Justia Texas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A commercial tenant (Tenant) remained in possession of property for over ten years after Tenant lost its lease when the property was sold through foreclosure. The new owner (Owner) continually insisted that Tenant vacate the premises, and Tenant ultimately conceded that it had become a tenant at sufferance. Owner filed suit against Tenant, alleging claims for breach of the terminated lease, for trespass and other torts, and for violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act (DTPA). The trial court entered summary judgment for Tenant on all claims. The court of appeals reversed and remanded in part. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding (1) a tenant at sufferance cannot be liable for breach of a previously terminated lease agreement; (2) a tenant at sufferance is trespassing and can be liable in tort, including tortious interference with prospective business relations; (3) Tenant in this case could not be liable under the DTPA; and (4) Owner in this case could not recover attorney’s fees under the Texas Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act. View "Coinmach Corp. v. Aspenwood Apartment Corp." on Justia Law

The trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights to her daughter and appointed as sole managing conservator the Department of Family and Protective Services. Mother appealed, contending that the evidence was insufficient to establish removal for “abuse or neglect” of her daughter under Tex. Fam. Code Ann. 262 and to terminate her parental rights in the child’s best interest. The court of appeals (1) upheld the Department’s appointment as sole managing conservator, but (2) reversed the termination judgment, holding that the evidence was legally insufficient to establish that the child was removed for “abuse or neglect” under chapter 262. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, in light of the Court’s recent decision in In re E.C.R., the child in this case was removed for abuse or neglect under chapter 262. Remanded. View "In re K.N.D." on Justia Law

CenterPoint Energy Resources Corporation, a gas utility that distributes natural gas, sought to raise its rates. CenterPoint’s proposed rate schedule included a “cost of service adjustment” (COSA) clause. The Railroad Commission of Texas approved a rate increase, including a revised COSA clause that provided for automatic annual adjustments based on increases or decreases in CenterPoint’s cost of service. On judicial review, the district court held that the Commission lacked the statutory authority to adopt the COSA clause as part of CenterPoint’s rate schedule. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission had the authority to enter the final order in this case, including the COSA clause. Remanded. View "Tex. Coast Utils. Coal. v. R.R. Comm’n of Tex." on Justia Law

A Foundation, a nonprofit corporation, completely controlled an LLC, which owned and controlled a LP, which owned apartments. The Foundation was a community housing development organization (CHDO), but the LLC and LP were not. The day the LLC acquired the LP, it applied for a tax exemption under Tex. Tax Code Ann. 11.182, which provides exemptions for properties that a CHDO owns. The Galveston Central Appraisal District denied the exemption because the LLC did not own the property. The Foundation and the LP then sued for a declaration that they were entitled to the exemption. The trial court granted summary judgment for the District. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that a CHDO’s equitable ownership of property qualifies for an exemption under section 11.182(b) and that Plaintiffs’ application for an exemption was timely. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) under AHF-Arbors at Huntsville I, LLC v. Walker County Appraisal District, equitable title to property was sufficient for the CHDO in this case to qualify for the tax exemption under section 11.182; and (2) The Foundation’s application was timely. View "Galveston Cent. Appraisal Dist. v. TRQ Captain’s Landing" on Justia Law

Ewing Construction Company entered into a contract with a school district to serve as general contractor on a project. The school district later filed suit against Ewing for faulty construction. Ewing tendered defense of the underlying suit to Amerisure Insurance Company, Ewing's insurer under a commercial package policy that included commercial general liability coverage. Amerisure denied coverage, and Ewing filed suit in federal district court seeking a declaration that Amerisure breached its duty to defend and indemnify Ewing for damages awarded in the underlying suit. The district court granted summary judgment for Amerisure, concluding that the policy’s contractual liability exclusion applied to exclude coverage because Ewing assumed liability for its own construction work pursuant to the contract such that it would be liable for damages arising out of its defective work. On appeal, the court of appeals certified questions to the Texas Supreme Court, which answered that “a general contractor that enters into a contract in which it agrees to perform its construction work in a good and workmanlike manner, without more specific provisions enlarging this obligation, does not ‘assume liability’ for damages arising out of the contractor’s defective work so as to trigger the contractual liability exclusion.” View "Ewing Constr. Co., Inc. v. Amerisure Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Respondent, a principal at a school in the Yesleta Independent School District (ISD), reported various "asbestos hazards" in the school to certain school officials. Eventually, the ISD indefinitely suspended Respondent. Respondent filed this whistleblower claim, alleging that the ISD violated the Asbestos Hazard Emergency Response Act (Act) by failing to respond to his asbestos reports. In so claiming, Respondent submitted no evidence showing that the ISD enforced the Act beyond its own internal compliance or that he reported the allegations to anyone other than school officials. The trial court denied the ISD's plea to the jurisdiction, concluding that Respondent produced sufficient evidence of his good faith belief that the ISD's superintendent and trustees were authorized to regulate under or enforce the Act. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and granted the plea to the jurisdiction, holding that a report to personnel whose only power is to oversee compliance within the entity itself is not enough to confer "law-enforcement authority" status. View "Ysleta Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Franco" on Justia Law

