Justia Texas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This mandamus proceeding arose from an arbitration agreement governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 1 et seq. The parties entered into a contract for interment rights and services. The contract obligated the parties to arbitrate this dispute over the care and maintenance of the cemetery. The arbitration agreement provided that an arbitrator would either be selected by mutual agreement of the parties or appointed by the American Arbitration Association (AAA). The parties failed to agree to an arbitrator and the trial court appointed an arbitrator without allowing a reasonable opportunity to procure an appointment by AAA. The court concluded that the trial court abused its discretion and conditionally granted the petition for writ of mandamus. View "In re Service Corp. Int'l and SCI Texas Funeral Services, Inc." on Justia Law

In this original proceeding Allcat, a limited partnership, and one of its limited partners sought an order directing the Comptroller to refund franchise taxes Allcat paid that were attributable to partnership income allocated, but not distributed, to its natural-person partners. Allcat claimed it was entitled to a refund for two reasons. First, the tax facially violated Article VIII, Section 24 of the Texas Constitution because it was a tax on the net incomes of its natural-person partners that was not approved in a statewide referendum. Second, as applied by the Comptroller, to Allcat and its partners, the franchise tax violated Article VIII, Section 1(a) of the Constitution, which required taxation to be equal and uniform. The court held that: (1) the tax was not a tax imposed on the net incomes of the individual partners, thus it did not facially violated Article VIII, Section 24; and (2) the court did not have jurisdiction to consider the equal and uniform challenge. View "In re Allcat Claims Service, L.P. and John Weakly" on Justia Law

This case concerned an arbitration provision that allowed each party to appoint one arbitrator to a panel, subject to certain requirements. At issue was whether Americo wavied its objection to the removal of the arbitrator it selected. The underlying dispute concerned the financing mechanism for Americo's purchase of several insurance companies from Robert Myer. Pursuant to the financing agreement, Americo and Myer submitted their dispute to arbitration under American Arbitration Association (AAA) rules. The arbitrators found in favor of Myer, and Americo filed a motion to vacate the award. The trial court granted the motion, holding that Americo was entitled to any arbitrator that met the requirements set forth in the financing agreement and that the arbitrator removed by the AAA met those requirements. The court of appeals reversed, holding that Americo had waived these arguments by not presenting them to the AAA. Because the record demonstrated otherwise, the court rejected the court of appeals' judgment and remanded the case to that court for further proceedings. View "Americo Life, Inc., et al. v. Myer, et al." on Justia Law

This matter arose out of a dispute over whether the City of Dallas paid its firefighters and police officers in accord with a 1979 ordinance adopted pursuant to a voter-approved referendum. Claiming the City had not properly paid them, some firefighters and police officers brought a class action asserting breach of contract claims and seeking a declaratory judgment. For the reasons set out in City of Dallas v. Albert, the court concluded that: (1) the ordinance's adoption by means of referendum did not result in the City's loss of immunity from suit; (2) the City had immunity from suit as to the declaratory judgment action; (3) by non-suiting its counterclaim the City did not reinstate immunity from suit as to the Officers' claims that were pending against the City when it non-suited the counterclaim; and (4) the case must be remanded for the trial court to consider whether the Legislature waived the City's immunity by amending the Local Government Code. View "City of Dallas v. Martin, et al." on Justia Law

This case involved a property dispute between the parties over easements and right-of-ways on plaintiffs' property. Defendant contended that the tort claims against it were barred by the two-year statute of limitations and that the declaratory judgment against it was unwarranted. The court held that plaintiffs' common-law tort claims were barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations and the estoppel effect of the alleged fraudulent concealment ended in December 2002. Because plaintiffs did not file suit until more than two years after this date, their claims were time-barred. The court agreed that claims for declaratory judgment were moot because defendant had removed its cable lines from plaintiffs' properties prior to trial. Accordingly, the court granted defendant's petition for review and reversed the court of appeals' judgment. View "Etan Industries, Inc., et al. v. Lehmann" on Justia Law

