Justia Texas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The case revolves around Pureza “Didit” Martinez, who was terminated from her position at the Texas Tech University Health Sciences Center at the age of 72. She filed a lawsuit alleging age discrimination against the Health Sciences Center, the Texas Tech University System, and the Texas Tech University System’s Board of Regents. The Texas Tech University System and the Board of Regents argued that they were not Martinez's employer and thus retained sovereign immunity.Previously, the trial court denied the plea to the jurisdiction filed by the Texas Tech University System and the Board of Regents, and the court of appeals affirmed this decision. The defendants argued that Martinez failed to plead allegations that could make them liable for age discrimination under the Labor Code, essentially denying being Martinez’s employer.The Supreme Court of Texas disagreed with the lower courts' decisions. The court found that Martinez's petition did not allege facts demonstrating that the Texas Tech University System or the Board of Regents employed Martinez directly or that either one controlled access to and interfered with her employment. Therefore, the court concluded that Martinez failed to allege a waiver of sovereign immunity, and the plea to the jurisdiction of the Texas Tech University System and the Board of Regents should have been granted. However, the court remanded the case to the trial court to give Martinez an opportunity to replead, as her petition did not foreclose a valid claim against those defendants. View "Texas Tech University System v. Martinez" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute over the use of a property in the River Plantation subdivision, which has been operated as a golf course since the subdivision's establishment. The River Plantation Community Improvement Association (the Association) sought a declaratory judgment that the golf course property is encumbered by an implied reciprocal negative easement restricting it to use solely as a golf course. The owners of the golf course property, River Plantation Properties, LLC and Preisler Golf Properties, LLC, counterclaimed for a declaration that the property is not so encumbered.The trial court granted summary judgment for the golf course property’s owners, holding it is not burdened by an implied reciprocal negative easement as a matter of law. The court of appeals affirmed this decision, noting that when the subdivision was developed, the developers retained the Reserves without placing any restrictions on their use, and the recitals in the property records put prospective lot owners on notice that the Reserves were excluded from the subdivision’s uniform plan.The Supreme Court of Texas agreed with the lower courts and affirmed the court of appeals’ judgment. The court held that the doctrine of implied reciprocal negative easements does not apply in this case. The Association's complaint was not that a substantial number of lots in the River Plantation subdivision were burdened by express restrictions when originally conveyed by the developer while others were not. Instead, the Association argued that the property should be burdened by an entirely different restriction: golf course use only. The court concluded that there are no substantially uniform express restrictions on the River Plantation lots that the Association claims give rise to similar restrictions on the golf course property. Therefore, the golf course property is not burdened by an implied reciprocal negative easement. View "River Plantation Community Improvement Assn. v. River Plantation Properties, LLC" on Justia Law

The case revolves around J-W Power Company (J-W Power), a company that leases, sells, and services natural gas compressors used in oil and gas operations. The company maintains these compressors in many counties across Texas and often leases them to customers in neighboring counties. The case specifically involves the taxation of compressors maintained in Ector County that were leased to customers in Sterling and Irion Counties. J-W Power filed motions to correct the appraisal rolls under section 25.25(c) of the Tax Code, arguing that the appraisal rolls included “property that does not exist in the form or at the location described in the appraisal roll.” The Appraisal Review Boards (ARBs) in both counties denied the motions, leading to the current lawsuits.Previously, the district court granted summary judgment to the appraisal districts, arguing among other things that res judicata barred the section 25.25(c) motions because those motions involved the same subject matter as the prior Chapter 41 protests. The court of appeals affirmed this decision, holding that res judicata barred J-W Power’s section 25.25(c) motions, which raised “nearly verbatim” claims as compared to its prior Chapter 41 protests.However, the Supreme Court of Texas disagreed with the lower courts' decisions. The Supreme Court held that section 25.25(l) of the Tax Code preserved J-W Power’s right to file a section 25.25(c) motion notwithstanding its prior Chapter 41 protests. The court interpreted the phrase “regardless of whether” in section 25.25(l) to mean that a property owner can file a section 25.25(c) motion regardless of whether there was a prior Chapter 41 protest related to the value of the property. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the judgments of the court of appeals and remanded the cases for further proceedings. View "J-W POWER COMPANY v. IRION COUNTY APPRAISAL DISTRICT" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a products-liability claim brought by Jennifer Parks, individually and as the guardian of Samuel Gama, against Ford Motor Company. Gama suffered serious injuries when his 2001 Ford Explorer Sport rolled over. Parks alleged that the Explorer's design made it unstable and prone to rollovers, and that the design of its roof and restraint system increased the risk of injury in a crash. Ford moved for summary judgment, arguing that Parks’ suit is foreclosed by the statute of repose in Section 16.012(b) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, which requires that a products liability action be brought within 15 years of the sale of a product.The trial court's proceedings were protracted and winding, with the court initially granting Ford’s summary-judgment motion, then vacating that order and granting Parks’ motion for new trial, then denying Ford’s renewed summary-judgment motion, then denying Ford’s motion for reconsideration of that order, before finally granting another summary-judgment motion by Ford. The evidence that Ford sold the Explorer to a dealership more than 15 years before Parks filed suit was overwhelming.On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, holding that Ford did not conclusively establish the 'date of the sale' from which section 16.012(b)’s claimed protection ran. The court reasoned that Ford was required to establish the specific date on which the dealership paid Ford for the Explorer in full and that Ford has not done so.The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the Court of Appeals’ judgment. The court held that the timing of a sale does not turn on the date of payment, and any inconsistency in Ford’s evidence regarding the timing of the dealership’s payment to Ford for the Explorer is immaterial and not a basis for denying or reversing summary judgment. The court concluded that Ford's evidence easily meets the test of proving that the sale must have occurred outside the statutory period, and thus, Ford is entitled to summary judgment. View "FORD MOTOR COMPANY v. PARKS" on Justia Law

