Justia Texas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner granted Respondent a right of way to construct a pipeline across Petitioner’s property. The parties signed an agreement requiring Respondent to install the pipeline by boring underground in order to preserve the trees on the property. The construction company Respondent hired, however, cut down several hundred feet of trees. A jury found Respondent liable for damage to Petitioner’s property on both breach of contract and trespass theories and awarded damages both to compensate Petitioner for the reasonable cost to restore the property and for the intrinsic value of the destroyed trees. The court of appeals reversed based on the trial court’s failure to submit a jury question on whether the injury to the property was temporary or permanent. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the general rule that temporary injury to real property entitles the owner to damages commensurate with the cost of restoring the property and permanent injury to the property entitles the owner commensurate with the loss in the fair market value to the property as a whole applies when the wrongful conduct causing the injury stems from breach of contract rather than tort; (2) the common law exception to this general rule that entitles the landowner to damages in keeping with the intrinsic value of the destroyed trees applies in this case; and (3) any error in the jury charge related to such damages was harmless. Remanded. View "Gilbert Wheeler, Inc. v. Enbridge Pipelines, LP" on Justia Law

William Drennan worked as an executive with Exxon Mobil Corporation (ExxonMobil), a Texas-based corporation. During his employment, Drennan received several forms of compensation through the corporation’s executive bonus-compensation Incentive Programs. The Incentive Programs included choice-of-law provisions providing for application of New York Law and allowed forfeiture of an executive’s bonus awards for engaging in “detrimental activity.” After Drennan retired he accepted a position at Hess Corporation, another large energy company. Drennan’s incentive awards were subsequently forfeited on the grounds that “there was a material conflict of interest, constituting detrimental activity” under the Incentive Programs. Drennan sued. The trial court entered judgment for ExxonMobil. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the choice-of-law provisions were unenforceable, that Texas law applied, and that the detrimental-activity provisions, as forfeiture conditions, were unenforceable covenants not to compete under Texas law. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the New York choice-of-law provisions in the executive compensation plan were enforceable and that the detrimental-activity provisions were enforceable under New York law. View "Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Drennen" on Justia Law

Respondents claimed that a road that was necessary for access to the party’s landlocked, previously unified parcel was a prior use easement. The trial court granted summary judgment for Respondents, finding they conclusively proved the existence of a prior use easement. The court of appeals affirmed. Among the issues before the Supreme Court was whether Respondents had an implied easement over Petitioners’ land despite a lack of continued necessity. The Court’s disposition of the first issue precluded it from reaching the remaining issues. The Court held (1) a party claiming an implied easement for roadway access to a landlocked, previously unified parcel must pursue a necessity easement rather than a prior use easement; and (2) because Respondents sought an implied easement for roadway access to their landlocked, previously unified parcels, the case must be remanded for them to elect whether to pursue a necessity easement claim. View "Hamrick v. Ward" on Justia Law

Homeowner lived in a house that she insured with Farmers Insurance Exchange. The policy contained a clause suspending dwelling coverage if the house was vacant for more than sixty days. Homeowner subsequently moved into a retirement community. While the policy was still effective, fire from a neighboring house spread to Homeowner’s house and damaged it. Farmers denied Homeowner’s claim on the basis that the house had been vacant for more than sixty days. Homeowner sued Farmers for breach of contract. The trial court granted summary judgment for Homeowner on the contract claim. The court of appeals reversed and rendered judgment for Farmers, concluding that Farmers was not required to establish that the vacancy contributed to cause the loss in order to assert the vacancy clause as a defense. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Farmers was not precluded from relying on language in the vacancy clause in response to Homeowner’s claim, and the vacancy provision must be applied according to its terms. View "Greene v. Farmers Ins. Exch." on Justia Law

W. Kirk Burbage (Kirk) and the Burbage Funeral Home sued Allan Chadwick Burbage (Chad), Kirk’s brother, for defamation after Chad created a website to air his grievances with Kirk and sent letters to family friends containing disparaging statements about Kirk. After a trial, a jury assessed compensatory and exemplary damages against Chad for ten statements defaming Kirk and permanently enjoined Chad from making similar statements. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the trial court abused its discretion by issuing the permanent injunction, which operated as an impermissible prior restraint on freedom of speech; and (2) no evidence supported the compensatory damage award, and exemplary damages cannot stand. View "Burbage v. Burbage" on Justia Law

