Justia Texas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Tex. R. Civ. P. 202 allows a “proper court” to authorize a deposition to investigate a potential claim before it is filed. In this case, “the Trooper,” an anonymous blogger, launched an online attack on The Reynolds & Reynolds Co. and its chairman (collectively, Reynolds). To discover the Trooper’s identity, Reynolds filed a Rule 202 petition in the Harris County district court seeking to depose Google, Inc., which hosts the blog, and requesting that Google disclose the contact information of the owner of the blog website. Reynolds stated that it anticipated the institution of litigation against the Trooper. The Trooper opposed Reynolds’ petition, arguing that because he did not have minimal contacts with Texas sufficient for a Texas court to exercise personal jurisdiction over him, there was no “proper court” under Rule 202 to order a deposition to investigate a suit in which he may be a defendant. The trial court ordered that Google be deposed. The Supreme Court conditionally granted the Trooper’s petition for writ of mandamus and directed the trial court to vacate its order, holding that the trial court’s order exceeded its authority under Rule 202 because a “proper court” must have personal jurisdiction over the potential defendant. View "In re John Doe A/K/A “Trooper”" on Justia Law

An intellectually disabled and mentally ill mother (Mother) gave birth to a child when Mother was a teenager. When the child was two, she fell and suffered injuries to her teeth and jaw. The next day, the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (DFPS) removed the child from Mother and filed a petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights. Two months after the suit was filed, DFPS served Father by publication. John received no notice of the hearings in the case, nor did he receive notice of the trial. After proceedings in the termination suit began, Mother executed an affidavit of voluntary relinquishment naming DFPS as managing conservator of the child. The first day of trial, the State served Father with a subpoena to attend the trial. Father missed the first few hours of the trial. Following the trial, the jury found that termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. The court of appeals affirmed both terminations. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that termination of both parents’ rights was improper because there was legally insufficient evidence that Mother knowingly and intelligently executed the affidavit of voluntary relinquishment and because Father did not receive notice of trial and did not waive notice. View "In re Interest of K.M.L." on Justia Law

Two subcontractors employed by Petitioner, a homebuilder, asserted claims on behalf of a class of subcontractors whose pay Petitioner had docked when the subcontractors did not furnish proof of adequate general liability insurance coverage. The parties settled. Under the terms of the settlement agreement, Petitioner would issue refunds checks, sending them to existing subcontractors as it would their paychecks or by mailing checks to the last known addresses of former subcontractors. The class representatives agreed, on behalf of the settlement class members, that refund checks not negotiated within ninety days of issuance would be void and that those and other unclaimed funds would be given to The Nature Conservancy as a cy pres award. The trial court approved the settlement and rendered final judgment accordingly. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the Texas Unclaimed Property Act prohibited the imposition of a ninety-day deadline for negotiating settlement checks and the cy pres award. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Act did not apply in this case and that the judgment approving the settlement agreement was binding on all settlement class members. View "Highland Homes Ltd. v. State" on Justia Law

Petitioner granted Respondent a right of way to construct a pipeline across Petitioner’s property. The parties signed an agreement requiring Respondent to install the pipeline by boring underground in order to preserve the trees on the property. The construction company Respondent hired, however, cut down several hundred feet of trees. A jury found Respondent liable for damage to Petitioner’s property on both breach of contract and trespass theories and awarded damages both to compensate Petitioner for the reasonable cost to restore the property and for the intrinsic value of the destroyed trees. The court of appeals reversed based on the trial court’s failure to submit a jury question on whether the injury to the property was temporary or permanent. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the general rule that temporary injury to real property entitles the owner to damages commensurate with the cost of restoring the property and permanent injury to the property entitles the owner commensurate with the loss in the fair market value to the property as a whole applies when the wrongful conduct causing the injury stems from breach of contract rather than tort; (2) the common law exception to this general rule that entitles the landowner to damages in keeping with the intrinsic value of the destroyed trees applies in this case; and (3) any error in the jury charge related to such damages was harmless. Remanded. View "Gilbert Wheeler, Inc. v. Enbridge Pipelines, LP" on Justia Law

William Drennan worked as an executive with Exxon Mobil Corporation (ExxonMobil), a Texas-based corporation. During his employment, Drennan received several forms of compensation through the corporation’s executive bonus-compensation Incentive Programs. The Incentive Programs included choice-of-law provisions providing for application of New York Law and allowed forfeiture of an executive’s bonus awards for engaging in “detrimental activity.” After Drennan retired he accepted a position at Hess Corporation, another large energy company. Drennan’s incentive awards were subsequently forfeited on the grounds that “there was a material conflict of interest, constituting detrimental activity” under the Incentive Programs. Drennan sued. The trial court entered judgment for ExxonMobil. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the choice-of-law provisions were unenforceable, that Texas law applied, and that the detrimental-activity provisions, as forfeiture conditions, were unenforceable covenants not to compete under Texas law. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the New York choice-of-law provisions in the executive compensation plan were enforceable and that the detrimental-activity provisions were enforceable under New York law. View "Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Drennen" on Justia Law

