Justia Texas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Homes built with an exterior insulation and finish system (EIFS) suffer serious water damage that worsens over time. Homebuilder began a remediation program in which it offered to homeowners to remove exterior EIFS from the homes it had built and to replace it with conventional stucco. Almost all the homeowners accepted Homebuilder's offer of remediation. Homebuilder sought indemnification for the costs from its insurers (Insurers). Insurers denied coverage, preferring instead to wait until the homeowners sued. This litigation ensued. Now, only one insurer remained. The court of appeals reversed the trial court's judgment in favor of Homebuilder, finding (1) Homebuilder failed to establish its legal liability to the homeowners to trigger Insurer's coverage; and (2) Homebuilder failed to offer evidence of damages covered by the policy. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Homebuilder's settlements with the homeowners established both Insurer's legal liability for the property damages and the basis for determining the amount of loss; and (2) Insurer's policy covered Homebuilder's entire remediation costs for damaged homes. View "Lennar Corp. v. Markel Am. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The Time Cole Act (Act) entitles a person who has been wrongfully imprisoned to compensation from the State. Payments terminate, however, if, after the date the person becomes eligible for compensation, the person is convicted of a crime punishable as a felony. Michael Blair had a lengthy criminal record. Blair was first convicted in 1988. In 1993, Blair was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. In 2004, Blair pleaded guilty to four indictments of indecency with a child, for which he was given three consecutive life sentences. In 2008, the court of criminal appeals set aside Blair's murder conviction based on DNA evidence, and the State dismissed the charge. Defendant subsequently applied for compensation for having been wrongfully incarcerated from 1993 to 2004. The Comptroller denied compensation. The Supreme Court concluded that the Comptroller correctly denied Blair's claim for compensation, holding that the Act does not require payments to a felon who remains incarcerated for a conviction that occurred before he became eligible for compensation. View "In re Blair" on Justia Law

Tara and Gregory were granted a divorce on October 18, 2010 after a jury trial. On December 22, 2010, the trial court signed a second judgment. Tara filed her notice of appeal seventy-five days after the trial court's second judgment. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal as untimely. However, Tara had timely filed a motion to modify the first judgment, and the trial court's second judgment did not grant all the relief Tara requested. Tara appealed the order dismissing her appeal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals erred in dismissing the appeal because the motion to modify operated to extend the appellate timetable after the second judgment, and therefore, the notice of appeal was timely. Remanded. View "Brighton v. Koss" on Justia Law

A government contractor (HCSC) contracted with the federal government to administer two health insurance programs. HCSC incurred expenses while performing the contracts that were reimbursed by the government. After the Comptroller denied HCSC's request for a refund for some of the sales and use taxes it paid on the expenses, HCSC brought tax-refund suits, claiming the purchases it made to administer the health-insurance programs qualified for the Tax Code's sale-for-resale exemption, which grants purchasers of taxable goods and services a sales-tax exemption if they resell the items. The lower courts determined HCSC was entitled to the claimed refunds. The Supreme Court affirmed on all but one issue, holding (1) the exemption applied to HCSC's requested refunds for tangible personal property and taxable services; but (2) the exemption did not apply to HCSC's requested refunds for leases of tangible of personal property. Remanded. View "Combs v. Health Care Servs. Corp." on Justia Law

A staffing services company (Company) furnished workers for the City, including Respondent. During the course of his employment, Employee lost an arm working on a garbage truck driven by an employee of the City. Respondent sued the City and its employee (collectively, Petitioners). Petitioners filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting governmental immunity based in part on the exclusive remedy under the Texas Labor Code, which provides that recovery of workers' compensation benefits is the exclusive remedy of an employee covered by workers' compensation insurance. The trial court dismissed the case. The court of appeals reversed, holding that a fact question remained whether Respondent, who was paid by Company, was within the specific terms of the City's workers' compensation coverage. The Supreme Court reversed and dismissed the case, holding that, as a matter of law, the City provided Respondent's workers' compensation coverage, and therefore, Respondent's exclusive remedy was the compensation benefits to which he was entitled. View "City of Bellaire v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Respondents filed this health care liability action against Petitioner. The trial court awarded Respondents $9 million in actual damages and $3 million in punitive damages. The court of appeals reversed the punitive damages award. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' judgment affirmance of the actual damages award, finding that Petitioner's liability was statutorily capped. On remand, the trial court vacated the original judgment and awarded Respondents actual damages capped according to the relevant statute plus postjudgment interest calculated from the date of the remand judgment. The court of appeals reversed the remand judgment, holding that the trial court erred by vacating its original judgment and by calculating the postjudgment interest from the date of the remand judgment rather than the date of the original judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the court of appeals had jurisdiction to review the trial court's remand judgment; (2) postjudgment interest must be calculated from the date of the original judgment; and (3) the trial court's order vacating the original judgment was error, but it was not reversible error. Remanded. View "Phillips v. Bramlett" on Justia Law

