Justia Texas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 101.106 bars a suit against a governmental unit after a plaintiff sues the unit's employee regarding the same subject matter. However, if the employee is sued for acts conducted within the general scope of employment, and suit could have been brought under the Texas Tort Claims Act (TTCA), then the suit is considered filed against the governmental unit. Plaintiff sued an employee (Employee) of the Texas Adjutant General's Office (TAGO). Employee filed a motion to dismiss himself pursuant to section 101.106(f). Plaintiff then filed an amended petition adding TAGO as a defendant and alleging that TAGO's sovereign immunity was waived under the TTCA. The trial court denied Employee's motion to dismiss. Thereafter, TAGO unsuccessfully filed a plea to the jurisdiction and motion to dismiss. The court of appeals reversed the denial of Employee's motion to dismiss but affirmed the denial of TAGO's plea to the jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Employee was entitled to dismissal because the suit against him arose from conduct within his general scope of employment; and (2) the suit against TAGO should proceed because Plaintiff was entitled to, and did, amend his pleadings to assert a TTCA claim against the government.View "Tex. Adjutant General's Office v. Ngakoue" on Justia Law

Reginald Lane, individually and as personal representative of Decedent's estate, filed suit under the Texas Medical Liability Act (TMLA) against anesthesiologist Michael Zanchi, alleging negligence. Zanchi was not served with process until September 16. In the meantime, Lane mailed the expert report to Zanchi on August 19. Zanchi filed a motion to dismiss for failure to timely serve an expert report as required by Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 74.351(a), arguing that he was not a "party" to Lane's suit until he was served with process. The trial court denied the motion, and the court of appeals affirmed, holding that one is a "party" if so named in a pleading, whether or not one has been served with process. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the term "party" in section 74.351(a) means one named in a lawsuit; (2) therefore, a claimant asserting a health care liability claim complies with section 74.351(a) by serving the report on a defendant who has not yet been served with process; and (3) "service" of an expert report on such a defendant need not comport with the service requirements of Tex. R. Civ. P. 106 that apply specifically to service of citation.View "Zanchi v. Lane" on Justia Law

Title to property of a local church (the Good Shepherd) was held by a Texas non-profit corporation (Corporation). The Corporation was formed as a condition of Good Shepherd's congregation being accepted into union with the Episcopal Diocese of Northwest Texas (Diocese). After members of Good Shepherd's parishioners began to disagree with doctrinal positions adopted by The Episcopal Church of the United States (TEC), a majority of the congregation voted to amend Good Shepherd's articles of incorporation and bylaws to withdraw God Shepherd from communion with TEC and the Diocese. The Corporation and the withdrawing faction maintained possession of the property. The Diocese and leaders of the portion of the congregation loyal to TEC and the Diocese filed suit seeking possession of the property. The trial court granted summary judgment for the loyal faction, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the legal methodology called "neutral principles of law," rather than "deference," should be applied in this case; and (2) applying neutral principles of law to the record, the trial court erred by granting summary judgment. Remanded.View "Masterson v. Diocese of Northwest Texas" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was working for a BP Amoco Chemical Company (BP) contractor in 2005 when BP's Texas City refinery exploded, killing fifteen workers and injuring many others. Plaintiff signed a power of attorney retaining William Wells to represent him on any claims he had against BP arising from the explosion. In order to increase the settlement in this and three other cases, Wells associated Ronald and Kevin Krist and the Krist Law Firm as additional counsel. After a settlement was obtained, Plaintiff and his wife brought this suit against Wells, the Krists, and the Krist Law Firm (collectively, Attorneys), claiming that the Attorneys failed to obtain an adequate settlement for both plaintiffs. The trial court granted summary judgment for the Attorneys, and the court of appeals affirmed, finding that Plaintiffs had not presented competent evidence of damages. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) an affidavit did not raise a genuine issue of material fact on malpractice damages; (2) discovery disputes in the trial court did not warrant denial of summary judgment on the issue of damages; and (3) the lay testimony of Plaintiffs did not raise a genuine issue of material fact on malpractice damages.View "Elizondo v. Krist" on Justia Law

Joel Martinez died after ingesting heroin with Defendant. Plaintiff, individually and as representative of Martinez's estate, sued Defendant under wrongful death and survival statutes, alleging that Defendant was negligent in failing to call 911 immediately and in failing to disclose Martinez's heroin use to the paramedics. Defendant asserted an affirmative defense based on the common law unlawful acts doctrine, under which a plaintiff cannot recover damages if it can be shown that, at the time of the injury, the plaintiff was engaged in an illegal act that contributed to the injury. The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendant based on the unlawful acts doctrine. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the common law unlawful acts doctrine is not available as an affirmative defense in personal injury and wrongful death cases, as, like other common law assumption-of-the-risk defenses, it was abrogated by Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 33's proportionate responsibility scheme; and (2) therefore, a plaintiff's illegal conduct not falling within the affirmative defense in Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 93.001 must be apportioned rather than barring recovery completely. Remanded. View "Dugger v. Arredondo" on Justia Law

