Justia Texas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

James Olis, a former officer of Dynegy, Inc., was indicted on multiple counts of securities fraud, wire fraud, and conspiracy. Olis hired attorney Terry Yates to defend him in the federal criminal investigation and a civil investigation conducted by the SEC. Olis told Yates that Dynegy would be paying his legal fees. Dynegy's legal department orally confirmed that Dynegy would pay Olis's legal fees. Yates later filed suit against Dynegy to recover his unpaid attorney's fees, asserting claims for breach of contract and fraudulent inducement. The jury returned a verdict for Yates. At issue on appeal was whether Dynegy was entitled to judgment in its favor based on its affirmative defense of statute of frauds. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed and rendered a take-nothing judgment in favor of Dynegy, holding (1) the statute of frauds rendered the oral agreement between Dynegy and Yates unenforceable, and therefore, Yates could not recover under his breach of contract claim; and (2) Yates's claim for benefit-of-the-bargain damages pursuant to his alternative fraudulent inducement action was barred.View "Dynegy, Inc. v. Yates " on Justia Law

The City of Lorena approved a subdivision plat. The City, however, subsequently enforced a moratorium against the property, citing the municipality's additional sewage system capacity requirements. The landowner sued for a declaratory judgment that the moratorium did not apply against its approved development and for damages, alleging a regulatory taking under an inverse condemnation claim. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the City. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the moratorium could not apply to the property because the property had been approved for development before the moratorium took effect. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the moratorium did not apply to the property because the City approved the property for subdivision before it enacted the moratorium; and (2) in regards to the inverse condemnation claim, the trial court needed to resolve factual disputes before the merits of the takings claim could be judicially addressed. Remanded.View "City of Lorena v. BMTP Holdings, LP" on Justia Law

An Insured obtained an insurance policy to reimburse its expenses in regaining control of an oil well in the event the well blew out. The well subsequently blew out and caught fire. The Insured represented to the Insurer that it owed 100 percent working interest in the well, andthe Insurer paid claims accordingly. After the Insurer discovered that the Insured might have possessed less than 100 percent working interest in the well, the Insurer filed a lawsuit for a return of its payments under breach of contract and equity claims. The court of appeals entered summary judgment in favor of the Insurer on its equity claims, but a different court of appeals overturned the prior rulings, concluding that the Insurer had no equitable right to reimbursement. The Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeals that the Insurer could not proceed on its equity claims but for different reasons, holding that because the insurance contract addressed the Insured’s conduct, the Insurer could not rely on its equity claims. Remanded to the court of appeals to address the contract claims. View "Gotham Ins. Co. v. Warren E&P, Inc." on Justia Law

TXU Portfolio Management Company (TXU) entered into a contract with FPL Energy, LLC to receive electricity and renewable energy credits (RECs) from wind farms owned by FPL. After FPL failed to provide the electricity and RECs, TXU filed a breach of contract action against FPL. FPL counterclaimed, arguing that TXU failed to provide it with sufficient transmission capacity. The trial court granted two partial summary judgments declaring (1) the contracts required TXU to provide transmission capacity, and (2) the contracts’ liquidated damages provisions were unenforceable. After a jury trial on the remaining issues, the trial court entered take-nothing judgments for both parties. The court of appeals reversed both summary judgment rulings. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the court of appeals’ holding that TXU owed no contractual duty to provide transmission capacity; but (2) reversed the portion of the court of appeals’ judgment regarding liquidated damages, holding that the liquidated damages provisions applied only to RECs and were unenforceable as a penalty. Remanded for a determination of damages. View "FPL Energy, LLC v. TXU Portfolio Mgmt. Co., L.P." on Justia Law

Mike Richey sold his interest in Richey Oilfield Construction, Inc. to Nighthawk Oilfield Services, Ltd. Richey remained employed as president of Richey Oil and became a limited partner in Nighthawk. The primary agreements regarding the transaction were a stock purchase agreement, an agreement for the purchase of Richey Oil’s goodwill, and a promissory note. Each of the acquisition agreements contained a forum selection clause naming Tarrant County as the venue for state court actions. When the business did not go as well as the parties had hoped, Richey filed suit in Wise County, where Richey resided, against two Nighthawk executives (together, Relators) for, among other claims, breach of fiduciary duty, common law fraud, statutory fraud, and violations of the Texas Securities Act. Relators responded by unsuccessfully moving the trial court to transfer venue to Tarrant County or dismiss the suit pursuant to the mandatory venue selection clauses in the acquisition agreements. Relators subsequently sought mandamus relief. The Supreme Court conditionally granted relief, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to enforce the forum selection clauses in the acquisition agreements. View "In re Fisher" on Justia Law

