Justia Texas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Title to property of a local church (the Good Shepherd) was held by a Texas non-profit corporation (Corporation). The Corporation was formed as a condition of Good Shepherd's congregation being accepted into union with the Episcopal Diocese of Northwest Texas (Diocese). After members of Good Shepherd's parishioners began to disagree with doctrinal positions adopted by The Episcopal Church of the United States (TEC), a majority of the congregation voted to amend Good Shepherd's articles of incorporation and bylaws to withdraw God Shepherd from communion with TEC and the Diocese. The Corporation and the withdrawing faction maintained possession of the property. The Diocese and leaders of the portion of the congregation loyal to TEC and the Diocese filed suit seeking possession of the property. The trial court granted summary judgment for the loyal faction, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the legal methodology called "neutral principles of law," rather than "deference," should be applied in this case; and (2) applying neutral principles of law to the record, the trial court erred by granting summary judgment. Remanded.View "Masterson v. Diocese of Northwest Texas" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was working for a BP Amoco Chemical Company (BP) contractor in 2005 when BP's Texas City refinery exploded, killing fifteen workers and injuring many others. Plaintiff signed a power of attorney retaining William Wells to represent him on any claims he had against BP arising from the explosion. In order to increase the settlement in this and three other cases, Wells associated Ronald and Kevin Krist and the Krist Law Firm as additional counsel. After a settlement was obtained, Plaintiff and his wife brought this suit against Wells, the Krists, and the Krist Law Firm (collectively, Attorneys), claiming that the Attorneys failed to obtain an adequate settlement for both plaintiffs. The trial court granted summary judgment for the Attorneys, and the court of appeals affirmed, finding that Plaintiffs had not presented competent evidence of damages. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) an affidavit did not raise a genuine issue of material fact on malpractice damages; (2) discovery disputes in the trial court did not warrant denial of summary judgment on the issue of damages; and (3) the lay testimony of Plaintiffs did not raise a genuine issue of material fact on malpractice damages.View "Elizondo v. Krist" on Justia Law

Joel Martinez died after ingesting heroin with Defendant. Plaintiff, individually and as representative of Martinez's estate, sued Defendant under wrongful death and survival statutes, alleging that Defendant was negligent in failing to call 911 immediately and in failing to disclose Martinez's heroin use to the paramedics. Defendant asserted an affirmative defense based on the common law unlawful acts doctrine, under which a plaintiff cannot recover damages if it can be shown that, at the time of the injury, the plaintiff was engaged in an illegal act that contributed to the injury. The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendant based on the unlawful acts doctrine. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the common law unlawful acts doctrine is not available as an affirmative defense in personal injury and wrongful death cases, as, like other common law assumption-of-the-risk defenses, it was abrogated by Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 33's proportionate responsibility scheme; and (2) therefore, a plaintiff's illegal conduct not falling within the affirmative defense in Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 93.001 must be apportioned rather than barring recovery completely. Remanded. View "Dugger v. Arredondo" on Justia Law

James Olis, a former officer of Dynegy, Inc., was indicted on multiple counts of securities fraud, wire fraud, and conspiracy. Olis hired attorney Terry Yates to defend him in the federal criminal investigation and a civil investigation conducted by the SEC. Olis told Yates that Dynegy would be paying his legal fees. Dynegy's legal department orally confirmed that Dynegy would pay Olis's legal fees. Yates later filed suit against Dynegy to recover his unpaid attorney's fees, asserting claims for breach of contract and fraudulent inducement. The jury returned a verdict for Yates. At issue on appeal was whether Dynegy was entitled to judgment in its favor based on its affirmative defense of statute of frauds. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed and rendered a take-nothing judgment in favor of Dynegy, holding (1) the statute of frauds rendered the oral agreement between Dynegy and Yates unenforceable, and therefore, Yates could not recover under his breach of contract claim; and (2) Yates's claim for benefit-of-the-bargain damages pursuant to his alternative fraudulent inducement action was barred.View "Dynegy, Inc. v. Yates " on Justia Law

The City of Lorena approved a subdivision plat. The City, however, subsequently enforced a moratorium against the property, citing the municipality's additional sewage system capacity requirements. The landowner sued for a declaratory judgment that the moratorium did not apply against its approved development and for damages, alleging a regulatory taking under an inverse condemnation claim. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the City. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the moratorium could not apply to the property because the property had been approved for development before the moratorium took effect. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the moratorium did not apply to the property because the City approved the property for subdivision before it enacted the moratorium; and (2) in regards to the inverse condemnation claim, the trial court needed to resolve factual disputes before the merits of the takings claim could be judicially addressed. Remanded.View "City of Lorena v. BMTP Holdings, LP" on Justia Law

