Justia Texas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A municipally owned utility in San Antonio owns power poles used for distributing electricity. Since 1984, a telecommunications provider (and its predecessor) has attached its equipment to these poles under a written agreement. The contract set a per-pole attachment fee, allowed for annual rate increases, and included a clause requiring both parties to comply with all applicable laws affecting their rights and obligations under the agreement. Over time, the utility charged one telecommunications provider higher rates, while continuing to invoice another provider at the original rate, resulting in a disparity in charges. After amendments to the Public Utility Regulatory Act (PURA) in 2005 prohibited discriminatory pole attachment rates and required uniform and federally capped rates, the provider paying the higher fee sued, seeking relief for breach of contract and statutory violations.The trial court, after abating proceedings while the Public Utility Commission (PUC) considered the matter, granted partial summary judgment for the utility on statutory and unjust enrichment claims, but for the provider on the breach-of-contract claim. The utility appealed. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the agreement did not incorporate new statutes into its terms, and thus the provider could not base its contract claim on the utility’s alleged statutory violations.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case. It held that the parties’ contract—by its express terms—incorporated post-1984 legal changes affecting their rights and obligations, including the 2005 PURA amendments. The Court concluded that the provider could pursue its contract claim based on the utility’s alleged failure to comply with current law, including prohibitions on discriminatory and excessive pole attachment rates. The Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "SPECTRUM GULF COAST, LLC v. CITY OF SAN ANTONIO" on Justia Law

During Winter Storm Uri in February 2021, extreme weather conditions in Texas led to record electricity demand and severe power shortages. The Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) declared a "Level 3 Emergency" and ordered transmission and distribution utilities (the "Utilities") to cut power to some customers, resulting in widespread outages. Plaintiffs alleged that the Utilities' actions during the storm, including failing to rotate blackouts and cutting power to critical infrastructure, worsened the crisis and violated common-law duties.The plaintiffs filed numerous lawsuits against various participants in the Texas electricity market, including the Utilities, asserting claims of negligence, gross negligence, and nuisance. The cases were consolidated into a multidistrict litigation pretrial court, which dismissed some claims but allowed the gross-negligence and intentional-nuisance claims against the Utilities to proceed. The Utilities sought mandamus relief from the court of appeals, which granted partial relief by dismissing some claims but allowing the gross-negligence and intentional-nuisance claims to continue.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and held that the plaintiffs' pleadings did not sufficiently allege that the Utilities "created" or "maintained" a nuisance, leading to the dismissal of the intentional-nuisance claims with prejudice. The court also found that the pleadings were insufficient to support gross-negligence claims but allowed the plaintiffs an opportunity to replead these claims in light of the court's guidance. The court conditionally granted mandamus relief, ordering the trial court to vacate its previous order and dismiss the intentional-nuisance claims while permitting the plaintiffs to amend their gross-negligence claims. View "IN RE ONCOR ELECTRIC DELIVERY CO. LLC" on Justia Law

The case revolves around the Public Utility Commission of Texas (PUC) and two market participants, RWE Renewables Americas, LLC and TX Hereford Wind, LLC. Following Winter Storm Uri, the Legislature amended the Public Utility Regulatory Act (PURA) to require that protocols adopted by the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) must be approved by the PUC before they take effect. ERCOT then adopted a revision to its protocols, which was approved by the PUC, setting the price of electricity at the regulatory maximum under Energy Emergency Alert Level 3 conditions. RWE challenged the PUC's approval order in the Third Court of Appeals, arguing that the order was both substantively and procedurally invalid.The Third Court of Appeals held that the PUC's order was both substantively invalid—because the PUC exceeded its statutory authority by setting the price of electricity—and procedurally invalid—because the PUC failed to comply with the Administrative Procedure Act’s rulemaking procedures in issuing the order.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and held that the PUC’s approval order is not a “competition rule[] adopted by the commission” subject to the judicial-review process for PUC rules. The court found that PURA envisions a separate process for ERCOT-adopted protocols, and the statutory requirement that the PUC approve those adopted protocols does not transform PUC approval orders into PUC rules eligible for direct review by a court of appeals. Therefore, the Third Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction over this proceeding. The Supreme Court of Texas vacated the court of appeals’ judgment and dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. View "Public Utility Commission v. RWE Renewables Americas, LLC" on Justia Law

The case revolves around the actions of the Public Utility Commission of Texas (Commission) during Winter Storm Uri, when the Texas electric grid was on the brink of collapse. The Commission issued two orders that effectively raised the market price of electricity to the regulatory ceiling of $9,000/MWh to incentivize generators to add supply and large industrial users to reduce their demand. This led to some market participants going bankrupt and subsequent litigation.The court of appeals held that the Commission’s orders exceeded its authority under Chapter 39 of the Public Utility Regulatory Act (PURA) because the statute prohibits price-setting. The court of appeals did not address whether the Commission complied with the Administrative Procedure Act’s (APA) procedural rulemaking requirements.The Supreme Court of Texas disagreed with the court of appeals' decision. It held that the Commission’s orders did not exceed its authority under PURA. The court also found that the Commission substantially complied with the APA’s procedural rulemaking requirements, an issue the court of appeals did not address. The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and rendered judgment affirming the orders. View "Public Utility Commission v. Luminant Energy Co. LLC" on Justia Law