A commercial tenant (Tenant) remained in possession of property for over ten years after Tenant lost its lease when the property was sold through foreclosure. The new owner (Owner) continually insisted that Tenant vacate the premises, and Tenant ultimately conceded that it had become a tenant at sufferance. Owner filed suit against Tenant, alleging claims for breach of the terminated lease, for trespass and other torts, and for violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act (DTPA). The trial court entered summary judgment for Tenant on all claims. The court of appeals reversed and remanded in part. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding (1) a tenant at sufferance cannot be liable for breach of a previously terminated lease agreement; (2) a tenant at sufferance is trespassing and can be liable in tort, including tortious interference with prospective business relations; (3) Tenant in this case could not be liable under the DTPA; and (4) Owner in this case could not recover attorney’s fees under the Texas Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act. View "Coinmach Corp. v. Aspenwood Apartment Corp." on Justia Law

The trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights to her daughter and appointed as sole managing conservator the Department of Family and Protective Services. Mother appealed, contending that the evidence was insufficient to establish removal for “abuse or neglect” of her daughter under Tex. Fam. Code Ann. 262 and to terminate her parental rights in the child’s best interest. The court of appeals (1) upheld the Department’s appointment as sole managing conservator, but (2) reversed the termination judgment, holding that the evidence was legally insufficient to establish that the child was removed for “abuse or neglect” under chapter 262. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, in light of the Court’s recent decision in In re E.C.R., the child in this case was removed for abuse or neglect under chapter 262. Remanded. View "In re K.N.D." on Justia Law

CenterPoint Energy Resources Corporation, a gas utility that distributes natural gas, sought to raise its rates. CenterPoint’s proposed rate schedule included a “cost of service adjustment” (COSA) clause. The Railroad Commission of Texas approved a rate increase, including a revised COSA clause that provided for automatic annual adjustments based on increases or decreases in CenterPoint’s cost of service. On judicial review, the district court held that the Commission lacked the statutory authority to adopt the COSA clause as part of CenterPoint’s rate schedule. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission had the authority to enter the final order in this case, including the COSA clause. Remanded. View "Tex. Coast Utils. Coal. v. R.R. Comm’n of Tex." on Justia Law

A Foundation, a nonprofit corporation, completely controlled an LLC, which owned and controlled a LP, which owned apartments. The Foundation was a community housing development organization (CHDO), but the LLC and LP were not. The day the LLC acquired the LP, it applied for a tax exemption under Tex. Tax Code Ann. 11.182, which provides exemptions for properties that a CHDO owns. The Galveston Central Appraisal District denied the exemption because the LLC did not own the property. The Foundation and the LP then sued for a declaration that they were entitled to the exemption. The trial court granted summary judgment for the District. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that a CHDO’s equitable ownership of property qualifies for an exemption under section 11.182(b) and that Plaintiffs’ application for an exemption was timely. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) under AHF-Arbors at Huntsville I, LLC v. Walker County Appraisal District, equitable title to property was sufficient for the CHDO in this case to qualify for the tax exemption under section 11.182; and (2) The Foundation’s application was timely. View "Galveston Cent. Appraisal Dist. v. TRQ Captain’s Landing" on Justia Law

Ewing Construction Company entered into a contract with a school district to serve as general contractor on a project. The school district later filed suit against Ewing for faulty construction. Ewing tendered defense of the underlying suit to Amerisure Insurance Company, Ewing's insurer under a commercial package policy that included commercial general liability coverage. Amerisure denied coverage, and Ewing filed suit in federal district court seeking a declaration that Amerisure breached its duty to defend and indemnify Ewing for damages awarded in the underlying suit. The district court granted summary judgment for Amerisure, concluding that the policy’s contractual liability exclusion applied to exclude coverage because Ewing assumed liability for its own construction work pursuant to the contract such that it would be liable for damages arising out of its defective work. On appeal, the court of appeals certified questions to the Texas Supreme Court, which answered that “a general contractor that enters into a contract in which it agrees to perform its construction work in a good and workmanlike manner, without more specific provisions enlarging this obligation, does not ‘assume liability’ for damages arising out of the contractor’s defective work so as to trigger the contractual liability exclusion.” View "Ewing Constr. Co., Inc. v. Amerisure Ins. Co." on Justia Law