An Insured obtained an insurance policy to reimburse its expenses in regaining control of an oil well in the event the well blew out. The well subsequently blew out and caught fire. The Insured represented to the Insurer that it owed 100 percent working interest in the well, andthe Insurer paid claims accordingly. After the Insurer discovered that the Insured might have possessed less than 100 percent working interest in the well, the Insurer filed a lawsuit for a return of its payments under breach of contract and equity claims. The court of appeals entered summary judgment in favor of the Insurer on its equity claims, but a different court of appeals overturned the prior rulings, concluding that the Insurer had no equitable right to reimbursement. The Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeals that the Insurer could not proceed on its equity claims but for different reasons, holding that because the insurance contract addressed the Insured’s conduct, the Insurer could not rely on its equity claims. Remanded to the court of appeals to address the contract claims. View "Gotham Ins. Co. v. Warren E&P, Inc." on Justia Law

TXU Portfolio Management Company (TXU) entered into a contract with FPL Energy, LLC to receive electricity and renewable energy credits (RECs) from wind farms owned by FPL. After FPL failed to provide the electricity and RECs, TXU filed a breach of contract action against FPL. FPL counterclaimed, arguing that TXU failed to provide it with sufficient transmission capacity. The trial court granted two partial summary judgments declaring (1) the contracts required TXU to provide transmission capacity, and (2) the contracts’ liquidated damages provisions were unenforceable. After a jury trial on the remaining issues, the trial court entered take-nothing judgments for both parties. The court of appeals reversed both summary judgment rulings. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the court of appeals’ holding that TXU owed no contractual duty to provide transmission capacity; but (2) reversed the portion of the court of appeals’ judgment regarding liquidated damages, holding that the liquidated damages provisions applied only to RECs and were unenforceable as a penalty. Remanded for a determination of damages. View "FPL Energy, LLC v. TXU Portfolio Mgmt. Co., L.P." on Justia Law

Mike Richey sold his interest in Richey Oilfield Construction, Inc. to Nighthawk Oilfield Services, Ltd. Richey remained employed as president of Richey Oil and became a limited partner in Nighthawk. The primary agreements regarding the transaction were a stock purchase agreement, an agreement for the purchase of Richey Oil’s goodwill, and a promissory note. Each of the acquisition agreements contained a forum selection clause naming Tarrant County as the venue for state court actions. When the business did not go as well as the parties had hoped, Richey filed suit in Wise County, where Richey resided, against two Nighthawk executives (together, Relators) for, among other claims, breach of fiduciary duty, common law fraud, statutory fraud, and violations of the Texas Securities Act. Relators responded by unsuccessfully moving the trial court to transfer venue to Tarrant County or dismiss the suit pursuant to the mandatory venue selection clauses in the acquisition agreements. Relators subsequently sought mandamus relief. The Supreme Court conditionally granted relief, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to enforce the forum selection clauses in the acquisition agreements. View "In re Fisher" on Justia Law

A commercial tenant (Tenant) remained in possession of property for over ten years after Tenant lost its lease when the property was sold through foreclosure. The new owner (Owner) continually insisted that Tenant vacate the premises, and Tenant ultimately conceded that it had become a tenant at sufferance. Owner filed suit against Tenant, alleging claims for breach of the terminated lease, for trespass and other torts, and for violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act (DTPA). The trial court entered summary judgment for Tenant on all claims. The court of appeals reversed and remanded in part. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding (1) a tenant at sufferance cannot be liable for breach of a previously terminated lease agreement; (2) a tenant at sufferance is trespassing and can be liable in tort, including tortious interference with prospective business relations; (3) Tenant in this case could not be liable under the DTPA; and (4) Owner in this case could not recover attorney’s fees under the Texas Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act. View "Coinmach Corp. v. Aspenwood Apartment Corp." on Justia Law

The trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights to her daughter and appointed as sole managing conservator the Department of Family and Protective Services. Mother appealed, contending that the evidence was insufficient to establish removal for “abuse or neglect” of her daughter under Tex. Fam. Code Ann. 262 and to terminate her parental rights in the child’s best interest. The court of appeals (1) upheld the Department’s appointment as sole managing conservator, but (2) reversed the termination judgment, holding that the evidence was legally insufficient to establish that the child was removed for “abuse or neglect” under chapter 262. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, in light of the Court’s recent decision in In re E.C.R., the child in this case was removed for abuse or neglect under chapter 262. Remanded. View "In re K.N.D." on Justia Law