In this dispute over a "Water/Sewer Base Fee" that Landlords billed tenants each month to recover certain amounts it had paid the municipal utility district the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's grant of partial summary judgment in Tenant's favor and the court of appeals' judgment affirming the trial court's order certifying a class under Rule 24 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, holding that there was no error.Tenant brought suit against Landlords challenging a fee that included not only each apartment's allocated portion of the utility's customer service charge for water and sewer service but also an undisclosed amount equivalent to a portion of the utility's charges for non-water emergency services. Tenant sued under the Water Code on behalf of a tenant class. The trial court granted Landlords' motion for partial summary judgment on liability and certified a class. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) did not err in granting partial summary judgment; and (2) did not abuse its discretion in certifying the class. View "Mosaic Baybrook One, L.P. v. Simien" on Justia Law

In 2010, Houston voters approved “Proposition One,” allowing the city to create a “Pay-As-You-Go” Dedicated Drainage and Street Renewal (DDSR) Fund. Perez and others filed an election contest while the city enacted the Drainage Fee Ordinance (DFO), creating a new public utility and requiring Houston to establish drainage fees “against all real property in the city subject to such charges” and “provide drainage for all real property in the city on payment of drainage charges unless the property is exempt.” The DFO based the drainage fees on the benefited property’s type and square footage. Failure to pay drainage fees carried various penalties.In 2015, the Supreme Court held that Proposition One’s ballot language was misleading, rendering the Amendment invalid. Perez then challenged Houston’s assessment, collection, and expenditure of the drainage fee. In 2018, Houston passed a new charter amendment curing many of the defects Perez alleged in the drainage fee ordinance. Perez was left with ongoing claims for reimbursement of the drainage fees she paid before 2018 and for an injunction against the future expenditure of fees collected before 2018. The Texas Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of those claims but remanded to allow Perez to replead in light of intervening events. Perez’s claims required her to articulate a viable theory of the DFO’s illegality to overcome Houston’s governmental immunity; her only theory failed as a matter of law. View "Perez v. Turner" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the Town of Westlake, a general-law municipality in which Builder Recovery Services, LLC (BRS), which hauled trash away from construction sites, operated, lacked the authority to impose a percentage-of-revenue license fee on companies like BRS.The Town enacted an ordinance that required trash haulers like BRS to obtain a license to operate in the Town. After the ordinance was adopted the Town cited BRS for operating without a lawsuit in violation of the ordinance. BRS brought this suitm, arguing that BRS lacked statutory authority to require BRS to obtain the license. The district court rejected most of BRS's arguments, and the court of appeals affirmed the portions of the judgment in favor of the Town. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Town of Westlake lacked authority as a general-law municipality to impose a percentage-of-revenue licensing fee on construction trash-hauling companies like BRS. View "Builder Recovery Services, LLC v. Town of Westlake" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the trial court against Landlord and in favor of the City of Baytown in this dispute over unpaid utility bills, holding that Landlord's challenge to the City's enforcement action failed to show the intentional taking or damage for public use necessary to establish a constitutional right to compensation.In this action, Landlord alleging that the City's withholding of utility service to collect payment resulted in the loss of a tenant and the disrepair of his property and was a taking in violation of the state or federal constitution. The trial court concluded that Landlord did not establish an intentional taking of private property for public use. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the City's utility enforcement actions did not establish a regulatory taking of private property as a matter of law. View "City of Baytown v. Schrock" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied mandamus relief in this action considering whether an electric utility may compel a plaintiff who alleges a common law personal injury claim to appear before the Public Utility Commission before appearing in court, holding that the Commission may not do so unless the claim complains about the utility's rates or its provision of electrical service.This was a personal injury claim against a utility arising under duties at common law and consumer protection statutes. Plaintiff alleged well-settled elements of a negligence claim, but his allegations did not rely on a utility acting in its regulated capacity, nor on a disruption of or failure to provide electrical service. At issue was whether the action was a regulatory action within the auspices of the Commission. The Supreme Court denied the utility's petition for writ of mandamus asking the trial court to abate the case to require Plaintiff to exhaust his administrative remedies before the Commission, holding that this action was not a regulatory action within the auspices of the Commission. View "In re Oncor Electric Delivery Co., LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied a petition for writ of mandamus sought by Texas-New Mexico Power Co. (TNM) in this negligence action, holding that Plaintiffs' claim was not one within the Public Utility Commission's (PUC) exclusive original jurisdiction because it was not about TNM's operations and services as a utility.Plaintiffs, a larger number of homeowners near the Junemann Bayou and Las Marque, sued TNM, their electric utility, for damages due to flooding during Hurricane Harvey, alleging that TNM was negligent in not requiring its contractor to secure wooden mats to the ground during a construction project. The trial court denied TNM's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and TNM petitioned for mandamus relief. The Supreme Court denied the petition, holding that the PUC's exclusive original jurisdiction did not extend to the issues underlying this tort claim. View "In re Texas-New Mexico Power Co." on Justia Law