Mother and Father divorced pursuant to a decree that named Mother as the parent with the exclusive right to designate the parties' children's primary residence and ordered Father to pay child support. Three years later, Father sought to modify the decree by requesting that the trial court name him as the parent with the exclusive right to designate the children's primary residence. Mother filed a countersuit requesting that the court increase Father's monthly child support obligation and reduce Father's periods of possession. The trial court denied Father's requests for modification and granted relief to Mother. Additionally, the trial court ordered Father to pay Mother's attorneys' fees as additional child support. The court of appeals affirmed in part, concluding that the Family Code grants trial courts authority to order a parent to pay attorney's fees for legal services benefitting the children as additional child support in non-enforcement modification suits. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court lacked the discretion to characterize Mother's attorney's fees as necessaries and as part of Father's child support obligation. View "Tucker v. Thomas" on Justia Law

A commercial tenant remained in possession of premises for six years after it lost its lease when the property was sold through foreclosure. The tenant ultimately conceded that the foreclosure terminated the lease and the tenant became a tenant at sufferance. The property owner sued the tenant for breach of the terminated lease, trespass and other torts, and violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act (DTPA). The trial court granted summary judgment for the tenant on all claims. The court of appeals reversed and remanded in part. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a tenant at sufferance cannot be liable for breach of the previously-terminated lease agreement; (2) a tenant at sufferance is a trespasser and can be liable in tort, including, in this case, tortious interference with prospective business relations; (3) the tenant here was not liable under the DTPA because the property owner was not a consumer; and (4) the owner in this case could not recover under the attorney's fees under the Texas Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act. Remanded. View "Coinmach Corp. v. Aspenwood Apartment Corp." on Justia Law

Defendant was a public nonprofit organization that provided mental health care to county residents. Plaintiff was a patient who sued Defendant after being struck by a falling whiteboard. Defendant pled immunity under the Texas Tort Claims Act, arguing that Plaintiff's alleged injury did not arise from Defendant's "use" of personal property. The trial court denied Defendant's plea. Defendant appealed, arguing for the first time that the property's "condition" did not cause the accident. The court of appeals declined to consider this argument because Defendant had not originally asserted it in the trial court. The court of appeals then affirmed the judgment of the trial court, thus rejecting Defendant's arguments that Plaintiff's pleadings failed to demonstrate a waiver of Defendant's immunity. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) pursuant to Rusk State Hospital v. Black, the appellate court should have considered all of Defendant's immunity arguments; and (2) the patient's alleged injuries were not caused by the "use" of the whiteboard, and the court of appeals erred to the extent it held otherwise. Remanded. View "Dallas Metrocare Servs. v. Juarez" on Justia Law

Respondent, a firefighter for the Houston Fire Department, suffered an on-the-job injury in 1988. The City of Houston and Respondent entered into a settlement agreement under which Respondent would receive lifetime medical expenses in exchange for releasing the City from any further claims derived from the injury. In 2004, the City stopped paying for many of Respondent's medical expenses, concluding they were not reasonable or necessary. A jury found for Respondent and awarded him $127,500 in damages. The City petitioned for the Supreme Court's review, arguing (1) the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case because Respondent did not exhaust his administrative remedies as required by statute; and (2) governmental immunity shielded the City from suit. The Supreme Court reversed and dismissed Respondent's action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that Respondent failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as required by statute, and therefore, the trial court was divested of jurisdiction. View "City of Houston v. Rhule" on Justia Law