Firefighters for the City of Baytown sued the City claiming that it improperly calculated pay for certain assignments in violation of the Firefighter and Police Civil Services Act. Here, the firefighters' claims for back pay and related damages for improper calculation of pay for assignments performed in the past were the type of retrospective relief that the court held barred by governmental immunity in City of El Paso v. Heinrich and City of Houston v. Williams. In Heinrich, the court noted however, that the Legislature could authorize retrospective relief. The firefighters asserted that the Legislature had done so with Local Government Code sections 271.151-.160, enacted during the pendency of this appeal. In addition to remanding to permit the firefighters to replead in light of Chapter 271, the court also remanded to permit the firefighters to replead in light of Heinrich and seek appropriate relief, if any, against the relevant city officials. View "Lowell, et al. v. Baytown, et al." on Justia Law

This case arose when plaintiff filed suit against its former employee and the employee's new employer for breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty, claiming, among other things, that the new employer had solicited and accepted business from clients and prospects of plaintiff who were serviced by the new employer or where the new employer supervised the solicitation of activities related to the client or potential client. At issue on appeal was whether a covenant not to compete signed by a valued employee in consideration for stock options, designed to give the employee a greater stake in the company's performance, was unenforceable as a matter of law because the stock options did not give rise to an interest in restraining competition. The court held that, under the terms of the Covenants Not to Compete Act, Tex. Bus. & Com. Code ch. 15, the consideration for the noncompete agreement was reasonably related to the company's interest in protecting its goodwill, a business interest the Act recognized as worthy of protection. The noncompete was thus not enforceable on that basis. The court reversed the court of appeals' judgment and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Marsh USA Inc., et al. v. Cook" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Ryland in 2007 and the case went to trial in May 2010. On May 4th, the jury returned a verdict for plaintiff. On May 25, 2010 - after the jury verdict but before the judgment was signed - Ryland filed a JNOV motion on legal insufficiency grounds. Though not styled as a motion for new trial, the JNOV motion also requested a new trial in the alternative. Prior to holding a hearing on the JNOV motion, the trial court signed a judgment for plaintiff on June 14, 2010, initiating the appellate time table. The judgment also purported to deny Ryland's JNOV motion. The court held that because an arguable interpretation of the procedural rules allowed Ryland's premature, JNOV motion to extend the appellate timetable to 90 days, the court of appeals erred in dismissing the appeal. Accordingly, pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 59.1 without hearing oral argument, the court reversed the court of appeals' judgment and remanded the case to that court. View "Ryland Enterprise, Inc. v. Weatherspoon" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Shell for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and fraud, based on claims that Shell underpaid royalty due under a mineral lease to plaintiff's grandmother. At issue was whether limitations barred a royalty owner's claims against the operator of the field. The court held that the fraudulent concealment doctrine did not apply to extend limitations as a matter of law when the royalty underpayments could have been discovered from readily accessible and publicly available information before the limitations period expired. When, as in this case, the information was publicly available and readily accessible to the royalty owner during the applicable time period, a royalty owner who failed to take action did not use reasonable diligence as a matter of law. Accordingly, because the parties did not dispute that the pertinent information was readily accessible and publicly available, plaintiff's claims were time-barred as a matter of law. View "Shell Oil Co., et al. v. Ross" on Justia Law

This case arose out of patent infringement litigation. At issue was whether federal courts possess exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over state-based legal malpractice claims that require the application of patent law. The federal patent issue presented here was necessary, disputed, and substantial within the context of the overlying state legal malpractice lawsuit. Additionally, the patent issue could be determined without creating a jurisdictional imbalance between state and federal courts. Therefore, the court concluded that exclusive federal jurisdiction existed in this case. Accordingly, without reaching the merits of the legal malpractice claim, the court reversed the court of appeals' judgment and dismissed this case. View "Minton v. Gunn, et al." on Justia Law