Justia Texas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed this action against Defendants for negligence based on an undertaking theory and for premises liability after he suffered personal injuries at a party at Defendants' residence. The trial court rendered summary judgment for Defendants as to Plaintiff's negligence claim. The court of appeals reversed, finding that summary judgment was improper because Defendants' summary judgment motion only addressed social host liability and failed to address the negligent-undertaking theory. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendants' summary judgment motion specifically addressed Plaintiff's negligent-undertaking claim by arguing that Graff v. Beard forecloses the assumption of any duty, i.e., an undertaking, by a social host under the facts of this case. View "Nall v. Plunkett" on Justia Law

Three retired fire fighters (Respondents) previously employed by the Houston Fire Department (HFD) sued the City of Houston to recover allegedly unauthorized deductions from their termination pay upon retirement. Specifically, Respondents asserted (1) the City wrongfully deducted pay for overtime hours that the HFD required fire rights to work after the implementation of a new shift schedule; and (2) the City incorrectly calculated each fire fighter's salary for purposes of paying termination pay upon their retirement. The trial court found in favor of Respondents on both claims and awarded two of Respondents reimbursement for overtime pay and all Respondents additional termination pay for accrued and unused sick and vacation leave. The Supreme Court (1) reversed as to the first claim related to the overtime pay, holding that the two Respondents were not entitled to receive reimbursement for overtime pay; and (2) affirmed as to the second claim related to additional termination pay, holding that all Respondents were entitled to recover additional termination pay. View "City of Houston v. Bates " on Justia Law

Plaintiff owed the surface estate of a forty-acre tract. Defendant, the lessee of the tract's severed mineral estate, constructed a well site on Plaintiff's tract without Plaintiff's approval. Plaintiff filed suit seeking an injunction requiring Defendant to remove the well, asserting that Defendant failed to accommodate his existing use of the surface so Defendant's acts exceeded its rights in the mineral estate and constituted a trespass. The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendant, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, even assuming that the failure of Defendant's operations to accommodate Defendant's existing use would have been sufficient to support injunctive relief, Plaintiff failed to raise a material fact issue as to whether Defendant failed to accommodate his use. View "Merriman v. XTO Energy, Inc." on Justia Law

A 2003 amendment to the Texas Constitution allowed the Legislature to delegate to a state agency the power to interpret certain provisions of the Constitution governing home equity lending. The state agency quickly issued final interpretations of the aforementioned provisions of the Constitution. Six homeowners then brought this action against the agency, challenging several of the interpretations. A bankers association intervened. The trial court invalidated many of the interpretations. The court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the agency's interpretations of the provisions of the Constitution governing home equity lending were subject to judicial review; (2) the homeowners had standing to assert their claims; and (3) of the three interpretations at issue in this appeal, one was valid and two were invalid. View "Fin. Comm'n of Tex. v. Norwood" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, as next friends of their daughter (Daughter) sued Hospital for injuries sustained by Daughter following her premature birth. One hundred and sixteen days after filing their original petition, Plaintiffs nonsuited their claim. Plaintiffs later filed a new lawsuit against Hospital and other health care providers and served an expert report on Hospital. Hospital objected to the report as untimely and moved to dismiss the claim against it. The trial court overruled the objection and denied the motion to dismiss. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that Plaintiffs timely served their expert report. At issue on appeal was the Texas Medical Liability Act's (TMLA) expert-report requirement, which requires a claimant to serve an expert report on health care providers against whom the claim is asserted 120 days after the original petition is filed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a claimant's nonsuit of a health care liability claim before the expiration of the 120-day period tolls the expert-report period until suit is refiled. View "CHCA Woman's Hosp., LP v. Lidji" on Justia Law