The case involves Yvondia Johnson, a 100% disabled U.S. Air Force veteran, who applied for a residence homestead tax exemption for her principal residence in Converse, Texas. The Bexar Appraisal District denied her application because her husband, also a 100% disabled U.S. military veteran from whom she is separated, claimed the same exemption for his principal residence in San Antonio, Texas.The trial court granted summary judgment for the appraisal district, arguing that Ms. Johnson was ineligible for the exemption because her husband claimed the same exemption on a different home they jointly owned. Ms. Johnson appealed, and the court of appeals reversed the decision, ruling in her favor.The Supreme Court of Texas affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. The court held that the Tax Code bestows the exemption on each individual 100% disabled veteran who meets the express statutory requirements without regard to whether the veteran’s spouse also claims the exemption on a separate residence homestead. The court found that the plain text of Section 11.131(b) of the Tax Code unambiguously states that a 100% disabled veteran is entitled to a tax exemption for his or her residence homestead. The court concluded that Ms. Johnson satisfies the express, unambiguous requirements of Section 11.131(b) and therefore is entitled to the benefit of the tax exemption for 100% disabled veterans. View "BEXAR APPRAISAL DISTRICT v. JOHNSON" on Justia Law

A roofing contractor in Texas, Stonewater Roofing, Ltd. Co., filed a lawsuit against the Texas Department of Insurance and its Commissioner, Cassie Brown, seeking to invalidate Texas’s licensing and dual-capacity regulations for public insurance adjusters. Stonewater, which is not a licensed public insurance adjuster, argued that these laws violated free speech and due process rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. The trial court dismissed the case, siding with the state regulator, who argued that the laws regulated professional conduct, not speech, and that Stonewater failed to state valid void-for-vagueness claims under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.The Court of Appeals for the Seventh District of Texas reversed the trial court's decision, holding that the regulations triggered First Amendment scrutiny because the business of public insurance adjusting necessarily involves speech. The court also held that Stonewater’s vagueness challenges survived because the Public Insurance Adjusters Act did not clearly proscribe Stonewater’s alleged conduct.The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the court of appeals' judgment. The court held that the challenged statutes do not regulate or restrict speech but, rather, representative capacity with a nonexpressive objective: employment to act on behalf of an insured in negotiating for or effecting the settlement of a claim. The court also held that the statutes are clear enough in proscribing Stonewater’s alleged conduct to preclude both its as-applied and facial vagueness challenges. The court concluded that Stonewater failed to state cognizable First and Fourteenth Amendment speech and vagueness claims, and therefore, the trial court properly granted the state regulator's dismissal motion. View "TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE v. STONEWATER ROOFING, LTD. CO" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed a case involving Samson Exploration, LLC and several families, including the Bordages, from whom Samson held oil-and-gas leases. The families sued Samson for unpaid royalties under those leases. The Bordages claimed that they were entitled to late charges on the late charges, arguing that the leases' Late Charge Provision imposed late charges on late charges, compounding them each month. Samson disagreed, asserting that the late charges were not compounded.Previously, the trial court found Samson liable for breach of contract and awarded the Bordages $12,955,919 in contract damages, based on the interpretation of the Late Charge Provision. The Bordages argued that collateral estoppel prevented the Supreme Court from deciding whether the Late Charge Provision calls for simple or compound interest because that issue was previously resolved in another case involving Samson and a different lessor, the Hooks case.The Supreme Court of Texas held that Texas law disfavors compound interest, and an agreement for interest on unpaid amounts is an agreement for simple interest absent an express, clear, and specific provision for compound interest. The court also held that Samson’s prior litigation of the issue does not collaterally estop it from asserting its claims here. The court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "SAMSON EXPLORATION, LLC v. BORDAGES" on Justia Law

