Justia Texas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Porretto family owned several acres of property between the Galveston Seawall and the Gulf of Mexico. Due to the State’s repeated recharacterization of the Porretto’s property as public property, the Porrettos had difficulty selling the property. The Porrettos sued the State, arguing that the State’s claims made it impossible for them to sell their property and therefore amounted to a compensable taking. The trial court held that the State’s actions had resulted in a compensable taking and awarded the Porrettos $5.012 million as damages for the lost market value of the property taken. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the State’s actions did not constitute a taking. The Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeals' conclusion that the State’s conduct did not constitute a taking and affirmed. View "Porretto v. Tex. Gen. Land Office" on Justia Law

A lessee leased a marina from a governmental entity providing that the premises be used only as a "marina, restaurant, gasoline and sundry sales and as a recreational facility.” When the governmental entity terminated the lease the business sued for breach of contract. The government entity filed a plea to the jurisdiction asserting governmental immunity. At issue in this case was whether Chapter 271 of the Texas Local Government Code waived the governmental entity’s immunity from suit. The trial court concluded that it did, and the court of appeals agreed. The Supreme Court disagreed with the lower courts and dismissed the lessee’s claims for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the parties’ lease agreement did not constitute a written contract stating the essential terms of an agreement for providing goods or services to a local government entity, and therefore, Chapter 271 did not waive the governmental entity’s immunity from suit. View "Lubbock County Water Control & Improvement Dist. v. Church & Akin, LLC" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the Texas-resident exception to the forum non conveniens statute, which allows “plaintiffs” who are legal residents of Texas to bring a case in a Texas forum even if forum non conveniens would otherwise favor dismissal. Here an estate was sued in Texas regarding a Mexican decedent’s alleged responsibility for a car accident that occurred in Mexico. The estate in turn filed a third-party claim against Ford Motor Company. Wrongful-death beneficiaries, three of whom were legal residents of Texas, intervened in the lawsuit and also filed claims against Ford. Ford moved to dismiss under forum non conveniens, and the trial court denied the motion. Ford then moved for mandamus relief. The court of appeals denied relief, reasoning that, because at least one of the beneficiaries was a legal resident of Texas, the wrongful-death beneficiaries were “plaintiffs” that could take advantage of the Texas-resident exception to forum non conveniens. The Supreme Court denied mandamus relief, holding that the wrongful-death beneficiaries are distinct plaintiffs that can rely on the Texas-resident exception. View "In re Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether the statutory requirement that a plaintiff in any action for damages arising out of the provision of professional services by a licensed or registered professional file a supporting expert affidavit with the complaint applies to a defendant or third-party defendant who files a third-party claim or cross-claim against a licensed or registered professional. In the underlying complaint, the court of appeals concluded that chapter 150 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code does not require third-party plaintiffs or cross-claimants to file a certificate of merit. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the certificate-of-merit requirement in chapter 150 does not apply to a defendant or third-party defendant who asserts claims against a licensed or registered professional because they are not the “plaintiff” in such cases. View "Jaster v. Comet II Constr., Inc." on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court articulated with greater clarity the standards governing whether an act of spoliation has occurred and the limits of a trial court’s discretion to impose certain remedies upon a finding of spoliation. In the underlying slip-and-fall premises-liability case, the defendant-premises owner retained a portion of surveillance video footage of the plaintiff’s fall but allowed additional footage to be automatically erased. The trial court submitted a spoliation instruction to the jury and allowed the jury to decide whether spoliation occurred. The jury rendered a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing the severe sanction of a spoliation instruction. Remanded for a new trial. View "Brookshire Bros., Ltd. v. Aldridge" on Justia Law

