Justia Texas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After Plaintiff purchased a used yacht, the yacht’s starboard engine failed beyond repair. Plaintiff sued Defendant-manufacturer, alleging several causes of action, including breach of the implied warranty of merchantability. The jury found Defendant liable only on the implied warranty claim. The trial court granted Defendant’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict because Plaintiff was a subsequent purchaser of the used yacht and because Defendant disclaimed any implied warranty at the time of the first sale. The court of appeals reversed, holding that someone who knowingly buys used goods may still rely on an implied warranty from the manufacturer to the original buyer since the warranty passes with the goods. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant could not rely on its purported express disclaimer of implied warranties issued at the first sale because it did not properly raise that defense in the trial court; (2) an implied warranty of merchantability, unless properly disclaimed, passes to subsequent buyers; and (3) therefore, Plaintiff was entitled to recover on his implied-warranty claim. View "MAN Engines & Components, Inc. v. Shows" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed an action in state court against Respondent, a county sheriff’s deputy, arising from an incident in which Petitioner was arrested at her home. Petitioner subsequently filed an action in federal court arising out of the same incident against the county and the former county sheriff. The two cases were consolidated in federal court. The federal court dismissed the federal claims against the county and the sheriff and then remanded the tort claims against Respondent. The trial court denied Respondent's motion for summary judgment. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Petitioner’s suit against the county in federal court entitled Respondent to dismissal under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 101.106(a). The Supreme Court affirmed but for different reasons, holding that Petitioner’s claims against Respondent should have been dismissed under subsection (f) of the Texas Tort Claims Act’s election-of-remedies provision. View "Stinson v. Fontenot" on Justia Law

Petitioners and Respondent entered into an agreement. The parties later disputed whether their agreement required Petitioners to indemnify Respondent for breaching certain representations and warranties in the agreement. The parties proceeded to arbitration, and the arbitrators selected Respondent’s $125 million settlement award. Petitioners moved to vacate the award, asserting that one of the arbitrators was neither impartial nor free from bias. After a hearing, the trial court granted Petitioners’ motion, concluding that the arbitrator did not disclose information that might yield a reasonable impression that the arbitrator was not impartial. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Petitioners waived their evident partiality claim by failing to object or inquire further when the disclosures occurred. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals’ judgment and reinstated the trial court’s order vacating the award and requiring a new arbitration, holding (1) the arbitrator’s failure to disclose the information that might yield a reasonable impression of the arbitrator’s partiality to an objective observer constituted evident partiality; and (2) Petitioners did not waive their partiality challenge. View "Tenaska Energy, LLC v. Ponderosa Pine Energy, LLC" on Justia Law

Two Patients were injured in a car accident with Third-Party. Patients were treated at Hospital, and to secure payment, Hospital filed hospital liens under the Hospital Lien Statute. Patients settled with Third-Party and released their claims against him. Third-party’s Insurer made the settlement checks jointly payable to Patients and Hospital. Patients deposited the checks without Hospital’s endorsement, and Hospital was never reimbursed for the treatment costs. Hospital sued Insurer to enforce its hospital liens, but Insurer refused payment, contending that it met its obligation to pay Hospital under the Hospital Lien Statute by making the checks payable to Hospital as a copayee. The trial court granted summary judgment for Insurer, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Hospital’s charges were not “paid” under the Hospital Lien Statute and Uniform Commercial Code; and (2) Hospital’s liens on Patients’ causes of action remained intact. View "McAllen Hosps., LP v. State Farm County Mut. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The Gobellans retained Law Firm to defend them and bring suit. Associate was assigned to the case. Associate later left Law Firm and took several clients, including Gobellans, with him. Law Firm sued Associate over client contingency fees, and later settled. Law Firm also sued Gobellans, and moved to compel the dispute to arbitration pursuant to an arbitration clause in the contingency fee agreement between Law Firm and Gobellans. The trial court and court of appeals denied Law Firm’s motion to compel arbitration, concluding that because Law Firm had litigated the fee issue with Associate, it waived its right to arbitrate claims stemming from its fee agreement with Gobellans. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because Law Firm’s litigation conduct involved suing Associate, with whom it had no arbitration agreement, and filing limited pleadings against Gobellans, the conduct did not substantially invoke the litigation process against Gobellans or prejudice them; and (2) thus, Law Firm did not waive its right to arbitrate its dispute with Gobellans. View "Hodges, LLP v. Gobellan" on Justia Law