James Olis, a former officer of Dynegy, Inc., was indicted on multiple counts of securities fraud, wire fraud, and conspiracy. Olis hired attorney Terry Yates to defend him in the federal criminal investigation and a civil investigation conducted by the SEC. Olis told Yates that Dynegy would be paying his legal fees. Dynegy's legal department orally confirmed that Dynegy would pay Olis's legal fees. Yates later filed suit against Dynegy to recover his unpaid attorney's fees, asserting claims for breach of contract and fraudulent inducement. The jury returned a verdict for Yates. At issue on appeal was whether Dynegy was entitled to judgment in its favor based on its affirmative defense of statute of frauds. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed and rendered a take-nothing judgment in favor of Dynegy, holding (1) the statute of frauds rendered the oral agreement between Dynegy and Yates unenforceable, and therefore, Yates could not recover under his breach of contract claim; and (2) Yates's claim for benefit-of-the-bargain damages pursuant to his alternative fraudulent inducement action was barred.View "Dynegy, Inc. v. Yates " on Justia Law

The City of Lorena approved a subdivision plat. The City, however, subsequently enforced a moratorium against the property, citing the municipality's additional sewage system capacity requirements. The landowner sued for a declaratory judgment that the moratorium did not apply against its approved development and for damages, alleging a regulatory taking under an inverse condemnation claim. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the City. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the moratorium could not apply to the property because the property had been approved for development before the moratorium took effect. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the moratorium did not apply to the property because the City approved the property for subdivision before it enacted the moratorium; and (2) in regards to the inverse condemnation claim, the trial court needed to resolve factual disputes before the merits of the takings claim could be judicially addressed. Remanded.View "City of Lorena v. BMTP Holdings, LP" on Justia Law

An Insured obtained an insurance policy to reimburse its expenses in regaining control of an oil well in the event the well blew out. The well subsequently blew out and caught fire. The Insured represented to the Insurer that it owed 100 percent working interest in the well, andthe Insurer paid claims accordingly. After the Insurer discovered that the Insured might have possessed less than 100 percent working interest in the well, the Insurer filed a lawsuit for a return of its payments under breach of contract and equity claims. The court of appeals entered summary judgment in favor of the Insurer on its equity claims, but a different court of appeals overturned the prior rulings, concluding that the Insurer had no equitable right to reimbursement. The Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeals that the Insurer could not proceed on its equity claims but for different reasons, holding that because the insurance contract addressed the Insured’s conduct, the Insurer could not rely on its equity claims. Remanded to the court of appeals to address the contract claims. View "Gotham Ins. Co. v. Warren E&P, Inc." on Justia Law

TXU Portfolio Management Company (TXU) entered into a contract with FPL Energy, LLC to receive electricity and renewable energy credits (RECs) from wind farms owned by FPL. After FPL failed to provide the electricity and RECs, TXU filed a breach of contract action against FPL. FPL counterclaimed, arguing that TXU failed to provide it with sufficient transmission capacity. The trial court granted two partial summary judgments declaring (1) the contracts required TXU to provide transmission capacity, and (2) the contracts’ liquidated damages provisions were unenforceable. After a jury trial on the remaining issues, the trial court entered take-nothing judgments for both parties. The court of appeals reversed both summary judgment rulings. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the court of appeals’ holding that TXU owed no contractual duty to provide transmission capacity; but (2) reversed the portion of the court of appeals’ judgment regarding liquidated damages, holding that the liquidated damages provisions applied only to RECs and were unenforceable as a penalty. Remanded for a determination of damages. View "FPL Energy, LLC v. TXU Portfolio Mgmt. Co., L.P." on Justia Law

Mike Richey sold his interest in Richey Oilfield Construction, Inc. to Nighthawk Oilfield Services, Ltd. Richey remained employed as president of Richey Oil and became a limited partner in Nighthawk. The primary agreements regarding the transaction were a stock purchase agreement, an agreement for the purchase of Richey Oil’s goodwill, and a promissory note. Each of the acquisition agreements contained a forum selection clause naming Tarrant County as the venue for state court actions. When the business did not go as well as the parties had hoped, Richey filed suit in Wise County, where Richey resided, against two Nighthawk executives (together, Relators) for, among other claims, breach of fiduciary duty, common law fraud, statutory fraud, and violations of the Texas Securities Act. Relators responded by unsuccessfully moving the trial court to transfer venue to Tarrant County or dismiss the suit pursuant to the mandatory venue selection clauses in the acquisition agreements. Relators subsequently sought mandamus relief. The Supreme Court conditionally granted relief, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to enforce the forum selection clauses in the acquisition agreements. View "In re Fisher" on Justia Law