Justia Texas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff brought a Deceptive Trade Practices Act suit against Company and its co-operators for violating the terms of a contract. Through a process server, Plaintiff served all three Defendants with citations, but one citation contained an error in a co-operator's name. Defendants failed to file a timely answer, and Plaintiff obtained a default judgment. Defendants filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that service on the co-operator was improper and that Defendants established the necessary Craddock elements to set aside the default judgment. The trial court denied the motion, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendants asserted facts that, if true, established the first Craddock element, i.e., that the failure to appear was not intentional or the result of conscious indifference but was the result of a mistake or an accident. Remanded for consideration of the second and third elements of the Craddock test. View "Sutherland v. Spencer" on Justia Law

After Employer fired her, Plaintiff filed suit, alleging that she was discriminated against based on her race, national origin, age, and gender. Employer filed a plea to the jurisdiction, arguing that Plaintiff's pleadings failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination because Plaintiff was replaced by another Mexican-American woman who was three years older than Plaintiff. The trial court denied Employer's plea. The court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the plea should have been granted on the age-discrimination, as replacement by an older worker was not fatal to Plaintiff's claim. The Supreme Court reversed and dismissed the suit, holding (1) to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (TCHRA), a plaintiff in a true replacement case must show she was (i) a member of the protected class, (ii) qualified for her employment position, (iii) terminated by the employer, and (iv) replaced by someone younger; and (2) because Plaintiff here was replaced by an older worker, she failed to allege a prima facie case, and the trial court should have granted Defendant's plea to the jurisdiction. View "Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia" on Justia Law

An injured employee (Employee) sought workers' compensation benefits for a work-related injury. A claims adjuster with Employer's workers' compensation insurer's (Insurer) third party administrator denied the claim. The Division of Workers' compensation determined that Employee was entitled to medical and temporary income benefits. Employee subsequently brought a bad faith action against Insurer, its third party administrator, and the claims adjuster (Defendants). During discovery, Employee sought communications made between Insurer's lawyer and Employer during the administrative proceedings. Defendants argued that the attorney-client privilege protected the communications. The trial court held that the privilege did not apply. The court of appeals subsequently denied mandamus relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the attorney-client privilege did not protect the communications between Insurer and its insured. View "In re XL Specialty Ins. Co." on Justia Law

This suit was filed by a daughter against an organ donation charity when she discovered that the charity - contrary to an earlier representation to her - would allegedly profit from harvesting her deceased mother's tissues. The charity requested a defense from its insurer, and the insurer denied a defense. The insurer's subsequent suit against the charity resulted in two certified questions from the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court held (1) the insurance policy provision for coverage of "personal injury" does not include coverage for mental anguish, unrelated to physical damage to or disease of the daughter's body; and (2) the insurance policy provision for coverage of "property damages," does not include coverage for the underlying plaintiff's loss of use of her deceased mother's tissues, organs, bones, and body parts. View "Evanston Ins. Co. v. Legacy of Life, Inc." on Justia Law

Sarah Friend collapsed at a city-owned water park in North Richland Hills. City employees responded with oxygen masks and other airway equipment but did not retrieve an Automatic External Defibrillator device (AED) from a storage closet elsewhere on the park grounds. Sarah died later that day. Friend's estate sued several defendants, including the City and some of its employees, claiming their gross negligence in failing to retrieve and use the AED caused Sarah's untimely death. Pursuant to section 101.106(e) of the Texas Tort Claims Act, the trial court dismissed the employees. The trial court denied the City's plea to the jurisdiction on three alternative grounds. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and rendered judgment dismissing the Friends' claims against the City, holding that the City's immunity was not waived by section 101.021 of the Tort Claims Act, which permits a plaintiff to rely on the "condition or use of tangible personal property" waiver provision if the plaintiff alleges that the governmental unit used property that lacked an integral safety component. View "City of North Richland Hills v. Friend " on Justia Law