A family from Mexico hired Jose Marciel, a “coyote,” to transport them to Houston or New Orleans. Marciel collected the family at a house in Texas, and, before dawn, arrived at the private Jones Ranch. An employee of the ranch operator stopped Maciel to ask why he had entered the property, after which Maciel fled at high speed. The vehicle rolled over, killing the family. Respondents, the deceased mother’s parents, sued the ranch’s operators and an employee (collectively, Petitioners), alleging wrongful death claims, including negligence and gross negligence. The trial court granted summary judgment for Petitioners. The court of appeals reversed in part. The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) the trial court erred in granting a traditional summary judgment based on the common law unlawful acts doctrine because the statutory comparative responsibility scheme abrogated this doctrine; (2) a land occupier owes only a duty to avoid injuring a trespasser wilfully, wantonly, or through gross negligence, and therefore, Respondents’ claim for simple negligence must fail as a matter of law; and (3) as to gross negligence, the trial court properly granted a no-evidence summary judgment motion because Respondents failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact. View "Boerjan v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

Randall Hughes was an employee and a minority shareholder of Cardiac Perfusion Services, Inc. (CPS). After Hughes’s employment terminated, CPS and Michael Joubran filed an action against Hughes and also requested declaratory relief. Hughes filed counterclaims for breach of fiduciary duty against Joubran, alleging that Joubran engaged in oppressive conduct toward him. After a jury trial, the trial court ordered Joubran and CPS to buy out Hughes’s shares based on its determination that Joubran engaged in “oppressive conduct” to the rights of Hughes. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding that there is no common-law cause of action for shareholder oppression, and the only statutory remedy for “oppressive” actions is a rehabilitative receivership. Remanded. View "Cardiac Perfusion Servs., Inc. v. Joubran" on Justia Law

Petitioners owned the royalty interests under two oil and gas leases. The leases were later pooled to form the Cogdell Canyon Reef Unit (CCRU). Since the CCRU was formed, a method of enhanced oil recovery began to be used by injecting carbon dixoide into the reservoir to sweep the oil to the production wells. With this method, the carbon dioxide returns to the surface entrained in casinghead gas, which is gas produced with the oil. At issue in this case was whether the royalty due on the gasinghead gas under the parties’ agreements must be determined as if the injected carbon dioxide were not present and whether the royalty owners were required to share with the working interest the expense of removing the carbon dioxide from the gas. The Supreme Court concluded that, under the parties’ agreements the royalty owners must share in the cost of carbon dioxide removal and were not entitled to a royalty based on the carbon dioxide’s value when it is produced with the casinghead gas. View "French v. Occidental Permian Ltd." on Justia Law

The Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (DFPS) removed a child from the custody of his Mother. After DFPS decided not to seek termination of Mother’s rights, the child’s Foster Parents filed suit, seeking appointment as the child’s joint managing conservators. After a jury trial, the trial court appointed the Foster Parents as the child’s sole managing conservators. The court of appeals reversed and awarded Mother managing conservatorship, concluding that the evidence was legally insufficient to support the jury’s finding that Mother’s appointment as the child’s conservator would significantly impair the child’s physical health or emotional development. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the court of appeals did not reach the question of whether the evidence was factually - as opposed to legally - sufficient to support the verdict, the case must be remanded for factual sufficiency review. View "Danet v. Bhan" on Justia Law

Jimmy Carty died in an accident during his employment for the state. The workers’ compensation carrier for state employees (carrier) began paying death benefits to Christy, Jimmy’s wife, and the couple’s three minor children. Christy, individually, as representative of her deceased husband’s estate, and as next friend of the couple’s children, brought suit against two defendants. The Cartys settled with the defendants. The district court subsequently calculated the carrier's reimbursement and apportioned the remainder of the settlement funds among Christy and the children “in the same ratio as they received death benefits.” The carrier appealed, challenging the apportionment. The court of appeals certified to the Supreme Court the question of “how a net recovery in excess of the amount of benefits paid by the workers’ compensation carrier should be apportioned among beneficiaries when multiple beneficiaries recover from a third-party tortfeasor.” The Supreme Court answered that when multiple beneficiaries recover compensation benefits through the same covered employee, the workers’ compensation carrier’s right to a third-party settlement is determined by treating the recovery as a single, collective recovery rather than separate recoveries by each beneficiary. View "State Office of Risk Mgmt. v. Carty" on Justia Law