Justia Texas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Respondent appealed the URSB's determination that her property was an urban nuisance and that the property should be demolished. The trial court affirmed the USRB's finding that respondent's home was an urban nuisance and awarded the city attorneys fees. The trial court then severed respondent's constitutional claims and tried them to a jury. At the close of trial, the City moved unsuccessfully for a directed verdict on the grounds that the Board's nuisance determination was res judicata, precluding respondent's takings claim. The jury rejected the City's contention that respondent's home was a public nuisance and awarded her for the destruction of her house. The trial court denied the City's post-verdict motions and signed a judgment in conformance with the verdict. The court of appeals affirmed but held that the USRB's nuisance finding could not be preclusive because of the brief delay between the nuisance finding and the house's demolition. The City subsequently petitioned the court for review, arguing that the lower courts erred in failing to give the URSB's nuisance determination preclusive effect in respondent's taking claim. The court held that the determination was not preclusive because substantial evidence review of nuisance determination resulting in a home's demolition did not sufficiently protect a person's rights under Article I, Section 17 of the Texas Constitution. View "City of Dallas v. Stewart" on Justia Law

A property owner appealed an administrative determination that his property was a nuisance and he also asserted a takings claim. The property owner then nonsuited the case. He later filed this suit, again alleging that the government illegally took his property. Because the property owner was collaterally estopped from doing so, the court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. View "Patel v. City of Everman" on Justia Law

This case involved a property dispute between the parties over easements and right-of-ways on plaintiffs' property. Defendant contended that the tort claims against it were barred by the two-year statute of limitations and that the declaratory judgment against it was unwarranted. The court held that plaintiffs' common-law tort claims were barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations and the estoppel effect of the alleged fraudulent concealment ended in December 2002. Because plaintiffs did not file suit until more than two years after this date, their claims were time-barred. The court agreed that claims for declaratory judgment were moot because defendant had removed its cable lines from plaintiffs' properties prior to trial. Accordingly, the court granted defendant's petition for review and reversed the court of appeals' judgment. View "Etan Industries, Inc., et al. v. Lehmann" on Justia Law

This case involved two related oil and gas mineral lease disputes that were jointly tried. At issue was whether limitations barred the Marshalls' (respondents and lessors) fraud claim against BP America Production Co., et al. (the lessee and operator), and whether Vaquillas Ranch Co., Ltd., et al. (lessors) lost title by adverse possession after Wagner Oil Co. (successors-in-interest) succeeded to BP's interests, took over the operations, and produced and paid Vaquillas royalties for nearly twenty years. The court held that because the Marshalls' injury was not inherently undiscoverable and BP's fraudulent representations about its good faith efforts to develop the well could have been discovered with reasonable diligence before limitations expired, neither the discovery rule nor fraudulent concealment extended limitations. Accordingly, the Marshalls' fraud claims against BP were time-barred. The court further held that by paying a clearly labeled royalty to Vaquillas, Wagner sufficiently asserted its intent to oust Vaquillas to acquire the lease by adverse possession. View "BP America Prod. Co., et al. v. Marshall, et al." on Justia Law

Respondent appealed the Dallas Urban Rehabilitation Standards Board's decision that her house was a nuisance and order of demolition, alleging a due process claim and a claim for an unconstitutional taking. The trial court, on substantial evidence review, affirmed the Board's findings. The court of appeals affirmed but held that the Board's nuisance finding could not be preclusive because of the brief delay between the nuisance finding and the house's demolition. The city petitioned the court for review, arguing that the lower courts erred in failing to give the Board's nuisance determination preclusive effect in respondent's taking claim. The court held that a system that permitted constitutional issues of this importance to be decided by an administrative board, whose decisions were essentially conclusive, did not correctly balance the need to abate nuisances against the rights accorded to property owners under the Texas Constitution. Accordingly, independent court review was a necessity and affirmed the court of appeals but on different grounds. View "City of Dallas v. Stewart" on Justia Law

The City of Dallas seized vehicles, which it alleged were stolen, from a company that was entitled to petition for their return. Instead of pursuing its statutory remedy, the company sued, alleging that its interest in those vehicles had been taken without just compensation. The court held that because the company had actual knowledge of the vehicles seizure the company knew the cars were seized from its lots, and it knew who seized them, it was required to pursue a chapter 47 proceeding. Accordingly, the court held that the availability of the statutory remedy precluded a takings claims and reversed the court of appeals judgment and rendered judgment dismissing the suit. View "City of Dallas v. VSC, LLC" on Justia Law

This action arose out of condemnation proceedings initiated by the State after the landowners and the State could not agree on the amount of compensation for a .33 acres out of a 3.5 acre tract of land fronting U.S. Highway 290 in Travis County. At issue was whether the trial court erred by only charging the jury to find the pre-taking value of the tract when there was evidence the taking did not cause damage to the remainder and whether there was any evidence the remainder suffered compensable damages. The court concluded that the trial court committed charge error by inquiring whether the landowner suffered damages to the remainder. The court also held that there was no evidence the taking caused compensable damages to the remainder and based on the jury findings, the value of the tract taken could be determined. Accordingly, the court reversed the court of appeals judgment and remanded to the trial court for rendition of judgment. View "State v. Petropoulos" on Justia Law

This case involved two related oil and gas mineral lease disputes that were jointly tried. One of the disputes was between petitioners, BP American Production Co., Atlantic Richfield Co., and Vastar Resources, Inc. (collectively, "BP"), the lessee and operator, and respondents, the Marshall family, the lessors. The other dispute was between BP's successors-in-interest, Wagner Oil Co. (collectively, "Wagner"), and another lessor, respondents Vaquillas Ranch Co. Ltd. ("Vaquillas"). At issue was whether limitations barred the Marshall family's fraud claim against BP and whether Vaquillas lost title by adverse possession after Wagner succeeded to BP's interests, took over the operations, and produced and paid Vaquillas royalties for nearly twenty years. The court held that, because the Marshall family injury was not inherently undiscoverable and BP's fraudulent representations about its good faith efforts to develop the well could have been discovered with reasonable diligence before limitations expired, neither the discovery rule nor fraudulent concealment extended limitations and therefore, the Marshall family's fraud claims against BP were time barred. The court also held that by paying a clearly labeled royalty to Vaquillas, Wagner sufficiently asserted its intent to oust Vaquillas to acquire the lease by adverse possession.

Respondents, owners of a vendors lien on each of four tracts of land, sued to have their liens declared superior to petitioner's liens. At issue was whether petitioner's liens were not unenforceable pursuant to section 32.06 of the Texas Tax Code's requirements for transfer. The court held that petitioner's tax liens were not unenforceable when verified copies were recorded in lieu of originals; when the procedure wherein the tax collector made the required certification before a notary, sealed with a notarial seal, in lieu of a seal of his own, complied with section 32.06(d); and when the tax collector's record-keeping and receipts were irrelevant to the enforceability of petitioner's liens.