A nuisance lawsuit was brought by neighbors against two poultry farms located on a single tract of rural land in Henderson County, southeast of Dallas. The neighbors claimed that the odors from the farms were a nuisance, causing them discomfort and annoyance. A jury found that the odors were a temporary nuisance and the trial court granted permanent injunctive relief that effectively shut down the farms. The farm owners and operators appealed, challenging the injunction on three grounds: whether the trial court abused its discretion in finding imminent harm; whether equitable relief was unavailable because damages provide an adequate remedy; and whether the scope of the injunction is overly broad.The Supreme Court of Texas upheld the trial court’s authority to grant an injunction, rejecting the first two challenges. However, the court concluded that the trial court abused its discretion in crafting the scope of the injunction, which was broader than necessary to abate the nuisance. The court therefore reversed in part and remanded for the trial court to modify the scope of injunctive relief. View "HUYNH v. BLANCHARD" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed a case involving the State of Texas, Ken Paxton in his official capacity as Attorney General of Texas, the Texas Medical Board, and Stephen Brint Carlton in his official capacity as Executive Director of the Texas Medical Board (collectively, the State) against a group of women and physicians. The plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of Texas's abortion laws, specifically the Human Life Protection Act, which generally prohibits performing an abortion except when a pregnant woman has a life-threatening physical condition that poses a risk of death or serious physical impairment unless an abortion is performed.The case reached the Supreme Court of Texas as a direct appeal from a temporary injunction issued by the 353rd District Court, Travis County, Texas, which halted the enforcement of Texas's abortion laws in various circumstances. The State contested the injunction, arguing that the plaintiffs lacked standing, the State had sovereign immunity, and the current Texas law permitting life-saving abortion was not more limiting than the Texas Constitution permits.The Supreme Court of Texas held that one of the plaintiffs, Dr. Damla Karsan, had standing to challenge the Attorney General’s enforcement of the Human Life Protection Act against her. The court also concluded that the Declaratory Judgments Act waives the State’s immunity for a claim that a statute violates the state constitution. The court further clarified that under the Human Life Protection Act, a woman with a life-threatening physical condition and her physician have the legal authority to proceed with an abortion to save the woman’s life or major bodily function, in the exercise of reasonable medical judgment and with the woman’s informed consent. The court concluded that Dr. Karsan had not demonstrated that the part of the Human Life Protection Act that permits life-saving abortion is narrower than the Texas Constitution allows. As a result, the court vacated the lower court's injunction order. View "State v. Zurawski" on Justia Law

The case involves Rachel Goldstein and James Sabatino, who had a two-year relationship in Massachusetts that ended in 2017. In March 2020, Sabatino began contacting Goldstein, informing her that he had found sexually explicit photos and conversations on a cell phone she had loaned him during their relationship. Despite Goldstein's request for Sabatino to return the phone, he refused. Goldstein became concerned that Sabatino would use these texts and images to control her and ruin her career. In May 2020, a Massachusetts court granted Goldstein a protective order against Sabatino, which he violated, leading to his arrest. In June, the Massachusetts court extended the protective order for another six months. The same month, Goldstein moved to Harris County, Texas. While the Massachusetts protective order was still in effect, Sabatino began filing small-claims lawsuits in Massachusetts against Goldstein. In October 2020, Goldstein filed an application for a protective order against Sabatino in Harris County.The district court in Harris County issued a protective order against Sabatino, a Massachusetts resident, based on conduct that occurred entirely within Massachusetts. Sabatino appealed, challenging the district court's personal jurisdiction over him and its subject matter jurisdiction over the proceeding. The Court of Appeals for the First District of Texas vacated the order and dismissed the case, holding that the district court lacked territorial jurisdiction—a purportedly nonwaivable, third jurisdictional requirement. The court of appeals did not address personal jurisdiction.The Supreme Court of Texas disagreed with the court of appeals’ territorial jurisdiction analysis, but agreed with Sabatino that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over him. The court held that territorial jurisdiction is not an independent jurisdictional requirement in Chapter 7B protective-order proceedings. The court also held that Sabatino did not enter a general appearance, and thus did not waive his challenge to the district court's personal jurisdiction. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Texas affirmed the court of appeals’ judgment vacating the protective order and dismissing the case. View "GOLDSTEIN v. SABATINO" on Justia Law