiction, which the trial court granted. The court of appeals reversed in part, holding that the administrative-level decision to demolish the owner's property did not preclude her from seeking a de novo review of that decision in a constitutional suit. The Supreme Court reversed in part and rendered judgment dismissing the owner's claims, holding that because the owner never appealed her nuisance determination, her takings claims were barred, and the trial court correctly dismissed them. View "City of Beaumont v. Como" on Justia Law

As tasked by the Legislature, the Texas Water Development Board (TWDB) identified potential reservoir sites. Hearts Bluff Game Ranch, Inc. purchased some of the wetlands on one of the sites identified by the TWDB as a potential reservoir location. When the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers denied its application for a mitigation banking permit because the State had identified the site as a potential reservoir, Hearts Bluff sued the State and the Corps for a taking for interfering with its asserted right to commercially develop the land as a mitigation bank. At issue was whether a takings claim against the State may be predicated on the denial of a permit by the federal government when the State had no authority to grant or deny the permit. The trial court denied the State's plea to the jurisdiction, which alleged that Hearts Bluff failed to plead a valid takings claim. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that absent demonstrating bad faith, Hearts Bluff did not establish the existence of jurisdiction in this case because it did not establish a viable takings claim. View "Hearts Bluff Game Ranch, Inc. v. State" on Justia Law

This was an appeal from the City of Austin's condemnation of property to build a parking garage for a nearby convention center and a facility to chill water to cool nearby buildings. A jury found the City's determination that the property was necessary for public use was fraudulent, in bad faith, and arbitrary and capricious, and the trial court entered judgment on the verdict, invalidating the taking. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the City's determination that the property was necessary for public use was not fraudulent, in bad faith, or arbitrary and capricious. Remanded. View "City of Austin v. Whittington" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from litigation between a homeowner, its insurer, and the company hired to restore the home after a series of storms caused damage to the home. A jury found in the restoration company's favor and the trial court rendered judgment against the homeowner and its insurer, jointly and severally. The court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court affirmed the court of appeals' judgment with respect to the homeowner's state Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA), Tex. Bus. & Com Code 17.50, claim because the homeowner was not a prevailing party and he was not a entitled to an order restoring all amounts paid under the contracts without deducting the value received under those agreements. The court also affirmed the restoration company's charge error complaint. The court reversed the court of appeals' judgment as to the insurer where the insurer received direct consideration for its promise to pay for the dehumidification and the court of appeals erred in concluding otherwise. The court remanded for that court to consider the insurer's remaining arguments, which included challenges to the factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury findings. View "Dr. Erwin Cruz v. Andrews Restoration, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

This was an appeal from a judgment awarding tenant damages for a landlord's breach of a construction-related duty under a build-to-suit lease agreement. The tenant sued asserting that the landlord's failure to adhere to construction plans resulted in a substandard building, diminishing the value of its leasehold. On appeal, the court agreed with the landlord that the cost of repair was the appropriate measure under the circumstances of the case. Because under the appropriate measure, there was no evidence that the tenant had been damaged, the court reversed. View "Ashford Partners, Ltd. v. ECO Resources, Inc." on Justia Law

Pursuant to article V, section 3-c of the Texas Constitution and Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 58.1, the court accepted the petition from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit to answer three certified questions. The central issue in this case was one of first impression: whether private beachfront properties on Galveston Island's West Beach were impressed with a right of public use under Texas law without proof of an easement. The court concluded that land patents from the Republic of Texas in 1840, affirmed by legislation in the New State of Texas a few years later, conveyed the State's title in West Galveston Island to private parties and reserved no ownership interests or rights to public use in Galveston's West Beach. Texas law had not otherwise recognized such an inherent limitation on property rights along the West Beach. Accordingly, there were no inherent limitations on title or continuous rights in the public since time immemorial that served as a basis for engrafting public easements for use of private West Beach property. Although existing public easements in the dry beach of Galveston's West Beach were dynamic, these easements did not spring or roll landward to encumber other parts of the parcel or new parcels as a result of avulsive events. New public easements on the adjoining private properties could be established if proven pursuant to the Open Beaches Act, Tex. Nat. Res. Code 61.001(8) or the common law. View "Severance v. Patterson, et al." on Justia Law