This suit was filed as a putative class action on behalf of Texas royalty owners alleging that Phillips Petroleum Company underpaid oil and gas royalties. The trial court certified three subclasses of royalty owners. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed as to two of the subclasses but reversed as to the third subclass, which alleged breach of a uniform express royalty provision contained in gas royalty agreements that amended the class members' leases. On remand, Respondent, class representative of the remaining subclass, amended her petition to add a claim for breach of the implied covenant to market. Phillips unsuccessfully filed various motions contending that there was no class claim for breach of the implied covenant to market. The court of appeals dismissed Phillips' interlocutory appeal for lack of jurisdiction and denied Phillips' petition for writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the court of appeals erred in dismissing the interlocutory appeal for lack of jurisdiction; and (2) the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the addition of a class claim for breach of the implied covenant to market without requiring Respondent to file an amended motion for class certification or holding a certification hearing. View "Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Yarbrough" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a professor at the University of Houston, sued the University under the Texas Whistleblower Act. Plaintiff alleged that the University retaliated against him for reporting that his supervisor violated state civil and criminal law and internal administrative policies located in the University's System administrative Memorandum (SAM). The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Plaintiff. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claim because the SAM's administrative policies constitute "law" under the Whistleblower Act. The Supreme Court reversed and dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, holding (1) the SAM's administrative rules do not fall within the definition of "law" under the Whistleblower Act because there is no evidence the University's Board of Regents enacted the SAM's administrative rules pursuant to authority granted to it in the Texas Education Code; (2) there was no evidence that Plaintiff had an objectively reasonable belief that his reports of the alleged violations of state civil and criminal law were made to an appropriate law enforcement authority; and (3) therefore, the University's sovereign immunity was not waived in this case. View "Univ. of Houston v. Barth" on Justia Law

Mother was seen punching and dragging her four-year-old daughter (Daughter) by her ponytail down the street. Mother's eight-month-old son (Son) was not present during the incident. The police arrested Mother, who later pleaded guilty to bodily injury to a child. The Department of Family and Protective Services took possession of Son under Tex. Fam. Code Ann. 262.104 because he faced a "continuing danger to his physical health or safety" if returned to Mother. Later, the trial court terminated Mother's parental rights to Son under Tex. Fam. Code Ann. 161.001(1). The court of appeals reversed, holding (1) for a trial court to terminate parental rights under section 161.001(1)(O), it must find the child who was the subject of the suit was removed as a result of the abuse or neglect of that specific child; and (2) Mother's abuse of Daughter was not evidence that Mother abused or neglected Son. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that abuse or neglect includes placing the child's physical health or safety at substantial risk, and the parent's abuse or neglect of another child is relevant to that determination. Remanded. View "In re Interest of E.C.R." on Justia Law

Law Firm sued Client for breach of contract, alleging that Client failed to pay its legal fees. A jury found that Client breached the agreement and awarded Law Firm damages, $150,000 as reasonable attorney's fees, and pre- and post-judgment interest. To suspend enforcement of the judgment pending appeal, Client deposited a cashier's check with the trial court, including the breach of contract damages and pre- and post-judgment interest. The trial court subsequently ordered Client to supplement the deposit to cover the attorney's fees award. The court of appeals denied Client appellate relief, concluding that attorney's fees are both compensatory damages and costs for the purpose of suspending enforcement of a judgment. The Supreme Court conditionally granted Client mandamus relief, holding that attorney's fees are neither compensatory damages nor costs for purposes of suspending enforcement of a money judgment, and directed the trial court to vacate its order and refund and monies overpaid by Client. View "In re Nalle Plastics Family Ltd. P'ship" on Justia Law

In a letter sent to colleagues and others, Defendant, a physician, accused a fellow physician, Plaintiff, of lacking veracity and speaking in half truths. The trial court granted a directed verdict that the letter was defamatory per se. A jury awarded Plaintiff $90,000 in actual damages for mental anguish and loss of reputation and $85,000 in exemplary damages. The court of appeals affirmed the damages award. The Supreme Court reversed, rendering judgment that Plaintiff taking nothing, where (1) the statements did not defame the physician per se, and thus, the Court could not presume damages for mental anguish and loss of reputation, and consequently, Plaintiff was required to prove actual damages; (2) there was no evidence of mental anguish that rose to the level of a substantial disruption in daily routine or a high degree of mental pain and distress; (3) there was no evidence of loss of reputation because there was no indication that any recipient of the defamatory letter believed in its statements; and (4) because Plaintiff did not establish actual damages, he could not recover exemplary damages. View "Hancock v. Variyam" on Justia Law