In 2008, the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (DFPS) filed suit to terminate Father’s parental rights to his two children. Two trials resulted in the termination of Father’s parental rights. In both cases, the court of appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial on the grounds that there was factually insufficient evidence of endangerment. DFPS and intervenors filed motions for en banc reconsideration. The court of appeals granted the motion and affirmed the termination of Father’s parental rights, finding the evidence of endangerment factually sufficient to support termination. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals, in affirming the termination, adhered to the proper standard for conducting a factual sufficiency review. View "In re A.B." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, the recipients of a home equity loan, reached two loan modification agreements with Defendant, which reduced the interest rate and payments. Plaintiffs subsequently brought this class action against Defendant in the United States District Court, alleging that the loan modifications violated Tex. Const. art. XVI, 50, which sets forth requirements for a new home equity loan. The district court dismissed the case for failure to state a cause of action. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals asked the Supreme Court whether the requirements of Article XVI, Section 50 apply to the type of loan restructuring in this case. The Supreme Court answered that, as long as the original note is not satisfied and replaced, and there is no additional extension of credit, the Constitution does not prohibit the restructuring of a home equity loan that already meets its requirements in order to avoid foreclosure. View "Sims v. Carrington Mortgage Servs., LLC" on Justia Law

Waste Management of Texas, Inc. (“WMT”) and Texas Disposal Systems Landfill, Inc. (“TDS”) competed for waste-disposal and landfill-services contracts with two Texas cities. During the bidding process, WMT anonymously published a community “Action Alert” claiming that TDS’s landfills were less environmentally sensitive than they actually were and as compared to other area landfills. TDS sued WMT for defamation. After a second trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of TDS, awarding it $450,592 for expenses, $5 million for injury to reputation, and $20 million as exemplary damages. The trial court treated the $5 million award for injury to reputation as non-economic damages for purposes of the statutory cap on exemplary damages and rendered an exemplary damage award of approximately $1.6 million. Both parties appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) a corporation may suffer reputation damages, and such damages are non-economic in nature for purposes of the statutory cap on exemplary damages; (2) the evidence in this case was not sufficient to support the award of reputation damages; and (3) TDS was entitled to exemplary damages, but the amount must be recalculated. View "Waste Mgmt. of Tex., Inc. v. Tex. Disposal Sys. Landfill, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff and Defendant were competitors. Plaintiff sued Defendant for tortious interference with Plaintiff’s non-solicitation agreements with employees. Five days after receiving a settlement offer from Defendant, Plaintiff filed its designation of expert witnesses. After Defendant filed its own expert designations, Plaintiff sent a letter “accepting” Defendant’s settlement offer. Defendant refused to pay the previously agreed-to amount based on fraudulent inducement and failure of consideration. Plaintiff amended its pleadings to assert a breach of contract claim based on the alleged settlement agreement. The trial court granted Plaintiff’s summary judgment motion on the breach of contract claim. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that no settlement agreement existed because Plaintiff had not accepted all of the offer’s material terms. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the evidence established that Plaintiff accepted Defendant’s offer. Remanded. View "Amedisys, Inc. v. Kingwood Home Health Care, LLC" on Justia Law

Mark Fisher and Reece Boudreaux were limited partners of Nighthawk Oilfield Services, Ltd. (“Nighthawk”), which acquired Richey Oilfield Construction, Inc. (“Richey Oil”) from Mike Richey. The business did not go well, and Nighthawk and Richey Oil filed for bankruptcy. Richey sued Fisher and Boudreaux in Wise County where Richey resided, alleging claims for, inter alia, breach of fiduciary duty, common law fraud, statutory fraud and violations of the Texas Security Act. Fisher and Boudreaux responded by moving to transfer venue to Tarrant County or dismiss the suit pursuant to the mandatory venue selection clauses in the acquisition documents. The trial court denied the motions. Fisher and Boudreaux sought mandamus relief from the court of appeals, which denied relief. The Supreme Court conditionally granted relief, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to enforce the venue selection clauses in the acquisition documents. View "In re Fisher" on Justia Law