Respondents claimed that a road that was necessary for access to the party’s landlocked, previously unified parcel was a prior use easement. The trial court granted summary judgment for Respondents, finding they conclusively proved the existence of a prior use easement. The court of appeals affirmed. Among the issues before the Supreme Court was whether Respondents had an implied easement over Petitioners’ land despite a lack of continued necessity. The Court’s disposition of the first issue precluded it from reaching the remaining issues. The Court held (1) a party claiming an implied easement for roadway access to a landlocked, previously unified parcel must pursue a necessity easement rather than a prior use easement; and (2) because Respondents sought an implied easement for roadway access to their landlocked, previously unified parcels, the case must be remanded for them to elect whether to pursue a necessity easement claim. View "Hamrick v. Ward" on Justia Law

Homeowner lived in a house that she insured with Farmers Insurance Exchange. The policy contained a clause suspending dwelling coverage if the house was vacant for more than sixty days. Homeowner subsequently moved into a retirement community. While the policy was still effective, fire from a neighboring house spread to Homeowner’s house and damaged it. Farmers denied Homeowner’s claim on the basis that the house had been vacant for more than sixty days. Homeowner sued Farmers for breach of contract. The trial court granted summary judgment for Homeowner on the contract claim. The court of appeals reversed and rendered judgment for Farmers, concluding that Farmers was not required to establish that the vacancy contributed to cause the loss in order to assert the vacancy clause as a defense. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Farmers was not precluded from relying on language in the vacancy clause in response to Homeowner’s claim, and the vacancy provision must be applied according to its terms. View "Greene v. Farmers Ins. Exch." on Justia Law

W. Kirk Burbage (Kirk) and the Burbage Funeral Home sued Allan Chadwick Burbage (Chad), Kirk’s brother, for defamation after Chad created a website to air his grievances with Kirk and sent letters to family friends containing disparaging statements about Kirk. After a trial, a jury assessed compensatory and exemplary damages against Chad for ten statements defaming Kirk and permanently enjoined Chad from making similar statements. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the trial court abused its discretion by issuing the permanent injunction, which operated as an impermissible prior restraint on freedom of speech; and (2) no evidence supported the compensatory damage award, and exemplary damages cannot stand. View "Burbage v. Burbage" on Justia Law

Respondent, an employee of the Texas Department of Human Services (TDHS), reported wrongdoing to his supervisor. Respondent was disciplined by his supervisor, after which he reported the alleged violations he witnessed to his supervisor’s supervisor and then to the lead program manager. Respondent was subsequently terminated. Respondent sued TDHS under the Texas Whistleblower Act, claiming that he was terminated for reporting the wrongdoing. TDHS filed a plea to the jurisdiction, arguing that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because Respondent failed to make a good-faith report of a violation of law to an appropriate law-enforcement authority. The trial court denied TDHS’s plea to the jurisdiction. On remand, the court of appeals affirmed, holding that the supervisors were appropriate law-enforcement authorities within TDHS, and, alternatively, Respondent had a good-faith belief that he was reporting to appropriate law-enforcement authorities. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Respondent neither reported the alleged violations to an appropriate law-enforcement authority nor in good faith could have believed he had, and therefore, Respondent was not entitled to the protections of the Whistleblower Act. View "Tex. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Okoli" on Justia Law

In 2003, the Legislature enacted the Medical Liability Act, which contains a statute of repose that operates as a bar to claims that are not brought within ten years of the date of the medical treatment. In this case, alleged negligence occurred during the birth of a child in 1996. No suit was filed until 2011, five years after the repose statute’s deadline. The hospital moved for summary judgment, asserting that the repose statute barred the claim. The mother responded that the Act’s ten-year statute of repose violates the open court and retroactivity provisions of the Texas Constitution. The Supreme Court upheld the Act’s repose statute against the mother’s as-applied constitutional challenges, holding (1) the mother’s open courts challenge failed due to the mother’s lack of diligence in filing suit; and (2) the mother’s retroactivity challenge failed because a compelling public purpose justified the legislation and granted the mother a three-year grace period to file suit. View "Tenet Hosps. Ltd. v. Rivera" on Justia Law