Justia Texas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

When Tyco Valves & Controls, L.P. decided to close one of its facilities located in Houston, Tyco offered certain employees retention agreements providing that, if the employees remained with the company through the facility’s closure, they would receive severance payments in the event they were not offered comparable employment with Tyco. After Tyco sold one of the production units located in the facility to another company, Plaintiffs, several former employees who had worked in that unit and been denied severance, filed a breach of contract action against Tyco. The trial court ruled in favor of the employees and awarded the severance pay. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Employee Retirement Income and Security Act of 1974 preempted Plaintiffs’ breach-of-contract claims. View "Arsenio Colorado v. Tyco Valves & Controls, L.P." on Justia Law

Decedent's family (the Kings) sued Toyota and the local Toyota dealership after Decedent lost control of his Toyota, which rolled over several times. The Kings asserted that the Toyota's allegedly defective seat belt system caused Decedent's ejection from the car and his subsequent death. The jury returned a verdict in Toyota's favor, and the trial court signed a corresponding judgment. The Kings moved for a new trial, alleging that Toyota's counsel had violated the trial court's limine rulings. The trial court granted the Kings' motion. Toyota subsequently filed an original proceeding in the Supreme Court. At issue was whether an appellate court may, in an original proceeding, determine whether the reasonably specific and legally sound rationale of the trial court for ordering a new trial was actually true. The Court conditionally granted relief, holding (1) an appellate court may conduct a merits review of the basis for a new trial order after a trial court has set aside a jury verdict, and if the record does not support the trial court's rationale for ordering a new trial, the appellate court may grant mandamus relief; and (2) in this case, the trial court abused its discretion in granting a new trial. View "In re Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc." on Justia Law

Claimant suffered a compensable injury to his right ankle in 1991 and developed reflex sympathetic dystrophy in the injured ankle. In 1997, the appeals panel determined Claimant was entitled to Lifetime Income Benefits (LIBs). The workers' compensation carrier for Claimant's employer (Insurer) did not seek judicial review of that decision. More than a decade later, Insurer sought a new contested case hearing on Claimant's continuing eligibility for LIBs. A hearing officer found that Insurer could re-open the previous LIB determination but that Claimant remained entitled to LIBs. The appeals panel affirmed. Both parties sought judicial review. The trial court granted Claimant's motion for summary judgment, concluding that the hearing officer lacked jurisdiction to re-open the previous LIB determination. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Legislature does not allow permanent benefit determinations like LIBs to be re-opened.View "Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Adcock" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a Texas company, sued nonresident Defendants in Texas. Plaintiff asserted claims for (1) trade-secret misappropriation regarding a proposed Texas venture during two meetings Defendants attended in Texas, and (2) tortious interference with Plaintiff's relationship with a California corporation. Defendants specially appeared, claiming specific personal jurisdiction over them was lacking. The trial court granted the special appearances. The court of appeals affirmed, holding (1) the location of the two Texas meetings was "merely random or fortuitous" as to Plaintiff's trade secrets claims, and (2) any alleged tortious interference that might have occurred took place in California. The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) Defendants' Texas contacts were sufficient to confer specific jurisdiction over Defendants on Plaintiff's trade secrets claim; but (2) the trial court lacked specific personal jurisdiction over Defendants as to Plaintiff's tortious interference claims. Remanded.View "Moncrief Oil Int'l Inc. v. OAO Gazprom" on Justia Law

The Fort Worth Diocese was formed in 1982 and was admitted into union with The Episcopal Church (TEC). The Fort Worth Corporation was formed the next year. After a doctrinal controversy arose within the TEC, the Forth Worth Corporation filed amendments to its articles of incorporation to remove all references to TEC. The Fort Worth Diocese then voted to withdraw from TEC. TEC later filed suit against the Fort Worth Diocese, the Fort Worth Corporation, the former Bishop, and other former TEC members (the Diocese) seeking possession of the property held in the name of the Diocese and the Fort Worth Corporation. The parties disagreed whether the "deference" or "neutral principles of law" methodology should be applied to resolve the property issue. The trial court agreed with TEC that deference principles should apply, and after applying deference principles, granted summary judgment for TEC. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) based on the Court's decision in Masterson v. Diocese of Northwest Texas, the trial court erred by granting summary judgment to TEC on the basis of deference principles; and (2) the case must be remanded for further proceedings under neutral principles. Remanded.View "Episcopal Diocese of Fort Worth v. Episcopal Church" on Justia Law