The State seized thirty-seven gaming machines called "eight-liners" after the sheriff's department executed a warrant to search a game room owned by Sammy Barnes. The warrant was obtained after an investigation, which yielded information that the eight-liners were awarding players tickets they could redeem for future play on another day, referred to as non-immediate rights of replay. Barnes challenged the seizure, contending that his eight-liners were statutorily excluded from the definition of "gambling device" because the contrivances rewarded players "exclusively with noncash merchandise, prizes, toys, or novelties." The trial court ordered the eight-liners forfeited to the State. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the eight-liners fell within the exclusion to the definition of "gambling devices" because the non-immediate rights of replay could be considered "novelties" under the exclusion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that non-immediate rights of replay are not novelties, and therefore, the eight-liners did not fall within the exclusion because the distributed tickets were not redeemable exclusively for noncash merchandise, prizes, toys, or novelties. View "State v. $1,760 in U.S. Currency" on Justia Law

The family of a nursing home patient filed this action against the nursing home for, inter alia, medical negligence, negligence per se, breach of contract, and retaliation. Plaintiffs asserted the retaliation claim under the Texas Health & Safety Code, which creates a cause of action against a nursing facility that retaliates against a resident or family member who makes a complaint concerning the facility. Defendants moved to dismiss all of the claims pursuant to the Texas Medical Liability Act (TMLA) because the expert report was deficient. The trial court dismissed all of Plaintiffs' claims except for the retaliation claim, concluding that the claim was not a health care liability claim (HCLC) for which the TMLA requires a supporting expert report. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' judgment with respect to the retaliation claim, holding that because the retaliation claim was based on the same factual allegations on which one of Plaintiffs' HCLCs was based, the claim should have been dismissed for lack of a sufficient expert report. View "PM Management-Trinity NC, LLC v. Kumets" on Justia Law

When Father and Mother divorced, the divorce decree awarded Mother sole physical custody of Child and ordered Father to pay monthly child support. Years later, Mother and Father agreed Father's support obligation would cease if he voluntarily relinquished his parental rights. Father signed the necessary paperwork, but Mother's attorney never filed it in court. Nine years later, Father received notice from the Office of the Attorney General (OAG) that he had failed to comply with the child support order and owed $81,450 in arrearages. Father denied that he owed the money, claiming that Mother, and thus the OAG, was estopped from pursuing child support payments because Mother led him to believe his parental rights had been terminated years earlier. The trial court rejected Father's estoppel defense and ordered him to pay arrearages. The court of appeals reversed and instructed the trial court to conduct a hearing on Father's estoppel defense. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that estoppel is not a defense to a child support enforcement proceeding. View "Office of Attorney Gen. v. Scholer" on Justia Law

After an investigation into allegations that Doctor had self-prescribed medications, the Board placed Doctor on probation. A media outlet subsequently aired an investigative broadcast suggesting that Doctor was disciplined for operating on patients while taking drugs. Doctor and his professional association (collectively Plaintiffs) sued Media Defendants for defamation. The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendants. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that under McIlvain v. Jacobs, none of Defendant's statements were actionable as a matter of law because the media outlet accurately reported third-party allegations. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Doctor raised a genuine issue of material fact as to the truth of falsity of the broadcast with evidence that he was not disciplined for taking drugs and had never performed surgery while taking them; and (2) therefore, Defendants could could avail themselves of the truth defense. Remanded. View "Neely v. Wilson" on Justia Law