Respondent, an employee of the Texas Department of Human Services (TDHS), reported wrongdoing to his supervisor. Respondent was disciplined by his supervisor, after which he reported the alleged violations he witnessed to his supervisor’s supervisor and then to the lead program manager. Respondent was subsequently terminated. Respondent sued TDHS under the Texas Whistleblower Act, claiming that he was terminated for reporting the wrongdoing. TDHS filed a plea to the jurisdiction, arguing that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because Respondent failed to make a good-faith report of a violation of law to an appropriate law-enforcement authority. The trial court denied TDHS’s plea to the jurisdiction. On remand, the court of appeals affirmed, holding that the supervisors were appropriate law-enforcement authorities within TDHS, and, alternatively, Respondent had a good-faith belief that he was reporting to appropriate law-enforcement authorities. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Respondent neither reported the alleged violations to an appropriate law-enforcement authority nor in good faith could have believed he had, and therefore, Respondent was not entitled to the protections of the Whistleblower Act. View "Tex. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Okoli" on Justia Law

In 2003, the Legislature enacted the Medical Liability Act, which contains a statute of repose that operates as a bar to claims that are not brought within ten years of the date of the medical treatment. In this case, alleged negligence occurred during the birth of a child in 1996. No suit was filed until 2011, five years after the repose statute’s deadline. The hospital moved for summary judgment, asserting that the repose statute barred the claim. The mother responded that the Act’s ten-year statute of repose violates the open court and retroactivity provisions of the Texas Constitution. The Supreme Court upheld the Act’s repose statute against the mother’s as-applied constitutional challenges, holding (1) the mother’s open courts challenge failed due to the mother’s lack of diligence in filing suit; and (2) the mother’s retroactivity challenge failed because a compelling public purpose justified the legislation and granted the mother a three-year grace period to file suit. View "Tenet Hosps. Ltd. v. Rivera" on Justia Law

A trial court may substitute a regular juror with an alternate if the regular juror is unable to fulfill or is disqualified from fulfilling his duties. A trial court may only dismiss a juror and proceed with fewer than twelve jurors if the dismissed juror is constitutionally disabled. In this child custody dispute, the trial court empaneled twelve jurors and retained one alternate. The trial court subsequently substituted the alternate juror for a regular juror whom it found to be disqualified. During the trial, the trial court found that one of the jurors had become disabled and proceeded with eleven jurors. The eleven-member jury returned a unanimous verdict. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that dismissal of the disqualified juror resulted in an eleven-member jury in violation of the constitutional right to a jury trial. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals failed to property examine the two dismissals under their appropriate standards. Remanded. View "In re Interest of M.G.N." on Justia Law

This mandamus proceeding related to a disciplinary proceeding against a former prosecutor Jon L. Hall, who allegedly suppressed exculpatory evidence in an aggravated robbery prosecution. The Commission for Lawyer Discipline commenced a disciplinary action against Hall, alleging prosecutorial misconduct. The Commission then filed a motion seeking access to expunged records in the aggravated robbery case. The trial court refused the Commission access to the expunged criminal records for use in the disciplinary proceeding and ordered the Commission to turn over investigative records. The grievance panel in the disciplinary proceeding construed the district court’s actions as a bar to the disciplinary proceeding and granted Hall’s motion for summary judgment. The Commission then petitioned for writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court conditionally granted the writ and directed the trial court to vacate its order, holding that the expungement order did not bar the Commission from using records from the criminal trial in the grievance proceeding. View "In re State Bar of Tex. " on Justia Law

The question presented to the Supreme Court in this case was whether Texas recognizes a legal right to stigma damages, which represent damage to the reputation of realty. Plaintiff, a ranch owner, sued Defendant, the owner of a metal processing facility, for nuisance, trespass and damages after the Commission found that Defendant had committed an unauthorized discharge of industrial hazardous waste that had affected Plaintiff’s property. As to damages, Plaintiff sought only a loss of the fair market value of the ranch and relied on an expert witness who testified that, in her opinion, the ranch had suffered a loss of market value due to stigma resulting from fear, risk, and negative public perceptions. A jury found that Defendant was negligent and that negligence caused the property to lose $349,312 of its market value. The trial court entered judgment on the verdict, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that even if Texas law permits recovery of stigma damages, Plaintiff’s evidence was legally insufficient to prove them. View "Houston Unlimited, Inc. Metal Processing v. Mel Acres Ranch" on Justia Law