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 101.106 bars a suit against a governmental unit after a plaintiff sues the unit's employee regarding the same subject matter. However, if the employee is sued for acts conducted within the general scope of employment, and suit could have been brought under the Texas Tort Claims Act (TTCA), then the suit is considered filed against the governmental unit. Plaintiff sued an employee (Employee) of the Texas Adjutant General's Office (TAGO). Employee filed a motion to dismiss himself pursuant to section 101.106(f). Plaintiff then filed an amended petition adding TAGO as a defendant and alleging that TAGO's sovereign immunity was waived under the TTCA. The trial court denied Employee's motion to dismiss. Thereafter, TAGO unsuccessfully filed a plea to the jurisdiction and motion to dismiss. The court of appeals reversed the denial of Employee's motion to dismiss but affirmed the denial of TAGO's plea to the jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Employee was entitled to dismissal because the suit against him arose from conduct within his general scope of employment; and (2) the suit against TAGO should proceed because Plaintiff was entitled to, and did, amend his pleadings to assert a TTCA claim against the government.View "Tex. Adjutant General's Office v. Ngakoue" on Justia Law

Reginald Lane, individually and as personal representative of Decedent's estate, filed suit under the Texas Medical Liability Act (TMLA) against anesthesiologist Michael Zanchi, alleging negligence. Zanchi was not served with process until September 16. In the meantime, Lane mailed the expert report to Zanchi on August 19. Zanchi filed a motion to dismiss for failure to timely serve an expert report as required by Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 74.351(a), arguing that he was not a "party" to Lane's suit until he was served with process. The trial court denied the motion, and the court of appeals affirmed, holding that one is a "party" if so named in a pleading, whether or not one has been served with process. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the term "party" in section 74.351(a) means one named in a lawsuit; (2) therefore, a claimant asserting a health care liability claim complies with section 74.351(a) by serving the report on a defendant who has not yet been served with process; and (3) "service" of an expert report on such a defendant need not comport with the service requirements of Tex. R. Civ. P. 106 that apply specifically to service of citation.View "Zanchi v. Lane" on Justia Law

Title to property of a local church (the Good Shepherd) was held by a Texas non-profit corporation (Corporation). The Corporation was formed as a condition of Good Shepherd's congregation being accepted into union with the Episcopal Diocese of Northwest Texas (Diocese). After members of Good Shepherd's parishioners began to disagree with doctrinal positions adopted by The Episcopal Church of the United States (TEC), a majority of the congregation voted to amend Good Shepherd's articles of incorporation and bylaws to withdraw God Shepherd from communion with TEC and the Diocese. The Corporation and the withdrawing faction maintained possession of the property. The Diocese and leaders of the portion of the congregation loyal to TEC and the Diocese filed suit seeking possession of the property. The trial court granted summary judgment for the loyal faction, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the legal methodology called "neutral principles of law," rather than "deference," should be applied in this case; and (2) applying neutral principles of law to the record, the trial court erred by granting summary judgment. Remanded.View "Masterson v. Diocese of Northwest Texas" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was working for a BP Amoco Chemical Company (BP) contractor in 2005 when BP's Texas City refinery exploded, killing fifteen workers and injuring many others. Plaintiff signed a power of attorney retaining William Wells to represent him on any claims he had against BP arising from the explosion. In order to increase the settlement in this and three other cases, Wells associated Ronald and Kevin Krist and the Krist Law Firm as additional counsel. After a settlement was obtained, Plaintiff and his wife brought this suit against Wells, the Krists, and the Krist Law Firm (collectively, Attorneys), claiming that the Attorneys failed to obtain an adequate settlement for both plaintiffs. The trial court granted summary judgment for the Attorneys, and the court of appeals affirmed, finding that Plaintiffs had not presented competent evidence of damages. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) an affidavit did not raise a genuine issue of material fact on malpractice damages; (2) discovery disputes in the trial court did not warrant denial of summary judgment on the issue of damages; and (3) the lay testimony of Plaintiffs did not raise a genuine issue of material fact on malpractice damages.View "Elizondo v. Krist" on Justia Law

Joel Martinez died after ingesting heroin with Defendant. Plaintiff, individually and as representative of Martinez's estate, sued Defendant under wrongful death and survival statutes, alleging that Defendant was negligent in failing to call 911 immediately and in failing to disclose Martinez's heroin use to the paramedics. Defendant asserted an affirmative defense based on the common law unlawful acts doctrine, under which a plaintiff cannot recover damages if it can be shown that, at the time of the injury, the plaintiff was engaged in an illegal act that contributed to the injury. The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendant based on the unlawful acts doctrine. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the common law unlawful acts doctrine is not available as an affirmative defense in personal injury and wrongful death cases, as, like other common law assumption-of-the-risk defenses, it was abrogated by Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 33's proportionate responsibility scheme; and (2) therefore, a plaintiff's illegal conduct not falling within the affirmative defense in Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 93.001 must be apportioned rather than barring recovery completely. Remanded. View "Dugger v. Arredondo" on Justia Law