Employee suffered an injury during the course of his employment that was compensable under the Texas Workers' Compensation Act. Petitioner insurance company provided workers' compensation coverage to Employee's employer. Petitioner disputed the impairment rating of twenty percent assigned by the doctor in the administrative proceedings. A hearing officer issued a decision finding that Employee had an impairment rating of twenty percent. The Division of Workers' Compensation upheld the decision. Petitioner appealed. The trial court granted Employee's plea to the jurisdiction and dismissed the case. The court of appeals affirmed. At issue on appeal was whether a reviewing court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to resolve an impairment rating appeal if the only rating presented to the agency was invalid. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the absence of a valid impairment rating does not deprive the court of jurisdiction. Remanded. View "Am. Zurich Ins. Co. v. Samudio" on Justia Law

Several months after removing Mother's four children from her home and becoming their temporary managing conservator, the Department of Family Protective Services petitioned the trial court to terminate Mother's parental rights. After an unsuccessful attempt at personal service, the Department decided to serve Mother by publication, a decision the trial court authorized. After a final hearing at which Mother did not appear, the trial court terminated Mother's parental rights to her children. Mother moved for a new trial within two years of the judgment. The trial court denied the motion, and the court of appeals affirmed, holding that the motion was untimely filed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that under the circumstances of this case, the substituted service was poor, hopeless, and unjustifiable. Remanded to the trial court to determine whether Mother unreasonably failed to act after knowing that a final judgment had taken away her children, and if so, whether granting relief would impair another person's substantial interest in reliance on that judgment. View "In re E.R." on Justia Law

Petitioner claimed a trailer was his, but, upon evidence the trailer was stolen, the justice court awarded the trailer to the State. Later, Petitioner filed for bankruptcy and scheduled the trailer as an asset of his estate. Petitioner also sued for damages for the lost use of his property as a constitutionally compensable taking. The trial court dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction, concluding that the justice court judgment was not void but was only voidable, and the judgment was voidable only if the bankruptcy court made certain determinations. The court of appeals reversed, holding (1) a judgment rendered in violation of the automatic stay is void, not merely voidable, and a state court has jurisdiction to make that determination, even though the bankruptcy court might later disagree; and (2) as to Petitioner's takings claim, subsisting fact issues precluded dismissal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a judgment that violates the automatic stay is void and subject to collateral attack in state court; but (2) the judicial award of property to the State was not, in these circumstances, a taking. Remanded. View "York v. State" on Justia Law

This case arose when the owner of a gas-fired electric power generating plant sued the owner of the pipeline that supplied fuel to the plant for negligence in allowing interruptions in service and in delivering gas below contractual quality standards. The court held that Wolf Hollow could not assert its delivery and quality claims against Enterprise in an action for negligence, and though it could assert its quality claim against Enterprise through an assignment from El Paso, the damages it sought would be barred by the consequential damages waivers. Those waivers also precluded Wolf Hollow's recovery of plant damages from El Paso, but El Paso had not established that they precluded recovery of replacement-power damages. Because Wolf Hollow's replacement-power claim survived, the trial court's declaratory judgment was not moot. Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals was reversed, and the case was remanded to the court of appeals for further proceedings. View "El Paso Marketing L.P., et al. v. Wolf Hollow I, L.P." on Justia Law

The parties to the appeal disagreed about whether an employer who self funded a health-benefit plan for its employees was an "insurer" under the Texas Insurance Code, and therefore should be treated as a reinsurer when purchasing stop-loss insurance. The court of appeals concluded that an employer's self-funded plan was clearly an insurer under the Code and that a plan's purchase of stop-loss insurance was also clearly reinsurance beyond the regulatory scope of the Texas Department of Insurance. The court accordingly reversed the trial court's judgment, which held that the agency's regulation of the stop-loss policies at issue as direct insurance. Because the regulatory agency did not clearly err in its regulation of these stop-loss policies, however, the court reversed the court of appeals' judgment and rendered judgment for the agency. View "TX Dept. of Ins., et al. v. American National Ins. Co., et al." on Justia Law